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Reflections Inspired by My Critics

Philip Bobbitt*
The crucial idea in constitutionallaw is legitimacy; the crucial
idea in jurisprudenceis justification.
For some time, the academic debate about U.S. constitutionalism has
looked for justifications for our practices, believing this would confer
legitimacy on them. In my work, I have endeavored to derive legitimacy
from the practices themselves, reserving the task of justification for other
purposes.
By showing the way in which legitimacy is established and maintained
in a constitutional system like ours, I hoped to derive solutions to a number
of classical questions, all of which, I believe, are at bottom questions about
legitimacy and legitimation.' These questions were the principal subject
of ConstitutionalFate, although there are many views expressed there that
bear on other contemporary legal issues. At the same time, I also wished
to propose a way of understanding constitutional law that changed its

relationship to jurisprudence, as practiced nowadays, rendering some

* Baker & Botts Professor, The University of Texas School of Law and Marsh Senior Research
Fellow in War Studies, King's College, University of London. A.B. 1971, Princeton University; J.D.
1975, Yale University; Ph.D. 1983, Oxford University. I wish to thank three persons whose
criticisms have had so influential an effect on this Essay: Ms. Catherine Kemp, Mr. Scott
Williams, and Mr. J.C. Rozendaal. Although they are enrolled as students at the Law School,
it is I who have learned from them, and I think of them truly as colleagues. It is a pleasure
also to thank Professor Betty Sue Flowers, of the English Department, who made extensive
comments on an earlier draft, as well as many thoughtful readers-Professors Levinson,
Laycock, LeClereq, Markovits, and Powers-who are on the Law Faculty. Of course, none
of these persons is responsible for the errors that, despite their efforts, yet remain.
1. Examples of these problems are the dilemmas posed by the constitutional assessment of the acts
of democratically elected officials and sometimes, the reversal of those acts by an unelected judiciary,
see PHILIP Boarnr, CONSTITUTIONALFATE 243-49 (1982) [hereinafter BonrT, FATE] (rejecting the
attempt to legitimate judicial review on the grounds of any foundational political theory), by the
necessity to give content to unenumerated rigbts while remaining within a written constitution, see,
e.g., id. at 121-77 (showing how ethical argument can be used to limit the powers of government), and
by the conflict between a government acting for the people but limited by law and a sovereign people
bound by law but with unlimited control over the content of that law, see, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The
Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 459
(1994), discussed infra text accompanying notes 137-59.
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jurisprudential questions far less insistente and some largely unexplored
questions central. 3 As such, this work is also thus directed to a description of how a constitutional system is evaluated, and how our responsibilities within that system are discharged-a system that depends so greatly
on the exercise of conscience. This description, I believed, is mainly a
matter of justification, and it is the principal subject of Constitutional
Interpretation. If one believes, as I do, that justification does not assure
legitimacy, whenever one evaluates a proposed system one must ask not
only whether it is easier to justify, but also whether it will be able to
achieve and maintain legitimacy.
A large part of Constitutional Interpretation is devoted to three
constitutional cases: Missouri v. Holland,4 the confirmation hearings of
Robert Bork, and the Iran-Contra Affair. The reader is asked to work
through these problems using the techniques developed in Constitutional
Fate and recapitulated in ConstitutionalInterpretation.Because the people
of this country have an important legal role to play in constitutional law,
these exercises are meant to teach the legal methods by which constitutional
problems are addressed. And because understanding is the product of
learning how to do something, these exercises provide an instance of the
process I am claiming to be at work. The reader must judge.
Although I believe my work to be original, and would disclaim this
vanity should its ideas belong to others, I hardly think my views are
unprecedented. Indeed, I hold that our earliest American political ideas of
the state have much in common with the perspectives I present. Let me
give one construction of the ideas of my precursors and suggest that these
anticipate the separation of legitimacy and justification that is so
fundamental to my work.
It was once common to assert that our framers, Jefferson and Madison
in particular, were American acolytes to European thinkers such as Locke
and Montesquieu.5 This has led to much mischief, particularly with

2. For example, what political or ethical theory is necessary to justify a constitutional system such
as ours? See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 181 (1991) [hereinafter BOBBITT,
INTERPRETATION] (arguing that attempts to justify the legal system through political theory "never exist
outside the seminar room, in part because the values society labors to preserve are contradictory").
3. For example, what sort of people must we be to make a system such as I have described
function justly? See id. at 178-79 (arguing that one of the central implications of Constitutional
Interpretationis how we might be better educated to make more just decisions).
4. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
5. See, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY

OF POLITICAL IDEAS 27 (1922) ("Most Americans had absorbed Locke's works as a kind of political
gospel; and the Declaration [ofIndependence], in its form, in its phraseology, follows closely certain
sentences in Locke's second treatise on government."); HENRY S. COMMAGER, JEIFFER.SON,
NATIONALISM, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 84 (1975) ("[Nleither Jefferson nor the American people
invented [the] principles [contained intheDeclarationofindependence].. . . [T]hey were elaborated
by the generation of Lilburne, Cromwell, Sidney, Milton, and above all John Locke in seventeenth-
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constitutional concepts such as the separation of powers, 6 as to which
Madison's ideas may be said to be sharply opposed to those for which
Montesquieu is most known, 7 and with respect to the natural rights of
man, as to which Jefferson's opinions are erroneously said to derive from
Locke and (or) Hobbes.! When Jefferson wrote that "[A]II Men are

created equal," 9 it was once thought that he meant no more than that in the

eyes of God (for Locke), or in the eyes of the rule of law (for Hobbes), all
persons stood to be weighed by the same scales."0 Although Jefferson
may have had these ideas in mind, I think he meant something more than
this-something quite distinct-and I imagine the American relationship to
European thought to have been far less that of a client than is usually
supposed. I am inclined to believe that the framers were an authentically

American, uniquely American, and uniquely lawyerly generation of
thinkers who have as much in common with twentieth-century pragmatists
as with seventeenth-century empiricists (or rationalists)."
All men are palpably not created equal, in any practical way, being
endowed with various deficits and advantages, except in this one respect:
All may choose their moral commitments. All must choose. 2 This
right-to make a moral life-is "unalienable" because it cannot be sold or
given away. Even if the chooser is in bondage, he is independent in this

century England .... '); MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 72-78
(1978) (contending that the notions of self-evidence and equality contained in Jefferson's draft of the
Declaration of Independence reflect strong commitments to Lockean rationalism).
6. See Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility:
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1373-74 (1994)
[hereinafter Bobbitt, War Powers] (noting that many commentators on war powers mistakenly assert
that the power to declare war is either exclusively Congress's or exclusively the Executive's).
7. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(arguing that all three branches of government must be "blended and connected" in order to prevent
the abuse of power in one of the branches) with MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (Yale University Press 1962) (1913) ("Montesquieu, whose writings
were taken as political gospel, had shown the absolute necessity of separating the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers.').
8. See GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE212
(1978) (arguing that while "Locke said man automatically and infallibly pursues pleasure," Jefferson's
moral theory grew out of the Scottish Enlightenment's less cynical view that one's moral sense
necessarily leads him to pursue the good of others); id. at 203-04 (distinguishing Jefferson's espousal
of the natural benevolence of all moral agents from Hobbes's theory that self-love governs all action).
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCEpara. 2 (U.S. 1776).
10. See, e.g., EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCEAND WHAT IT MEANS
TODAY 56-58 (1950) (tracing Jefferson's idea of equality to Locke and arguing that in the phrase "all
Men are created equal," Jefferson meant that all men are equal under the law of nature).
II. For a sympathetic point, see I BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3-6,
32-33 (1991).
12. I should note here that Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration read, "equal and
independent." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ROUGH DRAUGHT para. 2 (U.S. 1776),
reprintedin JOHN H. HAZELTON, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: ITS HISTORY 145-46 (1970).
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respect. From this view flows the separation of church and state,"3 the
resolute refusal to give to the government power over the intimate rights
of individuals, 14 and the crucial role of conscience in our constitutional

system.

15

Moreover, some of my claims are philosophical in nature, and so, in
addition to having precursors, can naturally be placed in the philosophical
period in which I have lived. Thus, Constitutional Fate asks, "What
legitimates judicial review?" and proposes an antifoundationalist answer.
That is, I located legitimation in a particular practice, rather than in a

prior, external rationale.1 6

Constitutional Interpretation asks, "What

makes the system of constitutional decisonmaking just?" The answer I
offered was an antirepresentationalist one. Treating the issue as one in
which "just" is a judgment of the system as a whole, I argued that the
American system permits acts of conscience to be decisive, instead of
determining that particular outcomes are just when correlated with the
outcome hypothesized by a theory of justice.17 When I began writing

ConstitutionalInterpretation,constitutional criticism (and jurisprudence)
reflected the universalist ideals of empiricism and scarcely questioned the

premises of autonomous human reason (if only on the part of the analyst),
which were taken as unproblematic, indeed axiomatic. 8 Since then,
many movements have sprung up in the law schools that renounce such an
epistemology, especially the hermeneuticist and the communitarian movements. I will say here only that there are many nonfoundationalist,

nonrepresentationalist accounts one might give, and that these accounts may
differ sharply, especially as to their prescriptive character.

13. Which would hardly have commanded the assent of Locke. See JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JOHN LOcKE 266 (1969) ("Rational action [for Locke] was tied logically to the strenuous
discharge of a series of duties to God. Hence the disappearance of this framework of religious belief
would dissolve the concrete structure of rational human action.").
14. Which would have seemed absurd to Hobbes. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 115 (Ernest
Rhys ed., 1940) (arguing that while a sovereign cannot prevent a person from feeding or protecting
himself, other liberties are at the whim of the sovereign). On the issue of the protection of intimate
rights of individuals, see BoBBiTT, FATE, supra note 1, at 159-60.
15. Which plays no significant legal role in the European political theory of complete sovereigns.
See Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1309 (1989) [hereinafter Bobbitt, Is Law
Politics?] (ascribing the American adherence to conscience to the liberal tradition of the Constitution).
On the role of conscience in our system, see BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 168, 184-85;

BoBBHIr, FATE, supra note I, at 169-75.
16. BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 1, at 237-40.'
17. BOBBIT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 170.
18. Cf. John Gray, Why the Owl Flies Late: The InadequaciesofAcademic Liberalism, TIMES
LITERARY SuPPLEmENT, Oct. 15, 1993, at 10, 11 (criticizing Western political philosophy for its
methods "of subjecting all human institutions to a rational criticism and of convergence on a universal
civilization whose foundation is autonomoushuman reason-[methods] that are taken as unproblematic,
even axiomatic").
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The account I chose originated in these questions: How do we determine a proposition of constitutional law to be true? Are statements of
law propositions about the world as, for example, statements in science are
propositions about the world? My way of dealing with these questions was
to take the customary constitutional assertions in support of a legal
proposition-for example, because the text warrants the proposition or
because the framers and ratifiers endorsed such a proposition-and show
that, within the system of which they formed the structure, they themselves
could not be shown to be true.19 For example, if the text of the Constitution itself provided for a textual interpretation of the Constitution,"
this would not establish the truth of the proposition that judges should
interpret the terms of the Constitution according to the common understanding of the words, because it presupposes that such a textual warrant
is valid. To see this, imagine that (as some originalists appear to think) the
text said the contrary: "In no case shall the judges of any state be bound
by the common understanding of the terms of this Constitution." Only the
judge that was already committed to obeying the text would face the
dilemma of whether to disregard it. This, I believed, meant either that
certain propositions of constitutional law functioned as modalities,
determining the truth of other propositions, but were themselves indeterminable as to this truth, or that some external structure validated these
propositions. If it was the former, then their legitimacy derived from their
use alone, and from nothing else.' If it was the latter, then what was the
constitutional warrant for that external structure? For, on my view, a state
of limited sovereignty could not rely on such an unauthorized source of
law.'
On this important issue, some of the participants in this Symposium disagree with me.
If there is no external legitimating idea, then what does the decider do
when the modalities conflict? What if an historical analysis leads to one
conclusion-for example, that the ratiflers intended that states should not
be sued without their consent-but the text suggests otherwise-as indeed
19. See BOBBirr, FATE, supra note 1, at 5; BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 8-10, 114
17. See generally id. at 118-86.
20. Suppose the Constitution stated that "the judges in every state shall be bound by the common
understanding of the terms of this Constitution."
21. Wittgenstein makes a similar point about religious belief: rather than explaining exotic
religious practices as products of ignorance, we should describe those practices in enough complexity
to understand how the practices have their own internal grammar. Just as magic cannot be wrongheaded science, constitutional propositions cannot be wrong-headed moral or political theory. See
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough, "THE HUMAN WORLD, May 1971, at 18,
28-30 (A.C. Miles & Rush Rhees trans.).
22. For an opposing viewpoint, see Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv.
469, 496 (1981) ("Some parts of any constitutional theory must be independent of the intentions or
beliefs or indeed acts of the people the theory designates as Framers. Some part must stand on its own
in political or moral theory; otherwise the theory would be wholly circular .... ." (footnote omitted)).
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it was once held?' I reserved the resolution of such conflicts for the
conscience of the decider. Stevens captures the quality of this decision
precisely:
The nothingness was a nakedness, a point
Beyond which thought could not progress as thought.
He had to choose. But it was not a choice
Between excluding things. It was not a choice
Between, but of.2
Of course, the decider had to be conscientious in the first place. A judge
or a President eager to reach a particular result might think that the
incommensurability of the modalities implied the following possibility:
If I can think of some argument for what I want to do that fits the
forms of the modalities-some historical or textual or structural or
ethical or prudential or doctrinal argument, any one will do, and I
only need one-then I can resort to my own conscience, and it is
legitimate for me to do whatever I want to do.
This confuses the legitimacy that is conferred by drafting a written opinion,
using accepted arguments that support a decision, with the justification for
that decision. "Doing what you want to do" is not a matter, in itself, of
legitimacy. To put it differently: It is only when assailed by doubt-when
nothingness prevails and there is no point to further legitimate judgment-that one resorts to one's conscience. A person like the one I have
caricatured never reaches that point: he is not conscientious enough to
reach that point when one would resort to conscience. Thus, the justice
that is conferred on the American system by its reliance on conscience is
sacrificed by a decider who "does whatever he wants." On the method of
resolving conflicts among the modalities, there is considerable disagreement
among the Symposium papers: some of the authors want to supply an additional decision procedure that would resolve this incommensurability
problem.
The identification and explication of the modalities also served a
second purpose in my work, viz., to provide a means of constitutional
analysis in the absence of a prevailing doctrinal resolution. I had used Paul

23. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The Eleventh Amendmentwas adopted to
reverse the Court's holding. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF
POWER: A SOURCE BOOK OF EARLY AMRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 70-72 (1991) (recounting
the history surrounding the Eleventh Amendment).
24. WALLACE STEVENS, Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction, in THE COMPLETE POEMs OF
WALLACE STEvENS 380, 403 (1954).
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Brest's casebook even before it was published, 2s and was much attracted
to its historical approach and use of extensive case text.2
Brest's
important article, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation," persuaded me that it was essential that nonjudicial
officials exercise their role as constitutional interpreters, a role they had
more or less abandoned to the judiciary. But how was this nonjudicial
analysis to be done in answering questions about which there was little or
no doctrine? Indeed, how could it be done when there was settled case
law, but when the legislator was required to make up his mind independently? I believed that learning the modalities of constitutional analysis
could provide this means; and I further believed that journalists, and
citizens generally, could make use of these forms of legal argument,
although they were not confined to legal argument in making constitutional
decisions as were government officials. The constitutional discourse of
which the people were an essential part could be enriched by legal argument, and judicial decisions need not be either ignored or passively
accepted. This subject-the contrast between constitutional discourse and
constitutional law-is also a matter of some debate in this Symposium.
Eventually, I came to believe that our entire constitutional discourse
had been distorted by the search for a political theory to justify our legal
practices. McCulloch v. Maryland,I not Marbury v. Madison,29 was the
foundation case for the legitimacy of American constitutional analysis.
Darby,' not Wickard,31 presented the paradox of an onmicompetent
Congress working from a limited charter. Youngstown 32 was best read
modally, and not for its stirring concurrence (and certainly not for its
holding). I read and taught the FederalistPapers from a constitutional
point of view, not as an essay in political theory. Others wrote of the
"search for something that was strangely missing in the Federalist and
other documents of the founding generation, a search for the people as
something more than an abstraction from individuals or a reference to the

25. Thne first text I used was PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (rev.

preliminary ed. 1974). The current edition is PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 1992).

26. Professors Brest and Levinson have included the full, unedited text of ChiefJustice Marshall's
majority opinion in the great case of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). BRST
& LEVNSON, supra note 25, at 18-19. The text of this opinion is a wonderful teaching tool in part

because Marshall invokes all six modalities of constitutional argument.
27. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,27 STAN.
L. REV. 585 (1975).
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
29. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
30. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
31. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
32. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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sum of factions and interests."' I found in those documents, however,
a role for the people that was precisely not an abstraction, and I came to
think that our understanding of the framers' views as to questions like that
of "factions " ' had been fatally distorted by treating these ideas in terms
of political theory and not in terms of lawyerly practice. The fear of
factions was not, I think, the fear of political parties, but of what we would
today call interest groups. The idea of disinterested representation was
taken5 from the lawyer's customary role, not the parliamentarian's. And so
3
on.
Achieving this goal of giving the people the intellectual tools to
conduct a richer constitutional discourse, should it ever be achieved, can
have important effects outside constitutional law. The future of international law will, I think, be affected by the spread to other societies of the
American idea of limited sovereignty. Should this happen, the constitutive
nature of the international legal order itself may change, as an international
society of limited sovereigns would embody different expectations from
those of the current world order. There is an important role here, too, for
an understanding of the modalities of American constitutional law because
they show how other states might adopt limited governments, like the
American form, without becoming other "americas." The very character
of a society is uniquely determined by its moral commitments, and by these
commitments it is defined. 36 The modalities of American constitutional
argument do not depend upon a moral justification to legitimate limited
government. A society need not lose its cultural character, therefore, when
it places its government under law.
As a consequence of these ideas, I am at present engaged in a rather
large project. The first part of that project is a two-volume work tentatively entitled The Shield of Achilles: Studies in History, Strategy, and
Law. The first volume, called States of War, explores the relationship
between the historical development of the states in response to strategic
innovation. The first part of this book argues that the war that ended in

33. Charles W. Collier, The Descent ofPolitical Theory and the Limitations ofLegal Tolerance,
44 J. LEOAL EDUC. 273, 279 (1994).
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (discussing
the ability of the proposed Constitution to "control the violence of faction").
35. Jefferson Powell's remarkable book on the framers. LANGUAGES OF POWER: A SOURCE BOOK
OF EARLY AMRIcAm CONsrTuTIONAL HISrORY, supra note 23, is an important resource for anyone
thinking about these questions, although I have no idea whether he would endorse the views I have
expressed here. His contribution to this Symposium is, as is evident, an important essay standing
alone. See H. Jefferson Powell, ConstiutionalInvestigations, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1731 (1994).
36. "For it is in the choosingthat enduring societies preserve or destroythose values that suffering
and necessity expose. In this way societies are defined, for it is by the values that are foregone no less
than by those that are preserved at tremendous cost that we know a society's character." GUIDO
CALABRESi & PHILIP BoBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 17 (1978).
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1990 began in 1914. The second part begins with a depiction of those
European ways of governance that antedate the modern state just before its
emergence in the fifteenth century and traces the evolution of statcs-each
genetically endowed with unique historical circumstances, each mimetically
copying those successful innovations that such circumstances forced on its
competitors-to the present period. Thus, law, which begins when the
state has achieved a monopoly on legitimate violence, undergoes change as
a consequence of the violence among states. Law and violence and history
are inseparable. The third part speculates about how the state would have
to change its security structures if it were to be committed to maintaining
a nonviolent world order among and within legitimate states. One might
say it studies the constituitive changes in the state that result from
interaction with other states.
The second volume, called The Powers of War and Peace, explores
various intersections between international law and U.S. constitutional law.
Relying on the description of the evolution of the state in the first volume,
this book argues that international law-the law of the society of state-is
made out of constitutional law, particularly the constitutional law of the
European states. The first part of this book deals with war powers in
American constitutional law. The second part takes up various anomalies
that appear when the limited sovereignty of the American state confronts
the complete sovereignty assumed by international law, specifically the
anomalies generated by the issues of treaty interpretation and treaty
succession. The final part speculates about the constitution of the
international society of states and its future development as a consequence
of the interplay between the law that structures a state, and that which
reflects the structure among states.
None of the contributors to this Symposium has read these manuscripts. Yet, the maps they offer regarding ConstitutionalInterpretation
and with respect to the methodological concerns that lie at the heart of my
way of writing about constitutional interpretation, are abundantly rewarding
for my new work. Indeed, all the papers that precede this Essay can be
read with profit by anyone interested in a wide variety of topics, by no
means confined to constitutional interpretation, or to my book of that title.
Every essay is a map." I wanted to map the American constitution,
and so I largely neglected mapping the terrain of the current scholarly
debate. "I have always been aware," E.B. White once wrote in an introduction to his essays, "that I am by nature self-absorbed and egotistical; to
37. See Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L-. 637, 637-38
(1989) (illustrating "what social scientists call 'cognitive maps'" by comparing Saul Steinberg's map
of the United States as seen by a New Yorker-in which "Manhattan dominates the map" and "everything west of the Hudson is collapsed together and minimally displayed"-to various "maps" of the Bill
of Rights).
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write of myself to the extent I have done indicates a too great attention to
my own life, not enough to the lives of others." 38 Fortunately, my colleagues have not been so self-absorbed, and in this Symposium my neglect
has been repaid with generous consideration.
In the following Essay, I want to describe three sorts of maps of my
work presented in this Symposium-maps of insight, description, and explanation. And I want to show the different patterns these maps reflect and
to account for these patterns by discussing some of the formal aspects of
ConstitutionalFate, ConstitutionalInterpretation, and a book I am currently writing, Constitutional Analysis, which further addresses issues
raised in the first two. 9 In what follows, I will be writing about the
readings of my own writing. This is hard to do without seeming absurdly
self-important. I accept this risk because of the high quality of the papers
in this Symposium and owing to the admiration and affection I have for its
organizers.
I.

Maps of Insight

A.

H. Jefferson Powell: ConstitutionalInvestigations

I should like to discuss two essays of Powell in my commentary: the
fascinating ConstitutionalInvestigations included in this Symposium, and
another essay recently published in the Virginia Law Review, The
Principles of '98: An Essay in HistoricalRetrieval.' Both are helpful to
my current project, and both are examples of the map of insight I have
been describing. The paper in this Symposium, moreover, has the distinction of showing the particular rhetorical strategies of such maps in a
highly creative and unusual way.
ConstitutionalInvestigations
begins with an extraordinary introduction,
one that at first appears to be a sort of case note devoted to a concurrence
of Mr. Justice Souter.4 1 In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 42 Souter,
according to Powell, writes a concurring opinion to emphasize that the
majority opinion in that case does not confirm the unfortunate "Smith
rule," which held, regrettably, that facially neutral statutes do not implicate
the Free Exercise Clause even if, their effect is to prohibit religious

38. E.B. WHITE, E SAYS OF E.B. wHITE at viii (1977).
39. Specifically, ConstitutionalAnalysis will address these questions: Is there a unique method of

American constitutional analysis? What form does it take? How has it changed? How do we read the
cases that changed it, in light of the basic constitutional assumptions of this method? What is the
relationship between this analytical method and the forms of argument?
40. H. Jefferson Powell, The Principlcs of '98: An Essay in Historical Retrieval, 80 VA. L. REV.

689 (1994).
41. Powell, supra note 35, at 1731-35.
42. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Ayev. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993).
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practices. 43
Souter's careful doctrinalism is reminiscent of Judge
Friendly's efforts to distinguish Warren Court precedents in habeas
corpus:' by meticulously confining the scope of the holding to those
questions actually decided, Souter prevents infection spreading to the
present case. Church of Lukumi does not depend on Smith. And Smith
itself, the Justice's concurrence argues, relies largely on precedent, making
it vulnerable to a withering doctrinal assessment. The issue is an ancient
one, portrayed by Sophocles and confronted by Thomas Beckett (and his
successor, Thomas More): to what degree may government, in the pursuit
of its secular goals, compel disobedience to what one believes religion
commands?
Although it may appear to be a simple case note, which has strayed
from the back of the law review where such notes are commonly kept, this
intriguing, but obscure beginning is methodologically so sympathetic to my
own style as to suggest that either Powell is writing a parody or that he
understands and agrees with the purposes behind my own "oblique" narrative tactics. For, why else would one begin a book comment with a case
note, not mentioning the book or its subject matter? Beginning this way
draws the reader into familiar terrain-What is more common to a law
review than a case note?-and then studiedly confuses her. The note is not
about a majority opinion, or even about a concurrence regarding an issue
of substance with the majority. The issue that appeared at first to be
doctrinal-Does Church of Lukumi implicitly re-affirm Smith?-turns out
to be about doctrinalism itself-What are its standards and what is the
consequence for the particular precedential value of a case if the rationale
of that case depends upon a distortion of the precedents on which it relies?
In short, the very subject of the inquiry is changed from one about truthIs the legal proposition "Church of Lukumi re-affirms Smith" true?-to one
about meaning-How do we determine when such a proposition is true?
Then, the already reeling reader is confronted by another unexpected turn
in what began as a purely innocent case note. The author tells us that the
issue is a profoundly moral question-an aspect that doctrinalism overtly
and purposefully shuns-and then refuses to say what the correct moral
view is.45 With that, the introductory section abruptly ends without
mentioning the ostensible subject of the paper, and the body of the paper
begins.
There are two main sections of the paper. The first section is a
summary of the argument in ConstitutionalInterpretation leading to the

43. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).
44. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Scully, 746 F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J.) (noting the
Second Circuit's conscious decision not to apply the Court's liberal habeas standard in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963), in cases in which the facts differed from "the precise situation in Fay").
45. See Powell, supra note 35, at 1735.
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apparent impasse when the forms of argument (the "modalities") conflict,
noted earlier by Gene Nichol,' and then by Mark Tushnet4 7 and Steven
Winter in this Symposium,48 an impasse that I attempt to bridge by the
"recursion to conscience"'-"a rhetorical Band-Aid over a very real
aporia," ° Winter calls it. This section summarizes what Powell calls the
part of the argument of Constitutional Interpretation that is actually
written."1
The second section is a methodological analysis of
ConstitutionalFate and ConstitutionalInterpretationwhich concludes that,
far from being a face-saving gambit, the move to conscience-and the way
in which I present it that seems to some readers so abrupt and desperatehas been misunderstood. Powell demonstrates that this move is not
resorted to but requiredby the epistemological point of view implicit in my
work generally, and, far from re-opening the regress for which it is
thought to be an ineffectual cure, it is instead a shift in strategy that reflects
an unusual and profound difference in one's understanding of the problem.
This part, Powell believes, is implicit in the first part of my argument; it
is, he says, "that part of Bobbitts argument that is not actually written in
his book." 2
Now, I might have put that differently-not so subtly nor so well. I
think the argument described by Powell in his second section is written in
ConstitutionalInterpretation-Powellhimself quotes passages in support of
his description-but I see exactly what he means, and how very illuminating his way of describing it is. As we shall see, the formal problem to
which Powell draws attention is how to show something without saying it,
not because one is coy, but because the analysis of the first section
demands such fastidious refusal. Powell understands this perfectly and thus
provides an explication that is faithful to my aims as well as to his own;
that is, he gives an insightful rendering of my ideas in the context of
criticism rather than narrative-an expository rather than didactic

46. See Gene R. Nichol, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1107, 1115 (1993)
(reviewing BoBBr, INTERPRErATION, supra note 2).

47. See Mark Tushnet, Justificationin ConstitutionalAdjudication:A Comment on Constitutional
Interpretation,72 TIx. L. REV. 1707, 1725-26 (1994).
48. See Steven L. Winter, The Constitution of Conscience, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1828 (1994).
49. BOBrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 184.

50. Winter, supra note 48, at 1828.
51. See Powell, supra note 35, at 1735-36.
52. Id. at 1745. Powell, with the graceful allusiveness of a poet, is referring here I believe to
Wittgenstein's celebrated letter to the publisher, von Fickert:
My work [the manuscript of the Tractatus] consists of two parts: the one presented here
plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely the second part that is the important
one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I
am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits.
G.H. von Wright, The Origin of Wittgenstein's Traqtatus, in WrrrENSTEIN (G.H. von Wright ed.,
1982) (quoting letter from Ludwig Wittgensten to Ludwig von Ficker, October 1919).
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experience. (And he does this so artfully as to show how the map of insight is itself an art form.) In the final section, he draws the entire piece
together, uniting his own introduction, an example of the methodology I
am attempting to develop, with the description of the underlying argument
I am pursuing. It is a tour de force by a young master.
In the next few paragraphs, I will recapitulate his argument; and
suggest how this fits into my larger project on American constitutional law;
and then draw attention to a recent piece of Powell's to show his harmony
with, and departure from, my views on the subject that I am at present
pursuing. I mean to make my comments more than just a "Reply to Critics." I want to point up the importance of these critical essays aside from
the purpose that has brought them together.
First, Powell summarizes the thesis of ConstitutionalInterpretation:
"The theme of ConstitutionalInterpretationis that American constitutional
law, rightly practiced, makes moral decision concerning the political
'relationships in our constitutional democracy' possible."" He then
proceeds to give what he regards as the explicit part of the argument of
ConstitutionalInterpretationin roughly the following terms: Powell asserts
that, on my view of matters, "to learn the law " ' is to become competent
at a variety of roles practiced by a particular group and directed toward
goals external to those practices.5 5 If one accepts this view of law as an
activity, then five propositions follow: First, legal decisions are not
politically or ethically neutral because in our society, the very purpose of
law is to allow persons to pursue their own political and moral goals by
means of law. Thus, the lawyer cannot be indifferent to the goals of her
client.56 Second, legal activity is not political activity. The former is
expressed and acted out through the various modalities of legal argument,
and the latter is expressed through law (among other means)." Third, the
legal system, including the practice of judicial review, cannot be
legitimated by appeals to ideology; nor, owing to circularity, can it be
legitimated by appeals to ideologies that reify any particular modality
itself.58 Fourth, law is legitimated by adherence to practice; this occurs
when a decision is rendered according to law.59 Finally, the modalities
are the grammar of the law; thus, they do not necessarily dictate what the

53. Powell, supra note 35, at 1735-36 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217,2250 (1993) (Souter, J., concurringin part and concurring in thejudgment)).
54. Id. at 1736. 1 might have said, "to understand the law."
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1737.
58. Id. at 1738.
59. Id. at 1739.
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constitutional decider should decide.' Two corollaries flow from these
five propositions: First, the modalities can conflict; 61 and second,
legitimacy cannot be the same as justification because more than one way
of expressing a proposition can be legitimate, but of two conflicting
propositions with respect to a particular predicate-for example, justice-only one can be true.62
Powell observes that, to a certain sort of theorist, this argument seems
willfully perverse.63 Such persons want constitutional theory to obviate
choice so as to ensure justice. ConstitutionalInterpretationargues, on the
contrary, that this "failure"-the failure to provide a decision procedure
that will yield a unique result-is a great virtue. Whereas other theorists
offer a "technology" by which moral decision can be converted into a
technical inquiry,' ConstitutionalInterpretationasserts that it is conflict,
the clash of values, that enables justice, and that a decision according to
conscience thus becomes a decision according to law.' Quoting from the
book, Powell notes, "The justice of the system lies in the extent to which
it is able to confer legitimacy on the right moral actions of its deciders. "I
There are, Powell writes, three fundamental criticisms of my views.67
First, in contrast to my denial of this position, some critics assert that the
Constitution-apart from the Thirteenth Amendment-does in fact enshrine
certain substantive moral commitments, though, Powell wryly observes,
even these persons do not seem to be able to agree on what these commitments are.6" Second, some persons may believe that the results of the
system are so awful that, if I am right in my standard of assessment, the
system stands indicted for having legitimated such results. Here, Powell
asks only that such persons agree that their criticisms are fundamentally
destructive of the system itself.'
Finally, some may believe that the
recursion to conscience is a kind of trick, too intuitionist, too individualistic, to be of any help. As Powell explains,
To what source, one might ask, does the constitutional interpreter
turn when the forms of argument will permit her to reach either of
two morally opposite conclusions? One reading of Bobbitt's book is
that he is indifferent to the answer, or unable to provide one other

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Powell, supra note 35, at 1739-40.
Id. at 1740.
Id. at 1740-41; see BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 118-20.
Powell, supra note 35, at 1741.
Id. at 1742.
See BoBBirr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 168, 184-86.
Powell, supra note 35, at 1743 (quoting BOBBTT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 170).
All three, I might add, are represented in the papers for this Symposium.
Powell, supra note 35, at 1743-44.
Id. at 1744.
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than the negative injunction that the interpreter must turn somewhere
other than to the (morally agnostic) Constitution.'
On this reading, the role of conscience is "unexplored and, perhaps, unexplorable," 71 one such critic has written, leading to the conclusion that
there is a "'disappointing inconsistency' between the book's masterful
explication of the forms of constitutional argument and its empty invocation
of conscience."' To this objection, Powell's answer lies in the "part of
Bobbitt's argument that is not actually written in his book,"' the subject
of the second part of Powell's paper.
Sometimes a map of insight must suggest readings of a text as to
which the critic, the map provider, must speculate. This is so not because
the text has eluded the critic, but because the writer being criticized has
chosen-or feels required by other choices made-to provide a role for the
reader that is open-ended; and the critic is, after all, a reader also. A critic
of insight will often be able to make sense of this ellipsis by a careful
reading of what is said, looking for signs that point beyond the text.
Whether the speculation is in harmony with the writer's intentions, or is
discordant, depends on the critic's abilities in determining whether the map
is one of insight or its opposite, occlusion.
Powell suggests that ConstitutionalInterpretationis an attempt to cultivate a certain sensibility in the reader, while preserving always the reader's decision whether or not to accept such a change.74 This explains a
great deal about both ConstitutionalFate and ConstitutionalInterpretation,
but it does not explain why the author makes this choice; here Powell
offers only my assertion that "the soul of one's conscience is not manipulable"' 5 without saying why this is so (if it is). Instead, he merely
quotes the following passage, which assumes the truth of the previous
proposition: "I have no recommendations; I will make only this observation: there is no conscience without faith for without faith there is only
expediency. Without faith, there are no tragic choices; there are only
choices."76
This passage raises very many questions that perhaps ought to be
addressed before we encounter Powell's account of my narrative technique
and its role in the argument about conscience. For if the animating force
of one's conscience cannot be manipulated, why should I be so fastidious
about specifying particular moral outcomes? Powell suggests that, fractal-

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Nichol, supra note 46, at I 115, quoted in Powell, supra note 35, at 1745.
Id., quoted in Powell, supra note 35, at 1745.
Powell, supra note 35, at 1745.
Id. at 1747, 1750.
Id. at 1745 (quoting BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xvii).
Id. (quoting BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xvii).

1884

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 72:1869

like, I am reproducing in my books the choices I believe the conscientious
decider faces7 (just as he, in turn, has replicated this structure in the
introduction to his essay). But why would one do so? And what does
Powell's observation have to do with the cultivation of the conscience?
Powell juxtaposes the sentences quoted above with the last sentence of the
book: "Decision according to law is an ideal, but it is also an art and
7
finally it is our piety, our 'service to God."'"
These sentences taken
together, he argues, articulate the profile of the decisionmaker in a way
that retains the individualism of the person without the solipsistic,
intuitionist "black box"79 of the conscience gambit. First, let us examine
Powell's argument about my proposed articulation, this revolving and
turning around of the object of our study-the conscience of the decider.
Then I will return to some of the issues raised by that articulation itself.
Powell begins his reconstruction with Constitutional Fate, and he
echoes many other critics by observing that the book must have seemed to
many readers "a very odd book indeed."' I was not unaware of this.
I cautioned readers, "In this book I have been engaged in a study of the
legitimacy of judicial review. I have, however, gone about it in an odd
way . . . ."
"The purpose of the book was not to present an analysis
of what constitutional law is 'really' about from the perspective of an
external observer," Powell argues.' Rather, he concludes, Constitutional
Fate was fundamentally :"pedagogical" in intention.' "My aim," I wrote,
"in this book is to plunge the reader into a world, the experience of which
will cultivate a particular sensibility toward the Constitution . . . ""' I
ask the reader, Powell says, "actually to participate by sympathetic and
attentive reading in the practices [the book] describes, and by participating,
to be changed."'
ConstitutionalInterpretation, he argues, relies on the same sort of
method. The extensive case studies of constitutional decisionmaking are
not "second-order reflection on constitutional law but rather the actual

77. Id. at 1749.

78. Id. at 1745-46 (quoting BoBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 186).
79. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, ConstitutionalGrammar, 72TEX. L. REV. 1771, 179596 (1994).
80. Id. at 1746.
81. BOBBrT, FATE, supra note 1, at 233.

82. Powell, supra note 35, at 1747; see also Patrick 0. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional
Tradition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1969 (1983) (reviewing BoBBrrr, FATE, supra note 1) ("Constitutional
Fate is intended to be a provocation-its flaws [the narrative style] are part of its message.").
83. Powell, supra note 35, at 1747. My colleague Scot Powe has also made this point in conversation with me.
84. BOBBrTr, FATE, supra note 1, at ix, quoted in Powell, supra note 35, at 1747.
85. Powell, supra note 35, at 1747.
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doing of constitutional law."86 The arguments of Part II of the book
persuade (if they do) "by the attractiveness of the activity displayed."'
As with ConstitutionalFate,ConstitutionalInterpretationis subject to
a "profound misreading":88 if the critic takes me to be presenting the
theory of constitutional law,89 providing the rhetorical tools by which
judges can seek an ever-greater realization in our society of the norms of
liberal (or republican) ideology, then he has mistakenly assimilated me into
the ranks of Professors Michelman, Wellington, and others. That is, the
conventional book of thcory is concerned with establishing the truth
conditions for legal propositions; "radical" approaches to this are books
concerned with critical perspectives on what particular truth conditions are
established-for example, why these particular doctrines prevail. My
concern, however, has .been with how such conditions come about. It is
a shift in subject, it is sometimes said, from "truth" to "meaning."
ConstitutionalInterpretationthus not only asserts that "[w]e do not learn
the forms of argument by studying them as forms, but by legal practice."' The book also actually asks the reader to do so.
In my view, the most important part of Powell's paper is his claim
that, by declining to lecture the reader about the proper attributes of a
constitutional conscience, I am portraying the conscience and faith of the
constitutional decisionmaker "in the only truthful manner." 91 It is
consistent with this view that I should therefore offer the reader a moral
choice about undertaking the activity I describe. As Powell notes, "Bobbitt
remarks ... that. . . 'I will ask the reader to work through three case
studies ....
The skills gained in these exercises amount to a sort of autoexperiment ....
The reader can then judge for himself or herself as to the
claims made for the various modalities of argument.'" 92
This is an invitation, as Powell rightly sees. It is not the conventional
approach, as he also sees. Powell explains:
For example, in discussing the usefulness of understanding
constitutional law through the modalities, Bobbitt claims that the
modalities permit those who know them to "work through current
problems on their own," and presents as an example the outline of
"a good beginniug to an answer" to an Eighth Amendment question.

86. Id. at 1749.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1747 (emphasis omitted).
89. As I noted in the preface to ConstitutionalInterpretation, "One [reviewer] even complained
that the subtitle 'Theory of the Constitution' had confused him; shouldn't it be 'The Theory of the
Constitution,' he asked?" BOBBrTr, INTEPzPRETATION, supra note 2, at xi.
90. Id. at 179.
91. Powell, supra note 35, at 1749.
92. Id. at 1749 n.1 11 (emphasis omitted) (quoting BoBBrTr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at
Xv-Xvi).
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Bizarrely (from the ordinary theoretical perspective), Bobbitt offers
no clues as to how to resolve the issues his outline raises, remarking
instead that "playing such a game ought to give one an idea of how
to proceed to answer a constitutional question rather than simply
shrugging one's shoulders. " '
But Powell's account does not explain why this is the only truthful manner
in which to present such a case. Nor does it establish Powell's claim that
"[tihe invitation of Constitutional Interpretation is ... just that, and
necessarily so."' Why, one wants to ask, is it necessarily so?
ConstitutionalFate depended upon two limiting conclusions. First, it
argued that the search for a grand theory was misconceived on logical
grounds. Thus, I described this book as
permit[ting] one to translate all the asserted statements in a wellformed judicial opinion into a series of constitutional arguments.
Using this system to characterize whether a particular proposition in
constitutional law was true or false..., [it] then argued that there

existed a number of constitutional propositions whose truth or falsity
could not be determined. And the examples [given] ... were the
six interpretive [modalities] themselves.9'
This meant that no grand theory privileging any-or all-of these modalities could legitimate and justify their operation in any case. A theory that
was comprehensive 6 and complete could not provide certainty, because
the modalities could conflict. A theory that was comprehensive and
provided certainty by privileging some modalities, as for example, by a
hierarchical arrangement, could not be complete because it would require
the inclusion of new principles to legitimate the hierarchy, and then new
rules to legitimate the operation of these principles, and so on. A theory
that was certain and complete (such as strict construction) could not be
comprehensive because it excluded some modalities. One way to read
ConstitutionalFate is as an extended proof of this claim. The methodological consequence, however, is that the assumptions of a grand theory
are dispensed with at the outset.
The second conclusion of ConstitutionalFate was its rejection of an
external legitimating criterion for law. The book described itself as
not interested in constructing such a foundation [based on political
theory], but instead in having a perspicuous view of the structures

93. Id. at 1748 n. 102 (citations omitted) (quoting BoBBiTT, INTERPk'rATION, supra note 2, at 28,
30).
94. Id. at 1750.
95. BoBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at x (describing ConstitutionalFate).
96. By "comprehensive," I mean a theory that is capable of generating all well-formed legal
propositions. For a similar discussion of this problem, see BoBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2,

at 31.
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that make justification possible .... [This book] discards the notion
that law takes place within a framework that is independent of the
structure of legal argument. It rejects the view that a set of legal
presuppositions exists that are discoverable in the absence of legal
argument, upon which legal argument is supposed to depend. The
entire enterprise in which others are engaged seems to be based on
a confusion between the justification [of the system]-which is that
legitimation that results from the operation of the various [modalities]-and a hypothesized causal explanation for [law] derived from
socio-political thcories.'
This position also compelled self-restraint, for if one could not explain one
state of affairs (law) by reference to another (politics or psychology) in the
macro, as it were, then one ought not to do so in the micro by propositions
that implied that they were outside the customary practices to which they
were addressed. That is why ConstitutionalFate was written as it was;
that is why this was, as Powell puts it, the only "truthful" way to do it.98
ConstitutionalInterpretationis written in a similar manner for similar
reasons. Powell is absolutely right in saying that my intention was
"pedagogical,"' that I wished to give the reader a certain experience,
through the reader's own efforts, that was not the same as simply being
told what the experience was like. "I have tried to replace the world of the
thought... with the world of... decision."" It is in the latter world,
Powell reminds us, "that conscience is cultivated and faith embodied." 0 1
So it is not exactly that Powell has relied upon that which is not written,
but rather that he has correctly seen that which, on my view, cannot be
written, and has seen also my reasons for believing so.
To demonstrate other links between our respective constitutional work,
I would like to close this particular section with a brief reference to
Professor Powell's latest law review article and indicate its relevance to
ConstitutionalAnalysis and The Powers of War and Peace. That article is
entitled The Principlesof '98: An Essay in HistoricalRetrieval,1" and it
is a reminder of just how good constitutional history can be when written
by a lawyer. This article focuses on the constitutional dispute that arose
over the Alien and Sedition Acts"°3 enacted in 1798, and that culminated
in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the Republican electoral

97. BoBrrr, FATE, supra note 1, at 244-45.
98. Powell, supra note 35, at 1749.
99. Id.
100. BoBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 183.

101. Powell, supra note 35, at 1750.
102. Powell, supra note 40.
103. Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (repealed 1802); Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(1798) (repealed 1802).
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sweep in 1800. Powell argues that this dispute re-ignited the fundamental
issues about the origin of federal sovereignty that had been smoldering
since the Revolution. Indeed, Jefferson asserted that "the revolution of
1800... was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as
that of 1776 was in its form." 1 4
The debate arose over the fundamental question of the source of federal sovereignty. Did the Union derive its authority from the states, or the
people acting through the states, or the people acting directly, or from its
predecessor (the Confederation or the British Crown)? Historians have
drawn the connection between the Republican and Federalist sides of this
debate to the older Country and Court parties of eighteenth-century English
politics, but it is Powell who, with characteristic legal insight, links this
debate with the choice of constitutional interpretive modes. Republican
partisans campaigned for a stringently textual approach to constitutional
interpretation, construing grants of congressional authority narrowly vis-Avis the states and more broadly against the Executive. 5 This may sound
to a political scientist like mere ad hockery, but it is grounded in the text
itself and in the principles of textual argument. From a textual point of
view, the very explicitness of the text of Article I, compared to Article II,
counsels for greater congressional powers when confronting the President's
vaguer powers, whereas the fact that all federal power is delegated power
demands that, as a whole, the Constitution must be strictly construed.
When, as a concomitant of the war against France, the Federalist
Congress enacted a series of statutes, known collectively as the Alien and
Sedition Acts, Jefferson and Madison secretly drafted resolutions
condemning the Acts. The Kentucky legislature adopted Jefferson's draft
in November 1798; Madison's was endorsed by the Virginia General
Assembly on Christmas Eve."° These are the famous resolutions that
were used, perhaps unscrupulously, in the defense of slavery and as a basis
for the doctrines of nullification and secession.
Jefferson and Madison disagreed as to the precise nature of the compact that delegated a limited sovereignty to the Union, Madison holding
that the Constitution was the creature of collective action by the states, and
Jefferson taking the view that the contract was between each individual
state and the rest of the states as a body. 7 Despite the language in the
Virginia Resolution about interposition, Madison's view did not in fact
endorse any legally significant action by an individual state if the federal

104. Letter to Spencer Roane from Thomas Jefferson (Sept. 6, 1819), reprinted in THE WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 151, 152 (Edward Dumbauld ed., 1955), quoted in Powell, supra note 40, at
694.
105. Id. at 702-03.
106. POWELL, supra note 23, at 130, 133.
107. Powell, supra note 40, at 717-18.
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government acted unconstitutionally."I Because the authority of the
states was collective, this action could be exercised only in concert, or by
a revolution of the people at large from whom the states derived their
powers. Jefferson believed, however, that, because each state was a party
to a compact with the federal government, no collective, unconstitutional
decision could be binding on a state. "[A]s in all other cases of compact
among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to
judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of
redress." 1" Although in his original draft Jefferson had confined the
states to political remedies if the federal government abused its powers, he
claimed for each state the right of nullification-the power to declare
federal laws void within its borders."' Kentucky did not adopt this
language in any event,"' and there is some dispute as to whether
Jefferson thought this right to be a natural right and not a constitutional
right.1 In any case Powell concludes that the principles of 1798 did not
More importantly for the work I
give any individual state that right.'
am now doing on ConstitutionalAnalysis, he suggests
that attempts to render definite [these concepts] mistake the
fundamental point of the language of compact. The notion of the
constitutional compact ... was not a literal definition of the
Constitution's metaphysical nature; instead, it served as a metaphor
for the Constitution's ultimate subordination to the people and thus
for the legitimacy of popular authority regarding the Constitution's
interpretation.
...
The Republican definition of the Constitution thus was
primarily an image or reminder of popular sovereignty and popular
control over the government rather than a proposition about federal114
state relations.

108. POWELL, supra note 23, at 133-35.
109. RESOLUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE OF KENTUCKY, RELATIVE TO THE ALIEN AND SEDITION
LAWS (Nov. 10, 1798), reprintedin POWELL, supranote 23, at 130, 130, quoted in Powell, supra note
40, at 719.
110. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 104, at 156, 159-60, quoted in Powell, supra note 40, at 719.
111. Powell, supra note 40, at 719.
112. See id. at 720 (noting that James Madison "consistently maintained that Jefferson did not
intend to endorse 'any constitutionalright of nullification' by an individual state" (emphasis in original)
(quoting James Madison, Notes on Nullfication, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES
OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 417, 428 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981))).
113. Id. at 720-21.
114. Id. at 721-22. There does not seem to have been any distinction between those laws that
offended individual rights (like the Alien and Sedition Acts) and those that offended federalism-a
modem distinction that makes most sense when the scope of rights is not held to be identical with the
limits on the grant of power.
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This is brilliant, and for my purposes, it is especially helpful to the
work I am currently undertaking. First, regarding ConstitutionalAnalysis,
Powell establishes a crucial point about the DNA, as it were, of constitutional doctrine. I intend to argue that there is a fundamental structure to
all doctrinal analysis; that every constitutional doctrine can be usefully
understood when organized into this structure; and that the development of
doctrine, in every area, is best understood as a set of replications, and
mutations, of doctrine organized into this fundamental way. The basic
parts of this structure have been perpetuated in an environment in which
constitutional law has a unique existence beyond the party and policy
preferences of the deciders called upon to construe it; indeed, I daresay this
structure could not have persisted-through civil war, economic reconstruction, and international conflict-without this status. "Usually, the dominance of this distinction between legal argument and political motivation
is attributed to Marshall, and the first substantive section of Constitutional
Analysis is a very close reading of McCulloch v. Maryland."' Powell
suggests that Republican efforts to put the state under close legal constraint
more strongly accounts for this environment, in which law and polities
were distinguished, than the nationalistic federalism with which Marshall
was associated."' This observation promises to be extremely fruitful for
my description because it is the interplay between possibilities-Hamilton's
urging of something like a rational relationship test," 7 Madison's
Lochner-like superstructure of rights,"' or St. John Tucker's Carolene
Products footnote, 9 to take but three otherwise astonishing anachronisms ---that identifies the fundamental structure and shows the limits
of its permutation when that structure serves as the duplicating template for
each generation's needs and experiments. Powell's work will help me, I

115. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
116. See Powell, supra note 40, at 729, 728-30 (pointing out that nationalistic Federalists, unlike
Republicans, "generally treated constitutional argument as a species of political reasoning... with the
specifically political and policy considerations of statesmanship").
117. In discussing the general powers of the national government, Hamilton identifies
a criterion of what is constitutional, and of what is not so. This criterion is the end, to
which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be clearly comprehended within any of
the specified powers, and if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not
forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to
come within the compass of the national authority.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion as to the Constitutionalityof the Bank of the United States, in THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 104, 113 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1850) (emphasis in original).
118. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), reprintedin 11 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297 (David B. Mattem et al. eds., 1991) (minimizing the need for a bill
of rights because the limited powers of the federal government and the open-ended scope of personal
liberties provided broader, more certain protection of "essential rights" than could a bill of rights).
119. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
120. The uncanny evidence of the framers' generation of what appear, from a 20th-century
perspective, to be examples of doctrinal clairvoyance is explored in ConstitutionalAnalysis.
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hope, to unite the two strands of ideas-the modalities of argument and the
fundamental structure of doctrine-by an historical association of the
political dynamies of the American Republic with particular forms of legal
argument. I have long argued that we have the modalities we do because
the Anglo-Americans took the forms of argument at common law and
superimposed these on the state when they imposed a written, limiting
Powell, in passages like this one, offers
constitution on the state."
proof: "The textualism of the principles of '98, by shaping public
constitutional discourse, played a key role in creating the assumption that
the Constitution [should be] something 'read' in a lawyerly fashion
.... ,'1 Finally, this is important for my larger objective to bring to
every citizen the means of looking at the problems from a constitutional
point of view, and at constitutional problems from a legal point of view,
beyond simply repeating whatever the prevailing precedent holds, or
worse, abandoning the project altogether if the constitutional case is one
that is not appropriate for judicial resolution. It is thrilling for me to read
Powell's conclusion:
The teaching of the "Jeffersonian Doctrines" is that obedience to the
Constitution which "We the People" have promulgated requires the
people to address its meaning and its demands actively, in their roles
as legislators, executive officials, jurors, voters, and citizens, not
merely passively, as the recipients of authoritative judicial deliverances.

123

For those persons who agree with this, the issues of nullification and
interposition are crucial: to what extent does the individual citizen have a
legal duty to refrain from enforcing a law that he or she takes to be
unconstitutional? I believe there is a clear answer to this, and it lies in
attending to the legal nature of enforcement. A person who disagrees with
Roe v. Wade 2" acquires no authority to perform any legal act on that
account. That person is not called upon to perform any duty. But what
about the government doctor called upon to perform an abortion? And
what about the draftee who believes a war is unconstitutionally authorized?
These questions have not gone away with the advent of judicial supremacy;
they have merely been sleeping, waiting for the intellectual tools to grapple
with these issues once the public is itself awakened.
In a second way, Powell's article is relevant to my work The Powers
of War and Peace,"z and its final part, a discussion of the constitution

121. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 120-21.
122. Powell, supra note 40, at 730.
123. Id. at 742.
124. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
125. See supra text accompanying note 36. This volume, the first part of The Shield ofAchilles,
originated in the Dean's Lectures at St. Mary's Law School in 1991 and 1992.
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that empowers international law, and some possible futures of that constitution. In that part, I take up three subjects: the Wilsonian vision of a world
made of law, in which states stand in relation to law roughly as individuals
stand in relation to domestic law; an argument against substantive
customary international law; and speculation about an international law
based on American constitutional ideas of sovereignty, in place of the
prevailing European assumptions. Powell joins the American framers with
Michael Reisman1" in an implicit attack on the assumption that sovereignty inheres in the formal apparatus of the state. Powell writes that
"[o]n the basis of the Constitution's contractual nature, the principles of
'98 endorsed a constitutional vision in which institutional power over
constitutional meaning was counterbalanced by popular authority over
institutions," 1" and he observes that, "[b]y denying finality to the
constitutional interpretations of anyone but 'the parties to the constitutional
compact'-the pcople 'in their highest sovereign capacity'-compact theory
legitimized continuing constitutional debate and disagreement even in the
teeth of consensus among the formal institutional loci of interpretative
authority." 2 For my purposes, this scholarship provides links between
the constitutional and the international that are crucial to my argument.
Law review articles-be they maps of insight like Powell's or the
other sort of maps that I shall soon be taking up-are not, usually,
examples of scholarship. They may be informed by scholarship, as is
Powell's work, but one should not read The Principles of '98 for a
scholarly article by an historian. It is more, and less.129 Law review
articles are examples of criticism, and it is by the standards of criticism
that they should be judged. "The most impressive thing about the good
critic," wrote one of the most impressive of them, "is the fact that he does
respond to the true nature and qualities of" the work he is criticizing."3
In Powell, this is true whether that work is ConstitutionalInterpretationor
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.

126. SeeW. Michael Reisman, SovereigntyandHumanRights in ContemporarylnternationalLaw,
84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866, 871 (1990) ("[A] jurist rooted in the late twentieth century can hardly say that
an invasion by outside forces to remove the caudillo and install the elected government is a violation
of national sovereignty.").
127. Powell, supra note 35, at 736.
128. Id. at 737 (footnote omitted) (quoting JAMES MADISON, The Report of 1800, reprintedin 17
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 120, at 303, 309).
129. "We are something different from scholars, although it is unavoidable for us to be also,
among other things, scholarly. We bave different needs, grow differently,. . . we need more, we also
needless." FRIEDRICH NIETZCSHE, THE GAY SCIENCE345 (Walter Kauffmanntrans., 1974) (emphasis
in original).
130. RANDALL JARRELL, The Age of Criticism, in POETRY AND THE AGE 63, 77 (1955).
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Akhil Reed Amar: In Praise of Bobbitt

I live on the side of a limestone hill, above the shoals of a limestone
creek. So when I read the words "In Praise of.. .,"11 the first thing
I think of is Auden's poem, and I wonder if I am the best and worst,
having stayed here long rather than seeking immoderate soils.132 And I
sometimes wonder if this, my beloved Texas, is, as Auden writes, "not the
sweet home that it looks," but
...
A Backward
And dilapidated province, connected
To the big busy world by a tunnel, with a certain
Seedy appeal ... 133
I know that I, too, like the poet, am reproached: "Not to lose time, / not
to get caught, not to be left behind, not please! to resemble. .. ."4
Professor Amar seems utterly free of all this in his generous tribute
to my work. He sets sail and discovers continents, yet names them for the
map-maker. I am grateful and appreciative, and I wonder: hasn't he
heard
1 35
of Harold Bloom? Isn't he tormented by the anxiety of influence?
A critic of greatness, Bloom, and thus much concerned with reputation. The reputation that Akhil Amar seems most concerned with, however, is mine. Amar devotes his essay to documenting various influences
in his own work that may be attributable to work of mine. And because
Amar is a critic of insight, he is able to take notions of mine to places I
might never go (such as "refined incorporation"). 136 Amar is generous,
gentlemanly-and as I would expect from the man who holds the chair that
was Leff's legacy-exciting and interesting to read.
But I will not dwell further on the appreciative remarks included in
Amar's paper in this Symposium-what can one say except "Thank
you"-and will treat instead another example of a map of insight, Amar's
celebrated Southmayd Lecture, The Consent of the Governed.1 37 This
essay is also of some importance to my current work.
Amar's remarkable article asserts the proposition that a majority of the
voters of the United States have the right, by means of a national referendum, to require Congress to call a Constitutional convention to propose

131. Akhil R. Amar, In Praise of Bobbin, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1703 (1994).
132. WYSrEN H. AUDEN, In Praise of Limestone, in SELECTED POEMs 184, 186 (Edward
Mendelson ed., 1979).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. In The Anxiety of Influence, Harold Bloom describes the struggle of writers to obscure,
overcome, and even figuratively slay their precursors. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE
5-15 (1973).
136. Amar, supra note 131, at 1706.
137. Amar, supra note 1.
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amendments; and further that these (or other amendments-or a different
Constitution entirely) would become law if a simple majority of the persons
voting in a national referendum were to so direct therein. It is an aweinspiring and perfectly awful idea, of that I have little doubt. But why do
I feel this way?
In the first place, such a plan would make the Constitution a political
football: no supermarket parking lot would be safe from petition-floggers,
seeking signatures and handing out buttons. On every ballot, there would
be a long list of referenda. The commercials that now are given over to
candidates would be joined by thirty-second spots on constitutional
amendments, and no sooner would one of these be adopted than its repeal
would become the focus of the special group that finds its identity as the
doppelganger of the group that proposed the amendment in the first place.
The permanence that a constitution requires cannot survive in such an
environment.
Second, this would cause a vast diversion of political attention and
resources in a country that is already too diverted from governance toward
what one might call identity-issues. Would the debate on health-care
reform, for example, really be enriched by a national referenda to enshrine
(or forbid) the single payer? For this is just the sort of amendment-a
statute by any other name-that occurs in states that have such mechanisms.
Third, the amendment process should be made more difficult, if
anything. Just look at the amendments we have. Not one amendment in
the last seventy years has been actually necessary, excepting possibly the
Twenty-First Amendment, which was required to repeal the absurd Eighteenth. Some have caused more problems than the situations they were
supposed to cure;13 some were of no appreciable effect; 13 9 one, once
necessary, was- not ratified until it had been overtaken by events that
rendered it no longer necessary."4
Fourth, constitutional referenda are a profoundly antimajoritarian
device, as counter-intuitive as that might seem. Take the Twenty-Second
Amendment as an example: It prohibits a President from serving three
terms. 4' The only time a President ever exceeded two terms occurred
when a very popular President was returned by large majorities on four
consecutive occasions. The amendment was adopted to stifle the people's

138. See, e.g., U.S. CONsr. amend. XX (fixing dates for presidential and congressional terms and
mandating annual congressional sessions); id. amend. XXV (specifying the procedures for succession
in the event of the death or disability of the President or Vice President).
139. See, e.g., id. amend. XXIII (providing for electors from the District of Columbia in presidential elections); id. amend. XXVI (setting the voting age at 18).
140. See id. amend. XXIV (banning poll taxes in national elections).
141. Id. amend. XXII.
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wishes, as is true of virtually all modern amendments. If there were no
fear that majorities would act otherwise-either by acting 42 or by
refusing to act"'4 -there would be no need for a constitutional amendment
in these cases.
Fifth, a referenda system would be profoundly divisive. It would
permit a bare numerical majority of national voters in a single election to
forbid the majorities in most of the states in the Union from varying the
definition and sentencing of crimes, setting their own tax rates, deciding
how to manage state-owned natural resources and parks, establishing
standards for child custody and divorce, and deciding what languages or
books are to be used for ordinary course instruction in the public schools.
Is that such a bad thing? Not if you are sure that the majority will act
wisely, so wisely in fact that the majorities in all the states they will have
overridden would accept such hegemony. But many of the most innovative
and progressive acts of government have come from states experimenting
with systems long before a national majority could be mustered. Perhaps
you are thinking all this could happen now by national statute; most of the
examples given above could. But by bypassing the Senate, a referenda
system gives a very few states command of the rest, and thus changes the
mix of bills that would become national law.
Finally, such a system makes governance almost impossible. Do you
think the first successful referenda would be on abortion rights, or prayer
in the schools, or a balanced budget? I think it would be a bar on the
imposition of the income tax. For all our folly, the system we have
functions smoothly and strategically compared to a system whose finances
do not have the bare protection of the biennial appropriation and representative government.
I could, as Professor Tushnet says, pile example upon example.'4
And why shouldn't I? Because this would utterly miss Professor Amar's
point. He is not suggesting that we should adopt such a procedure because
it would be a good idea-although he may think so-but rather because he
believes it is the law. It is his conviction that a careful examination of the
classic modalities of argumentl will yield the conclusion that we have,
and have always had, a constitution that is amendable by referendum.
We may disagree on this; I should like to give it much more thought.
But it is very satisfying to know that we do agree on how to analyze the

142. See, e.g., id. amend. XXII (preventing the act of re-electing a President to a third term).
143. See, e.g., id. amend. XVIH (prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcohol and thereby
removing the possibility that some states might refuse to impose such bans); id. amend. XXIV (invalidating poll taxes in those states that had not yet repealed them).
144. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1712.
145. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 459-60 (examining the views of Jefferson-the historical
modality); id. at 461 (examining the entire text of the Constitution-a textual argument).
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issue. I have been dwelling on the prudential aspects of the matter;
doubtless there are arguments in favor of the proposal from a prudential
point of view. I am inflamed rather than persuaded by prudential arguments such as the following:
Women today constitute a majority of ... the ... American
polit[y]. They are today governed under a federal Constitution
largely the making of men who died long ago, men who may not
have had their interests foremost in mind....
This is not popular self rule; it is rule from cold graves of dead
men ... and by small clumps of old men in ordinary government.14
Such arguments re-enforce, I think, the danger in transferring constitutional
issues to the mercies of the group politics that have taken over our society
much as regional politics did in the last century. The "dead men" to
whom Amar refers are something we have in common, something that can
bind us together; putting it as he does vividly illustrates how vulnerable
such a heritage is to the fashionable slogans of the hour. For this reason,
prudential argument should, as its great architect Justice Brandeis so often
counseled, be used principally as a defensive measure to avoid miring the
courts in political controversies,14 7 and I would not yet rely on the
arguments I have made until I had canvassed all the forms. The mere fact
that such a proposal comes from Professor Amar gives me pause and
cautions that I should consult the various modalities of argument despite
my initial reaction.
All of Amar's work with which I am familiar is characterized by a
singular depth. He begins at a level that most are content to leave
undisturbed. This is true here also. His fundamental inquiry can be
phrased as follows: If the Constitution is a limited instrument endowed by
the sovereign people, did they purport to give up the power of constitutionmaking when they ratified this particular constitution, and, in any case,
how could they, since sovereignty inheres in the people and is not, as
Jefferson reminded us, "alienable"'?1 I will not try to summarize his
detailed and rich argument; readers would be better off spending the time
reading it. But I will take up three points of difference between us so that
I may ultimately make some observations about the relevance of this work

146. Id. at 508.
147. See, e.g., Ashwanderv. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting
that judges should "shrink from exercising" the power to strike down legislation on prudential
grounds).
148. See Amar, supra note 1, at 459 ("Article V nowhere prevents the people themselves, acting
apart from ordinary Government, from exercising their legal right to alter or abolish Government via
the proper legal procedures.").
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to my own current projects, and to the work I have done that Amar has so
generously praised.
Amar rightly begins by considering the text of Article V, which
provides the mechanism by which the Congress can propose constitutional
amendments, or by which the state legislatures may call a convention for
proposing amendments, and by which such amendments are ratified by the
legislatures (or in conventions) of three-fourths of the states. 149 He then
notes that the text of Article V "emphatically does not say that it is the only
way to revise the Constitution." 1" He quickly, and of course correctly,
concedes that the constitutional text is exclusive as to the powers of the
federal government. For example, one could not say that the Presentment
Clause, which provides for the president's signature or an override of his
veto before a bill becomes a law, emphatically does not say that it is the
only way to produce a statute."' Article V "enumerates the only
mode(s) by which ordinary Government ... can change the Constitution.""5
But this does not prevent the people, "acting apart from
ordinary Government, from exercising their legal right to alter or abolish
Government via the proper legal procedures." 53
This argument goes right to the heart of the matter. The people must
have legal rights outside the Constitution or they could not have set it upa legal act-in the first place. Moreover, if they granted to the government
a monopoly on how that government is to be constituted, the government
itself could thwart structural change, becoming in effect the sovereign
rather than the agent. To these structural arguments, Amar adds an
historical argument: Sovereignty in the people was, he claims, "universally
understood in 1787 as majoritarian. A simple majority of the People
themselves ... had a legal right to alter Government and change
Constitutions."154
This is the issue all right, but is there not more to say on the other
side? Why do we not say that, for example, the electoral college is
emphatically not the exclusive means of choosing a President?155 This
is not an act solely of "ordinary" government, but is in fact an act of the
people. Or is it? Let us look at this example clearly, because it is not an
instance of federal power which must therefore be otherwise strictly
construed.

149. U.S. CONST. art. V.

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Amar, supra note 1, at 459 (emphasis in original).
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 460.
See U.S. CONST. art. 11 & amend. XII (establishing the electoral college).
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I think we must distinguish between the polity in 1787 (or now) and
the persons empowered by that polity to elect the President, the electoral
college, or, in some circumstances, the reconstituted House. Only the
persons empowered by the polity and designated by them in the Constitution can elect the President of the United States. The polity can choose a
Supreme Leader, perhaps, or they can even withdraw their consent from
the Constitution so that no one can be President, but I do not think the
polity can, acting outside the means it has designated, confer the legitimacy
of that particular instrument on any person elected by means other than
those specified in the instrument. For the same reason, a simple majority
of the polity could not remove the President by means other than impeachment 5 6 (though there are doubtless times when this might appear attractive). They may take the entire matter back into their hands because it has
always been theirs, partly on loan to the voters and the government, but
they cannot replace the voters and the government without taking it all
back into their own hands.
Well, what difference does it make? Whether "voters" or "polity,"
it is the People, or rather a majority of them, either way, is it not? No.
Majorities are like nuclei; they only exist within a defined boundary. What
will count as the relevant group of designated voters is determined by the
polity. That is why the polity, and not the voters, are sovereign. By
changing what counts as a constituency, "majorities" can vary widely. In
our own history, this constituency has changed to include women, former
slaves, and persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one. But the
polity, because it is sovereign, cannot be parsed any more than a bodyfrom which the idea of sovereignty derives-can be parsed.
Well, then, is not Amar right in saying that a majority of the polity,
determined by referendum, can do what it pleases, being sovereign? Yes,
with two significant qualifications: First, it can do what it pleases so long
as it accepts what it does. There is no magical formula (even majoritarianism); there are only practices that are sufficiently acceptable to be
accepted. And second, that means that the one thing a majority cannot do
is masquerade as the constitutional government, whose legitimacy is
axiomatic because it is derived from an original agreement on a fixed set
of exclusive procedures. To put it in the terms of this Symposium: It
would be a mistake to think that a political theory (like majoritarianism),
which can justify a system, can also legitimate it. What Professor Amar
appears to want to do is take the fruits of legitimacy and confer them on
an untried practice (the national referendum) that is justified by a widely
held political theory. It is true that the framers (and ratifiers) were widely
and tenaciously committed to majoritarianism. It is equally true, however,

156. See id. art. I, § 3 (detailing the procedures for presidential impeachment by the Senate).

1994]

Reflections Inspired by My Critics

1899

that they were sensitive to its dangers and erected many barriers to
majorities in the system they presented for ratification. Indeed, the
FederalistPapers advertised the Constitution as being especially sound on
just this point,"5 7 and thus we must be careful not to betray the
understanding of the ratifiers by introducing elements that circumvent the
promises once made. I sometimes fear that political scientists would like
a world in which the people were more preoccupied with political matters
than they are, whereas the Constitution was designed, I believe, by persons
who did not believe in the primacy of politics, and who went to great and
imaginative lengths to create a system that would harness the citizenry to
responsibility without pretending that they were (or should be) as
committed to public life in a democracy as were the aristocrats and
monarchs they supplanted.
Professor Amar does not necessarily disagree with this. On the
contrary, he accepts the important distinction between a "legal process
provided for by our existing Constitution, and one that ... bootstraps
itself into existence by its own self-defined rule of recognition.""'8 Amar
asserts that amendment by referenda is provided for in the present
Constitution. He reaches this conclusion largely, but not exclusively, by
relying on doctrinal argument-not the doctrine of court cases, but the
precedent of the state constitutions. 59'
This is a crucial part of his argument, and it is detailed in a masterly
way. If I am not thus far persuaded, it is because the states, being
creatures of plenary power, have a different relationship to the polity than
does the federal government, which is an institution of enumerated powers.
There is no constitutional reason why a state must even have a written
constitution. I am inclined to think that Amar, by treating the states as if
they were to the federal government what the counties are to the statesthat is, bodies with no unique constitutional basis-errs in a way that is
fundamental to his argument. But I have not reflected on his provocative
piece and, in any case, offer these reactions to underscore a different point.
What is the use of Constitutional Interpretation and Constitutional
Fate, which try to identify means of legal argument for the public at large,
as well as for judges, law professors, and lawyers, if the public is denied
the right to amend the Constitution by referenda? That is, what is the point
of saying that the citizenry ought to have these constitutional techniques at
their disposal if, in the end, there is no interpretive role for them to play?
And if there is such a role, why does it not extend to deciding which

157. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 34 (arguing that the proposed Constitution
will protect against the dangers of the majority).
158. Amar, supra note 1, at 501.
159. See id. at 469-87.
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provisions of the Constitution-like Article V-are being misinterpreted?
And if they so decide, should they not be able to validly and lawfully
enforce their judgment, because all constitutional power derives from their
consent in the first place?
In a way, this issue is also at the heart of the nullification and
interposition problem with which Powell dealt in his essay, The Principles
of '98.11 I take comfort in the fact that my solution seems to be in
harmony with that of James Madison: The remedy is political rather than
legal in nature. Madison insisted that the "states" that were parties to the
Constitution were "the people composing those political societies, in their
highest sovereign capacity."'
He believed that refusing to recognize the
interpretive authority of the people would be "a plain denial of the
fundamental principle on which our independence itself was declared.""6
Nevertheless, Powell tells us, Madison contrasted the pronouncements on
constitutional issues by "citizens [or] legislatures"" with judicial
decisions on the meaning of the federal Constitution: "The expositions of
the judiciary ... are carried into immediate effect by force."'" For
Madison, Powell writes, "the interpretive authority of the [people] was
political rather than legal in nature.""
Amar and Powell address similar issues in ways that are intensely
relevant to my current work. The questions of legal intervention in
international security turn on matters of compact theory: whether the
people of a state are denied constitutional avenues of redress, so that
popular sovereignty cannot have a political effect, and thus can enlist
foreign assistance (as the French assisted us) is a notion quite at odds with
European ideas of popular sovereignty (in which the state embodies that
sovereignty).'" Moreover, the vexing question of self-determination lies
behind Amar's majoritarianism. The Serbian people have contrived to restore themselves to majority status in Bosnia on the basis of constitutional
claims that, they tell us, would have pleased the Republican Party in 1860.
And, viewed from Belgrade, the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, and then

160. SeePowell, supra note 40, at 717-19; supra text accompanying notes 107-14.
161. MADISON, supra note 128, at 309, quoted in Powell, supra note 40, at 718 n. 117.
162. Id. at 311, quoted in Powell, supra note 40, at 718 n.117.
163. Id. at 348, quoted in Powell, supra note 40, at 718 n.118.
164. Id., quoted in Powell, supra note 40, at 718 n.l18.
165. Powell, supra note 40, at 718-19.
166. See John Chipman, The FutureofStrategic Studies: BeyondEven GrandStrategy, SURVIVAL,
Spring 1992, at 109, 117-18; Lloyd N. Cutler, The Right to Intervene, 64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 96 (1985)
(both exploring when international law allows states to intervene in a civil war). See generally John
D. van der Vyver, Sovereignty andHuman Rights in Constitutionaland InternationalLaw, 5 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 321, 331-37 (1991) (discussing the evolution of the concept of popular sovereignty in
Europe).
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Bosnia-Hercegovina must have looked-and was often portrayed-as
leaving behind a federal Yugoslavia whose responsibility was to restore the
unified state.167 Perhaps part of my anxiety about Amar's proposal arises
from concerns over whose "majority" counts in a national referendum of
a people who are increasingly fragmented and distanced from one another
and their common heritage.
Maps of insight, like maps of ancient and varying states, intersect, as
Powell's and Amar's do, and give us perspective on what is otherwise
capable of becoming too familiar.
These modifications of matter
...
make a further point:
...
what I hear is the murmur
Of underground streams, what I see is a limestone landscape.168

C. Dennis Patterson:Wittgenstein and ConstitutionalTheory
It is fortunate that the editors have brought together three legal
academics-Powell, Amar, and Patterson-whose work is also informed by
history, political science, and philosophy, respectively. This greatly
enriches this Symposium, and brings out more in the text with which the
Symposium is concerned.
Patterson 69 situates Constitutional Interpretation, as does Stephen
Griffin,"T by understanding it on its own terms first and then trying to
associate it with the ongoing debate, instead of, as with a map of explanation, situating the work first as representing a particular camp in the
debate, a tactic that can sometimes serve as a replacement for understanding. Thus, the map of insight is useful for the boundaries it limns,
in a way that the map of explanation can never be, because the boundaries
of the latter are inferred only, like maps of Atlantis.
Patterson divides his paper into three parts: a brief description of
ConstitutionalInterpretation in jurisprudential terms; an assessment of
Balkin and Levinson's paper in this Symposium, mainly to give an example
of some of the uses of the jurisprudence of ConstitutionalInterpretation;
and a more extended treatment of some of Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas as

167. For a summary of the events and constitutional claims surrounding the dissolution of
Yugoslavia, see generally Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution ofthe Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992). See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutionalismand Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 633, 643 (1991) (noting that the Yugoslavian
government has claimed the right to "use military force to ensure against secession").
168. AUDEN, supra note 132, at 187.
169. Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and ConstitutionalTheory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1837 (1994).
170. StephenM. Griffin, Pluralismin ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 TEX. L. REv. 1753 (1994).
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these have been drawn into the debate by the Symposium paper of Steven
171
Winter.
Patterson begins by characterizing contemporary jurisprudence as
dominated by two approaches. In one, a body of law is explained in light
of various principles or insights (often drawn from collateral fields of
study) to reveal a unity or underlying principles."7 In the second, an
ideal structure of law is described, to which the law should aspire, and the
present state of affairs is compared to that ideal."7 Both of these kinds
of jurisprudence are efforts at explanation and understanding. With respect
to the first approach, to explain the law in terms of a unifying theme, or
from a unified perspective, is to make the claim that it can be usefully
understood in this way and that this understanding can give us useful
guidance, much as the identification of a particular pathogen gives us
guidance as to treatment. The work in the field of law and economics of
Judge (at the time, Professor) Posner has been of this type. 74 With
respect to the second approach, the effort to offer an ideal system for
comparison is also an effort at explanation and understanding: The
operations of the current system are appreciated by contrast, and their
shortcomings are explained by the gap between the actual operation of
these systems and their ideal functioning, much as we say the unusual
appearance of a particular antigen, or symptom, indicates a pathology
because this departs from the normal or ideal. The work in law and
economics of Professor Coase has been of this type."7
Patterson
correctly concludes that, although I have a good deal to say about both the
nature of explanation and the proper use of ideal systems, I neither provide
such a system nor offer an explanation of the law. 76 Rather, I attack
both of these approaches and argue that the meaning of legal practices
inheres in the practices themselves, and accordingly that understanding is
a matter of mastering the activities that comprise those practices. Whereas
both approaches unify legitimacy and justification-the ideal system
prescribing the justification and demanding that a legitimate system
conform, and the explanatory system providing the understanding by which
justification and legitimacy are linked-I argue that law must be seen as a
set of practices that are legitimated, but perforce cannot be justified, by
following rules embodied in, but not necessarily abstracted from, those
practices. These practices, and these rules, have arisen contingently and
have no a priori status. In my view, as Patterson characterizes it,

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Winter, supra note 48.
Patterson, supra note 169, at 1837-38.
Id. at 1837.
E.g., RcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (4th ed. 1992).
E.g., R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
See Patterson, supra note 169, at 1838-39.
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"Illegitimacy is not delivered to the law from outside, as virtually all
contemporary theorists maintain." 1"
Patterson also sees why, in
ConstitutionalFate, I chose the problem of judicial review as the vehicle
to make these arguments. Examining the role of the legitimacy of the
forms of argument in that context is analogous to determining whether an
arithmetical system is complete, consistent, and comprehensive by looking
not at a particular well-formed mathematical equation, but by looking at the
expression of the axioms themselves.
After providing a very brief summary, Patterson turns to a discussion
of selected elements of Balkin and Levinson's and Winter's papers in this
Symposium. With respect to both of these papers, I will offer my own
critique; it would be captious, I think, for me to comment on Patterson's,
although I will observe that his criticism is always lucid and serious. For
similar reasons, I will not dwell at length on the reply by Winter,"'8
which does not, in my view, take as its subject the topic for this
Symposium. As to that paper, I will confine my comments largely to the
notes.
Patterson's discussion of ConstitutionalInterpretationbegins with the
point that
[f]rom the left, the center, and the right, the debate is over the
proper lens for interpreting the Constitution. If Bobbitt is correct,
there is no lens-nothing between the Constitution and our understanding of it. When we understand how the modalities are used to
show the truth of propositions of constitutional law, we understand
how the Constitution has meaning. We do not grasp the meaning of
the Constitution with the modalities; rather, the modalities are the
means by which constitutional propositions are shown to be true or
false.1 79
One consequence of this view is that we can understand constitutional law
by learning to use the various modalities, and this, rather than any
particular interpretive "take" on that subject, can be a worthwhile
enterprise, pedagogically. As Patterson puts it in a later section of his
paper, "We do not interpret the Constitution with the modalities, for to put
it that way assumes that the Constitution already has a meaning that is then

interpreted.

1

80

Patterson's discussion of Wittgenstein is illuminating, particularly as
he ties Wittgenstem's comments regarding the sources of our anxiety about
continuity and coherence-questions of how we ensure that we will all

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 1839.
Steven L. Winter, One Size Fits All, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1857 (1994).
Patterson, supra note 169, at 1842 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1846.
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follow the same rules in the same way and how we are enabled to do so
over time-to Wittgenstein's rejection of mediating devices.'
This is
a rejection of what Winter calls the "moment of objectification" that links
the internal and the external, thought and behavior.1" Despite Winter's
disclaimers to the contrary, Patterson has identified the chief source of
difference between the two of them: Patterson denies that conceptual
structures have the kind of autonomy that would allow their characteristics
to outrun what can be ratified by human thought-he denies that such
structures thereby provide an external, normative constraint on our
cognition. Winter accepts what Patterson denies, perhaps because Winter
sees no other way in which our thought can be made to grasp external
reality. Otherwise, as Patterson quotes, "[w]hat they know is either inside
them, or... beyond them. " "
To illustrate the difference between Winter and Patterson, let me offer
the following conjecture about mathematical proof and the reactions of
these two thinkers to some of the questions that arise about that subject.
Patterson, following Wittgenstein, likely believes we are compelled to
accept a mathematical proof, for example, not because it tells us what must
be the case in the world, or because it commands our assent, but because
we are induced to make a decision that is guided by the proof. I imagine
that Winter, on the other hand, would take the view that mathematical
propositions that are proved-like Euclid's Fundamental Theorem-enjoy
a cognitive certainty because they match up something in the world with
something in us. Accordingly, there must be a mediating device (the rules
of mathematical proof, for example, might be the "objectified sedimentations""' of which he writes) that accounts for this. I realize it is brazen
of me to introduce a problem that neither of these scholars discuss (nor, as
far I know, have even contemplated), and then imagine their views. I take
this absurd risk because it may be a way to give the reader a handle on
what they are argning about. As it is, this is made difficult by Professor
Winter's demurrer to Patterson's paper, which I suppose I must now
discuss.
In his reply to Patterson, Professor Winter offers a compendium of
things Winter has said about his own writing that are inconsistent, in
Winter's view, with Patterson's characterization of Winter's opinions.
Winter also makes the claim that Patterson, like the famous hedgehog, has

181. Id. at 1847-50.
182. Winter, supra note 48, at 1821, quoted in Patterson, supra note 169, at 1846 n.57.
183. Id. (quoting STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND
THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERACY AND LEGAL STUDIES 373 (1989)), quoted in Patterson, supra
note 169, at 1847.
184. See id. at 1820 ("An important part of this process of institutionalization involves the phenomenon of 'sedimentation' which, among other things, includes objectification in language.").
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but one big idea, and that his work consists in misconstruing writers so as
to make their views vulnerable to this idea. He appears to be so enraged
at Patterson that, as we shall see, he is driven to deny assertions of
Patterson's that he himself gives support for.
Winter tells us that "[m]any have wondered about [his] sustained
productivity over the past several years," 18 5 questioning whether there
might be two Steven Winters at work, and he offers us vignettes of his
college life (he edited the same magazine as a cousin of the same name)
and the subsequent careers of his namesake cousins (both are successful
doctors, one gathers, and one is a cardiologist) by way of setting up the
point that the "Steven Winter" described by Patterson must be someone
else of the same name.186 I dwell on all this because it actually reflects
the fundamental error in Winter's approach to his rebuttal: Just because we
see ourselves in a certain light, and take our argnments to reflect a certain
position, other persons are not required to accept our characterization.
Even in his short piece, Winter provides ample evidence, of his own
choosing, that supports Patterson's description and criticism. Let us see.
Patterson describes Winter's argument as requiring Winter "to show
that the fit 'between our thought and the world is determined independently
of human cognition."'"" In reply, Winter quotes himself from a piece
in the Pennsylvania Law Review in which he states that "there is no
objective description of reality separate from our conceptual schemes."188
But isn't that Patterson's point? Winter has the burden of showing that a
conceptual scheme plays a necessary role when a human being follows a
rule. Simply because Winter assumes that conceptual schemes are a
necessary part of human cognition does not forbid Patterson from argning
that such a position implicitly maintains the need for mediating devicesconceptual schemes-as necessary for meaning. 89

185. Winter, supra note 178, at 1857.
186. Id. at 1857-59.
187. Id. at 1858 (quoting Patterson, supra note 169, at 1854).
188. Id. at 1859 (quoting Steven L. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense,MetaphoricReasoning, and
the Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1136 (1989)).
189. Patterson complains that Winter has not shown that "'objectified sedimentations' give rise
to meaning in the same way as human practices." Patterson, supra note 169, at 1850, quoted in
Winter, supra note 178, at 1860. Winter replies: "Yet my claim was precisely that 'social experiences
such as routine or habitual interactions hetween subjects give rise to mutual or reciprocal sedimentations.'" Winter, supra note 178, at 1860 (quoting Steven L. Winter. Indeterminacy and
Incommensurabilityin ConstitutionalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1488 (1990) [hereinafter Winter,
Indeterminacy]). Exasperatedly, he says, he has already "explained that the claim that cognition is
grounded means that 'already existing social practices and conditions ... form hoth the grounds of
intelligibility for andthehorizonsofourworld.'" Id. (quoting Winter, Indeterminacy, supra, at 1452).
But saying that social experiences give rise to sedimentations is not to say, much less show, that
sedimentations give rise to meaning. Nor does saying that social practices govern the ground of
intelligibility show that "objectified sedimentations" govern the grounds of intelligibility (as Winter
clearly believes), even if we assume that the grounds of intelligibility are the source of meaning.
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Winter heatedly denies that he "believes that there must be 'something
standing between the Constitution and our understanding of it ..... I
have argued, in contrast, that . . 'the meaning of [the Court's] consti-

tutional interpretation is as much a matter of... our interpretive commitments, as it is a matter of the understanding of the Justices.'"" g And
here one begins to see the problem: What exactly does Winter think this
"understanding" consists in? If it is a matter of interpretive commitments,
objectified sedimentations, and the like, then is Winter's outrage really
justified?191
Patterson is asking questions such as, "What sort of structures does
legal understanding have and how do these structures relate our understanding to legal practices in the world?" He is trying to get an account

of such understanding, but he is not frying to answer such questions as,
"How do they come to be what they are?" or "What makes them intelligible?" I am not even sure that Patterson would find the latter sort of

questions meaningful. 1
Patterson seems to me to be in the midst of an important career in our'
field. His fundamental insight has to do with the similar expectations, on

the part of a very diverse group of writers, about the necessary epistemological role of mediating devices in rule-following.Y He addresses
the question, and puts it at the center of jurisprudence: What do we need

190. Winter, supra note 178, at 1860 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Patterson, supra note 172, at
1846, and Winter, Indeterminacy, supra note 188, at 1229 (emphasis inoriginal)).
191. Patterson states that Winter helieves that "objectified sedimentations" stand as "something
outside ourselves" that "regulates what we do in law." Patterson, supra note 169, at 1854 (quoting
Winter, supra note 48, at 94). On the contrary, Winter replies: "I have explained that 'the concept
expresses theway meanings and assumptions build up within the subject and, once internalized, operate
without the subject's conscious awareness.'" Winter, supra note 48, at 1859 (quoting Winter,
Indeterminacy, supranote 189, at 1451 n.30). Surely this is precisely what Patterson had in mind: that
some structure outside ourselves-which is, I assume, what something must be if it is to be
"internalized"-plays a crucial role in determining our practices in law.
192. Patterson began his paper by describing two sorts of approaches in jurisprudence: One sought
to bring to bear essentially collateral perspectives on law in order to explain its operations; the other
hypothesized ideal formations in law and contrasted these with the status quo. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77. Some writers do both-for example, Marx or Mill. To this, Winter replies,
"Now, I've written about law (a little), and nothing I have done fits into either of these categories. In
fact, I have criticized both these approaches." Winter, supra note 178, at 1866. Winter describes his
approach as an effort to map "the diverse cognitive and cultural infrastructures that animate legal
doctrine and structure judicial decisionmaking. For this we need a new set of tools, which is why I
have devoted so much effort to the elaboration of the new conceptual developments in cognitive
science." Id. at 1867. This is, it would seem, a paradigmatic example of the first sort of approach
described by Patterson. It is an effort to account for law by reference to an underlying explanatory
system.
193. See Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction
of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REv. 1, 21 (1993) (dismissing the common reliance on "interpretation"
that scholars with otherwise differing viewpoints offer as a mediating device "between utterances and
the understanding of them").
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in order to know what to do, how to go on in the law? His insights into
this question are coupled with work on the logical status of propositions of
law-asking whether they are true or false, and if they are, what determines this. Patterson's work thus brings these two topics together, one
novel, one classic. To charge that he levels a similar claim against many
different sorts of thinkers is only a negative criticism if Patterson's claims
are unwarranted; otherwise, it merely measures the scope of his achievement. It is always difficult, as both Winter and Patterson doubtless know,
to argue philosophically in a law journal. My own view is that law has
much to teach philosophy 1" and that, until rather recently, jurisprudence
has not exploited the epistemological advances of post-war philosophy.
I was surely not the first person to conclude that jurisprudence consists
in the determination of what makes a proposition of law true. Formalism,
legal realism, positivism, and critical legal theory all provide answers to
this question. I think, ironically, that it has been a concentration on what
renders a legal statement true that has misled us. We think that an
understanding of a legal statement must consist in a grasp of what would
make it true and that such a grasp must consist in a knowledge of how we
could recognize that condition as obtaining. And therefore it is also widely
held that only by having a conclusive recognition that the condition
obtained could we give meaning to the statement itself, but this I deny.
My account of how a proposition acquires meaning differs from the
standard account, which is shared by all these schools, so that problems of
indeterminacy, authoritativeness, et cetera, do not have the same significance for me that they do for the schools of thought mentioned above.
It was in part to show this that I chose to analyze the situation of judicial

194. At the end of his rebuttal, Winter strips off his professorial shirt and declares (with respect
to legal practices):
Now, I've been out there. I spent eight years representing convicted and condemned
prisoners, parents whose children were shot by the police, and hard-working people who
were treated as second-class citizens and second-class workers solely because of their
race.... Patterson wants to leave the law as it is. I think we might do things a little
better.
Winter, supra note 178, at 1867. There are many things one might say about this outhurst, not the
least of which would be that it comes at the end of a paragraph that Winter begins by charging that
Patterson "mistakes my work for an attempt to justify law," when presumably the view that we should
do things better is a matter ofjustification. Id. But the thing that strikes me most about it is how very
unfair it is.
Patterson's wanting to leave law as it is is a reference, as Winter can't quite resist showing he
knows, to Wittgenstein's observation that philosophy leaves everything as it is.
LUDWIG
WrrTENSITEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 124 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958). It
simply means that jurisprudence clarifies but does not determine the law, just as we have now come
to believe that the philosophy of science was misguided when it declared relativity to be impossible.
It has nothing to do with law reform, or racism, or the personal biographies of the people who write
law review articles. I can think only that Winter may have been goaded into this sort of thing because
he himself feels unfairly treated, feels that Patterson has mistaken him for holding views-about the
need for mediating devices-that he believes he has distanced himself from.
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review. The demand for conclusive grounds-analogous to Descartes's
cogito-is a source of confusion, and not a source of the firm foundation
all were seeking.
Now my view is not that all legal propositions are neither true nor
false, nor that they have no truth conditions, but rather that a grasp of their
meaning cannot depend upon an ability to recognize those conditions as
obtaining in cases in which they can be conclusively so recognized. What
this implies, in turn, is that the meaning of the modalities of legal
statements cannot be represented as given by a determination of their truth
conditions. The account of meaning in terms of truth conditions has to be
replaced by an account of meaning in terms of the conditions under which
our practices legitimate our making such statements, including conditions
under which the legitimation may be overturned. What legitimates a legal
statement does so only in view of the facts of our common practices. This
is very much in sympathy with Patterson's efforts to treat law, jurisprudentially, as a practice.19
Patterson's aim is to show that law is best conceived not as an object
to be explained-for example, in terms of moral philosophy-but as a practice that is distinct from other practices while not wholly autonomous. For
Patterson, a proposition of law is true when the reasons advanced in
support of the proposition are such as to invite the assent of competent
professionals. Consistent with this, Patterson denies that doing law
correctly is a matter of correct "interpretation" because this would account
for the truth of propositions of law by reference to something outside the
legal discourse."
At the same time, Patterson has been attempting to chart the course of
postmodernism in jurisprudence, based on his views of the contemporary
connections between law and the philosophy of language. In his article
1 9' he describes postmodernism
PostmodernismFeminisml~aw,
as a
development in analytic philosophy, principally the philosophy of language.
To criticize the law from a normative perspective, the critic must now
show not only how the language of legal justification could better cope with
contemporary phenomena through the expansion of its discursive categories, but also that new vocabularies could in fact complement law and
not merely serve as external points of criticism. 98 Such an account of

195. See, e.g., Dennis M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism:A Theory of Law as Practice and
Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937, 940 (1990) ("[L]aw is an activity and not a thing. Its 'being' is in the
'doing' of the participants within the practice.").
196. See, e.g., id.'at944 (arguing that there is no interpretationthat mediates between a rule and
its application, but rather that reality and grammar are coextensive).
197. Dennis Patterson, Posrmodernism/Feminism/Law,77 CORNELL L. REv. 254 (1992).
198. Patterson cites approvingly Catharine MacKinnon's effort to develop legal discourse that
looks at rape from a woman's point of view. See id. at 259 (discussing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40-41 (1987)).
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knowledge, Patterson argues, does not spell the end of feminism as an
emancipatory discourse, but does require that the problem of normative
critiques of law be reconceived. 199
In conclusion to these comments, I would like to rely on an important
distinction in Postmodernism/Feminism/Lawthat has significance for my
own work in much the way that Powell's and Amar's other essays do.
That distinction is the one Patterson draws between the "modern" and
"modernism," and between the "postmodern" and "postmodernism. " '
And I would like to speculate on what the postmodern will bring us.
Patterson's jurisprudence is built on foundations that modernism long
ago abandoned, having assumed that skepticism had made them untenable.
Ironically, it is precisely skepticism that has killed the project of the
modern and that, along with self-reference, characterizes the faith of the
postmodern. When we realize that skepticism itself is a part of the nature
of belief, that the certainty on which modernism was founded and which
it promised is in fact no more than a part of the nature of belief, then we
will see that faith, which modernism felt forced to forsake, is satisfyingly
fertile for us. But I think that because that world needs faith, and because
we are so in need of faith-giving, a postmodern world will not be as brittle
(or as ironic) as the postmodernists are inclined to portray it. What can be
said of this world?
A postmodern era would be more ethical 2' than meritocratic because
it is self-conscious about the choices we make when we exalt one sort of
trait above others. It will be more constitutional than democratic because
it does not believe in the independent dimension of equality, being selfaware of the attributes by which equality is derived. It will be more
spiritual than theocratic, having learned that the will to power is equally
distributed among all institutions, including religious ones. And it will be
less legalistic for the same reason. It will take up a problem that is as new
to man's history as was the machine of the world for the premodern. That
problem may be stated as follows: How can we live meaningful lives when
the link between meaning and reality runs through ourselves-when there
is no description or explanation that excludes us, our limitations, our
perspective? This requires us to make decisions rather than follow
procedures (mathematical or otherwise), knowing that we are the architects
of such decisions (though not of the requirement). It raises a host of
subsidiary questions: How can we restore beauty when it has perished
through our own efforts, which efforts are indispensable to the well-being

199. See id. at 256-57 ("The choice between feminism and postmodernism is a false one....
Postmodernism poses no threat to feminism.").
200. See id. at 256 n.9.
201. Which is not to say it would be any more moral.
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of ourselves, who nevertheless would perish without beauty? How can we
ensure a peaceful world order when the state itself is a strategic instrument
whose diplomacy is ineffectual without force and when states are indispensable to order? How can we decide to preserve the priceless value of
life when we are all too aware of the decisions we make that depend on an
implicit pricing and the very preservation of life requires such decisions?
Law in such a skeptical, self-conscious world would tolerate different
visions not as "contradiction" but as a necessary function of man's
finiteness, the situated nature of all our perceptions, and the requirement
of choice-making imposed on us by our Creator. In international law, this
may mean nonuniversality; in constitutional law it could presage a revival
of federalism and the constitutional bases for nonjudicial governmental
decisions; in jurisprudence, the complete abandonment of modern questions, like the search for a single explanatory superstructure. There are
many possibilities.
One sad spectacle of modernity was the effort to try to make law a
god, and politics a religion.'
In a letter to me, Patterson replies to my
portrait of postmodernity by saying: What does a person like myself, who
has no faith in God, do?'
I think he has in mind my claim that conscience plays a crucial role in the sort of decisionmaking we have built into
the American constitutional system, and my further claim that "there is no
conscience without faith for without faith there is only expediency."'
I will return to this question in my Conclusion.
II.

Maps of Description

A.

J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson: ConstitutionalGrammar

In their lucid and engaging paper for this Symposium, Professors
Balkin and Levinson incorporate six common descriptions of my work,
from which they draw conclusions with which I disagree.
First, they argue from internal evidence that my list of the six
modalities of constitutional argument is incomplete without a seventh
modality (a view they share with Richard Markovits °5 and Frederick

202. E.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, THE GOOD SocIETY (1937).

203. Letter from Dennis Patterson to Philip Bobbitt (Oct. 17, 1994) (on file with author).
204. BoBBTrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at kvii.
205. Professor Markovits distinguishes between two types of moral norms that are differentiated
by the kind of moral discourse to which they are relevant. The type of moral norm that is found in
discourse about moral rights and duties Markovits labels "moral principles." The type that is found
in discourse aboutwhat the individual or the state "ought" to do, he labels "personal ultimate values."
According to Markovits, arguments of moral principle are not only part of legal discourse but are the
dominant mode of legal argument in that they control the appropriate definition, use. and even legitimacy of the other modes of argument that have been used in law. See RICHARD MARKOVITS, MORAL
REASONING AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IN THE AMERICAN LIBERAL STATE (forthcoming

1995 or 1996).
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Schauer'), although they derive this view in a unique and interesting
way. The source of our disagreement might come about in either of two
ways: First, they could believe, having surveyed the practices of American
constitutional argument, that I have simply omitted one widely practiced
form-that my list of six forms is not comprehensive because some
arguments cannot sensibly be made to fit in any of the six categories I
offer. Second, they could believe that my list is inadequate to decide
cases, and thus they infer that there must be an additional modality.
Insofar as it is the former, Balkin and Levinson simply dispute the
accuracy of my list and imagine that another form, natural law, is widely
used. I am dubious about that. Insofar as it is the latter, it means that
they do not accept the incommensurability of the modalities because the
addition of one (or a hundred) does not provide a rule for decision among
them. And this means that Balkin and Levinson are actually saying that
my list does not explain constitutional decision. But because I hold that it
is an error to require that the arguments of an opinion explain how the
decision was reached rather than how it can be rationalized, this is not an
argument, on my terms, for an additional modality.
Second, they conflate constitutional argument (an activity confined to
those persons whose decisions must be explained in terms of legal argument) with constitutional discourse (an activity that takes up the same
subjects, and which may include legal argument, but which, though constrained by its own modalities of argument, is not confined to legal
argument). This conflation arises, I think, because Balkin and Levinson
believe discourse to be entirely undifferentiated, so that what counts as a
legal argument is indistinguishable from nonlegal constitutional arguments.
To illustrate, I invite the reader simply to compare a passage in the
Federalist Papers with an argument in a judicial opinion relying on that
passage from the Papers. That these borders may be disputed-that there
is, in Balkin and Levinson's term, no "consensus "-rather proves my
point. For there would be no reason for radicals to dispute the inclusiveness of legal argument if in fact all were permitted?"
Third, they imagine, "because I claim that the legitimacy of constitutional argument is maintained and assessed solely by reference to the
practices of constitutional argument, that I am therefore disabled from
judging any actual practices to be illegitimate, and thus that I cannot
vindicate the American system of constitutional decisionmaking. Perhaps
because Balkin and Levinson are unable to distinguish between constitutional argument and constitutional discourse, they find it difficult to

206. Frederick Schauer, Remarks at Symposium on Recent Development in Political Theory, The
University of Texas School of Law (Feb. 4, 1994).
207. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1790.
208. 1 have in mind "radicals" like Raoul Berger, for example, as well as the usual suspects.
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extrapolate from actual practice to a determination of what sorts of
arguments fall within customary practice. And perhaps this gives force to
their conclusion that one who derives rules from practice must, perforce,
accept novel or aberrant practices as establishing new rules. This,
however, imagines that any act whatsoever is a "practice" within a field-a
highly implausible claim.
Fourth, they read me as committed to a present system of practices
that, insofar as it constitutes the standards of legitimate argument, cannot
admit of change in the law (because "new" arguments are necessarily
outside the current practice). Change, on Balkin and Levinson's view,
escapes my analysis because the very act of defining what is novel, from
an undifferentiated mass of acts, implies a legitimation by recognition, an
interpretive act whose normative content-assessing whether each act is
within the field of legitimate acts or not-is not permitted by my
description. If I rigorously adhere to the view-as I do-that practice alone
determines legitimacy, then any departure from that practice is illegitimate,
and here, Balkin and Levinson claim, there is no possibility for change.
Their conclusion, that I can neither account for nor admit change, rests on
an important misunderstanding. It translates my view that "legitimacy is
limited by practice" into "the acts that comprise practice limit legitimacy"" 9 when in fact many practices-legal argument among
them-have built-in mechanisms for change. The very practice itself
admits of, and indeed in some instances requires,2 1 change. Moreover,
as practices change, they carry with them legitimation, conferring
legitimacy on new acts. I think Balkin and Levinson take the view they do
because they cannot shake the expectation that something must legitimate
practice, or else we would be unable to draw lines between legitimate and
illegitimate practices.
Fifth, they believe my refusal to concede a hierarchy of modalities
implies a commitment to some sort of justification because one or the
other-an internal hierarchy or an external standard-is necessary to
specify a decisionmaking procedure by which conflicts can be resolved
according to rules. This too is simply an insistence on a particular kind of
explanation, namely, that following a rule always amounts to the same
thing. When we follow the rule by which historical argument is constructed, for example, we have well-known parameters that can be used to
construct a decision procedure."' Similarly, it is thought, we must be
209. This translation is complicated by the use of "practice" to mean a language game and also
an act within (or without) that language game.
210. Thus textual argument, which relies on the contemporary understanding of constitutional
language, requires a constant up-dating of the meaning of the terms.
211. Cf.JOHN P. MEIER, A MARGINAL Jaw 183 (1991) (eschewing simplistic criteria for judging
the historical accuracy of Christian scriptures because "[t]here will always be some difficult cases in
which no criterion applies or in which different criteria ... point in opposite directions").
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able to construct that kind of procedure to resolve extra-modality conflicts.
But here, Balkin and Levinson differ from me on what it means to follow
a rule at all. I did not wish to maintain that, even as to the conflicts within
modalities, the decider had to consult some parameter to make a decision;
I argue only that the parameter can be derived. So the lack of a parallel
parameter when the modalities conflict tells us something about the kind of
decision being made-that it is among incommensurables-but nothing
about whether a decision is possible or not.
Sixth, they take my reliance on the faculty of conscience as a kind of
"gambit" or metaphysical "simple" that, like the deus ex machina in the
playwright's arsenal, is deployed to extricate my analysis from an impossible situation. I will discuss this at length, but for now let me just label
this the "Jiminy Cricket" fallacy. It takes the formal expectation about
explanation discussed immediately above and combines it with a certain
view of conscience ("Always let your conscience be your guide."").
But these expectations are unimaginative ones for two such versatile and
creative minds as Balkin and Levinson and, in any case, are not compelled
by the nature of either decisionmaking or conscience.
All of these readings can be found in other commentary on my work,
but they are seldom made with the elegance and charity found in Balkin
and Levinson's paper. Rather than further take up these points one by one,
let me try to do justice to their paper by presenting them in the intertwined,
mutually supportive way in which they appear.
The various sorts of criticisms I have just outlined above seem to me
different, however, from the fundamental characterization that I will next
take up and that links them all. This is the "Grammarian" label that Balkin
and Levinson wish to affix to my lapel. I describe six constitutional
modalities. One can dispute the accuracy of my description by reference
to standards of description, the norms of accurate description. Do
American lawyers really argue this way? Is natural law prominent in
contemporary Supreme Court opinions? Such inquiries form one normative
basis for an assessment of the proffered description. It is a different matter
to dispute whether my approach is useful-also a normative assessment.
In my description of the modalities, the normative standards I use are
those of description, but this very normativity misleads Balkin and
Levinson into thinking that a larger evaluative mission is subtly at work.
They say that "Bobbitt's claims cannot be purely descriptive; they must
rather be interpretive and normative claims about what the norms of
argument should be in order for them to possess legitimacy."3 To this,

212. This was Jiminy Cricket's advice to Pinocchio. PINOCCHIO (Walt Disney Pictures 1940).
This view treats conscience as if it were an external guide to behavior, something we 'consult."
213. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1784.
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I demur. As a claim, it has force only if one is locked into the view that
legitimacy must consist in the validation of a practice by something
external to the practice in order to be legitimated.
Balkin and Levinson view my books as contributions to understanding
a constitutional grammar." 4 I am flattered by this opinion, but the
complement is one I must decline for, as Balkin and Levinson understand
the term, I'm afraid I am no grammarian. It is true that, in my law
classes, I spend a good deal of time with students practicing various kinds
of argument. Every professor does this-every one must, although perhaps
usually less self-consciously. In my case, I will sometimes correct an
argument that is poorly formed. Or I may say, "That is a conclusion.
Give me an argument." Or I may say, "That is not a legal argument.
Give me an argument in law." And this practice, the way a golf pro at a
country club might watch a club member hit tee shots, is meant to familiarize the student with the forms of constitutional argument. So it can be said
that I am (tacitly, perhaps) approving certain forms of argument, but the
reason I am doing so is because these forms of argument are the ones that
are approved-are validated by their ever-presence in the practice. The
"normativity" here is simply that the rules constituting a practice are
norms. It is not the normativity of justification. I am not approving these
forms of argument because I approve of them.
I do not legitimate these arguments, nor does my theory that they arise
from the superimposition of the forms of common-law argument onto state
action when the state was put under law by the American constitutional
innovation of limited state sovereignty. Legitimation occurs when actors
charged with deciding according to law frame their appeals and their
explanations in the ways of which my sketch of the modalities is a description. To put it briefly: Practice legitimates because legitimacy is a matter
of practice. Some may take my obstinate refusal to provide a nontrivial
validation of arguments as implying that legal propositions cannot therefore
be true or false. I do not deny that legal propositions have truthconditions. I deny only that these can be satisfied in any nontrivial
way-in any way external to the practice itself. A proposition of constitutional law is true if it forms part of the rationale offered in support of a
legal decision and if that rationale is composed of the kinds of arguments
recognized in legal practice as legitimate.
Clausewitz remarks that war has its own grammar, but not its own
logic.2" 5 Used in this way, Wittgenstein might have said, "Law has its
own grammar, but not its own logic," meaning that a particular form of

214. See id. at 1775.
215. CARL VON CLAUSEWrrZ, ON WAR 605 (Michael Howard & Peter Parct eds. & trans., 1984
ed., Princeton Univ. Press) (1832).
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life is expressed in acts, the regularity and success of which are validated
by repetition. Now that is not grammar as Balkin and Levinson, or as
most people, understand the term. Their sort of grammarian is well
described by Collingwood as follows:
A grammarian is not a kind of scientist studying the actual structure
of language; he is a kind of butcher, converting it from organic
tissue into marketable and edible joints. Language as it lives and
grows no more consists of verbs, nouns, and so forth than animals
as they live and grow consist of forehands, gammons, rump-steaks,
and other joints.216
One can see how important consensus is for this sort of grammarian.
He or she is not describing a practice, but is "converting" it into a
different practice altogether, one that would be unmanageable without
general agreement. Practices, however, consist in many kinds of uses.
Practices differ in kind-unlike the undifferentiated slab of meat that
arrives for the butcher's work, practices are already differentiated.217
Some are evaluative, some are legal, some are aesthetic, pedagogical,
political. Existing practices are subject to description-their contours,
though often disputed, can be discerned. Practices are legitimate before
they are described. They are bounded before their boundaries are drawn
by the cartographer. A cartographer's map may be adduced in a border
dispute, but that is only because the boundedness at issue was already well
understood.
Every language game has a certain grammar, by which I mean the
rules that enable a person to participate and thereby to understand that
language game. In even the simplest of human situations, there will be
many language games, overlaid as it were. Imagine two parents watching
their child play a little-league game. The rules that constrain the child
from running from first base directly to third are not part of the same
system of rules that constrain the father from shouting abuse at the
opposing pitcher or that constrain the coach from selling tickets. It is
difficult and artificial to separate out various language games, especially
because they so often influence each other." 8 Nevertheless, this is a task
to which I have set myself, because the rules of different language games

216. ROBIN G. COLLINOWOOD, THE PPINCIPLES OF ART 257 (1958).
217. An old friend describes how, when living in Paris and both hungry and impoverished, he
went into a boulangerieand asked for just 200 grams of patg. When the butcher gave him too much,
my friend objected, knowing he could not pay for it. But when the butcher then gave him too little,
my friend objected again, because he was so hungry. After several of these exchanges, as the butcher
put more back on the thin paper, and then took less away, always getting closer to the maximum my
friend could afford, the butcher finally said, in exasperation, "Monsieur, I am not a jeweler."
218. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 1,at 239 (noting that the way concepts are used within legal
conventions influences the uses of those concepts in other conventions).
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are distinct from one another. Making these rules evident, and describing
them scrupulously, is a task worth doing in its own right, and, as I will
argue, has various important uses.
In my attempt at this, however, Balkin and Levinson see me as confronting the following dilemma: If a grammarian takes the legitimacy of a
particular grammatical use to be determined by social practice, where does
he derive his authority to take normative positions with respect to particular
usages? 219 How many persons have to "misuse" the word "hopefully"
before the grammarian must concede that it has become a proper use? '
In my case, they see me playing a double game: While I profess to
derive legitimacy for legal argument from the use of the modalities, I also
want to be able to defend certain decisions and certain practices, and thus
I play both a descriptive and a normative role. Balkin and Levinson
conclude that I must either accept whatever is practiced or abandon my
pose as simply a descriptive observer. These descriptions depend on
several assumptions that I do not share, and especially on conflating the
ideas of legitimacy and justification and ignoring the distinction between
constitutional decisionmaking and constitutional discourse.
Thus, I am prepared to entertain a great many arguments I do not
endorse as legitimate; and indeed, I am able to criticize such arguments
precisely because the various modalities of argument give me standards by
which to do so. If I refuse to accept a form of argument-such as natural
law-as legitimate, it is only because I have not generally encountered it
in the rationales offered for constitutional decisions made on a legal basis.
I may be wrong, and I am perfectly willing to change my mind and add
new modalities as they appear with sufficient frequency in legal opinions." 1 But at present, at this moment in our history, there are six.
Structural argument flourished in the first half of the nineteenth century,
then languished during the next half.m After three-quarters of a century
of neglect, prudential argument steadily and methodically made headway,
owing in great measure to the genius of Louis Brandeis, and that of his
219. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1781.
220. See id. at 1773 n.7. This is the point of Balkin and Levinson'sAcademi~frangaiseanalogy.
This point of comparison has also been raised by Professor Allesandra Lippucci:
Bobbitt's insistence on requiring obedience to an academically sanctified tablet of
arguments is reminiscent of attempts by the stem grammarians of the early Academig
frangaise to legislate the forms and meters a poet could properly use in constructing a
poem.
Allesandra Lippucci, Bobbitt's NoselGnose: Severing Legitimation from Justification 13 (1994)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
221. See BOBBrrr, FATE, supra note 1, at 8 ("[N]ew approaches will be developed through
time.").
222. See generally id. at 74-92 (discussing the history and application of the structural modality
of argument); CHARLFsL. BLACK, JR., STRUCrU.EANDRELATIONSHIPIN CONSTrruTIoNALLAw3-32

(1969) (analyzing early constitutional cases from a structuralist point of view).
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intellectual descendants, Frankfurter, Bickel, and Ackerman. 2 Different
talents would surely have taken this development in a different direction.
It would not surprise me if some of the present forms should fall into
desuetude.
Balkin and Levinson see various difficulties in my position, as a
consequence of the misreadings I listed earlier. First, they suggest that
there may be more modalities than the ones I offer (and therefore that I
have applied a normative element in identifying the list I present).'
As
an illustration, they say that my description of one form, ethical argument,
strikes them as so contrived that it cannot be actually descriptive of current
practice, a signal that a normative, and not descriptive, agenda is at
work.'
Second, they assert that there is no consensus among practitioners as to what questions are really constitutional in nature and thus are
up for discussion, and therefore that the very delimiting of a domain of
activity as constituting the relevant practice depends upon a normative
decision.'
Third, Balkin and Levinson maintain that I cannot account
for change because the notion of legitimacy based on description is as static
as the description. 7 All of these points, save the last one, serve as a
basis for an indictment of disguised normativity. These objections are
easily met once it is established what I actually assert and believe.'
Of course, there is a normative element in my project of determining
the ways of legitimation, and that element is the descriptive. I am still not
persuaded that natural-law arguments are part of the list of legitimating
modalities, not because I think there is something troubling about introducing this sort of argument into our jurisprudence-although I do-but
because it simply is not there. Balkin and Levinson are able to find it only
by adding in the Gettysburg Address and other examples of constitutional
discussion that are not decisions according to law.Y 9 It is telling that
advocates of this position always end up by dragging out Justice Johnson's
concurrence in Fletcher v. Peck,' just as devotees of the dubious attack
on judicial review always cite Eakin v. Raub, 1 a dissenting opinion in
a state supreme court case. Samuel Johnson is reported as saying that if
one says, "There are no apples in that orchard," and is later shown two or

223. See BoBBrrr, FATE, supra note 1, at 61-65 (tracing the historical emergence of prudential
argument).
224. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1784.
225. Id. at 1785.
226. Id. at 1790.
227. Id. at 1791.
228. For this lack of clarity, I certainly do not blame Balkin and Levinson.
229. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1787.
230. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 143 (1810) (Johnson, J., concurring), cited in Balkin & Levinson,
supra note 79, at 1786 n.49.
231. 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 343 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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three fugitive fruits on the orchard ground, he is not really wrong. 2
There are no apples in that orchard; the fact that only two or three can be
found confirms, rather than disconfirms, the assertion.
My formal description of ethical argument is awkward, and it would
strike most practitioners as unfamiliar. But that is only because they are
unfamiliar with the terms in which I am expressing their activity, like the
man who was surprised to learn that he had been speaking prose all his
life. 3 I doubt that most constitutional advocates would really have been
so surprised to learn that they have written in briefs, or read in opinions,
arguments "whose force relies on a characterization of American institutions and the role within them of the American people."'
I have
attempted to ground, in unshakable legal sources, those decisions that are
based on a constitutional ethos; to this end, I have identified certain
constitutional texts-such as the Declaration of Independence, 5 the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 6 and
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments 2 7 -and constitutional rules, for
example, that generally no state may use any means that is forbidden the
federal government, that comport with the case law. 8 I leave to the
reader whether my redescriptions of Roe239 and Skinner'l are persuasive. But in7 any case, the decisive matter is whether my analysis fully
accounts for the decisions and can be applied to new situations. That the
persons making these arguments might identify them by different names or
describe them somewhat differently does not affect the general view I am
presenting.
Whether there is a consensus on what confers legitimacy is not a
matter of the modalities. One of the important parts of my work (to me)
is the identification of these forms of arguments as modalities-asaccomplishing their legitimation by providing the ways in which the truth of any

232. I am indebted to Charles L. Black, Jr. for this point.
233. "For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it." JEAN B.
MOU ER, THE WOULD-BR GENTLEMAN, reprintedin EIGHT PLAYS BY MoufERE 346 (Morris Bishop
trans., Modem Library College ed., Random House 1957) (1670).
234. BOBBTT, FATE, supra note 1, at 94.
235. I take it that the Declaration of Independence, by which the sovereignty of the American
people was asserted against that of George III, is a constitutional act, in that it establishes the ground
by which all subsequent constitutional acts are confirmed. Why else should ratification, for example,
confer authority on the text of the United States Constitution, but for the Declaration? And I take it
that while some subsequent constitutional acts were superseded by the Constitution (for example, the
Articles of Confederation), this is not the case with the Declaration,which stands on wholly different
grounds than the Articles, providing in fact the basis for the supersession of the Articles.
236. U.S. CONsr. amend. X1V, § 1, cl.
2.
237. Id. amends. IX, X.
238. See BOBBrrr, FATE, supra note 1, at 150-53.
239. See id. at 157-65 (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
240. See id. at 105-06 (discussing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
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proposition of constitutional law can be established, while not being either
true or false in themselves. The issue of whether such modalities are the
right ones-or whether we should have some other system of doing their
work-is a matter of justification. I am not surprised that there is no
consensus on this matter among academics, but fortunately, that is not
necessary to uphold the present system of legitimation.
Does that mean, then, that my work is necessarily bound to the
present system, that it cannot account for change, such as the development
of new modalities or new standards of arguments within the modalities?
Not at all. Because the constitutional system of establishing these forms
is entirely descriptive of practice, any change that is sufficiently widespread
becomes a legitimate participant. As I have remarked above, there have
been and I expect there will be changes in the number and composition of
the modalities ." Change is built into the system because the forms of
argument take their life from the general society. This is the idea of the
participatory Constitution expressed in ConstitutionalFate.U The notion
that my description of the constitutional process cannot account for change
is so widely asserted that it must give me pause. This charge was made
early on in an article in the Harvard Law Review with respect to
ConstitutionalFate,U3 and then faithfully repeated last year in the same
journal with respect to Constitutional Interpretation.' But there is
really nothing to it. The static quality of my description, which intelligent
critics such as these intuitively feel, inheres in the fact that it is a
description. It is, however, a description of a process that is necessarily
in transition all the time: the observers who characterize change are also
necessary participants in giving meaning. I meant to convey this in the
closing paragraphs of Constitutional Fate, in which I contrasted the
ongoing improvisational choreography of constitutional law with a photographic snapshot, an image that seems to me expressive of the usual law
review article.'

241.
242.
243.
... [he]

See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
BoBrrr, FATE, supra note 1, at 239.
Gudridge, supra note 82, at 1985 ("Clearly, Bobbitt leaves out something important when
does not even refer to the commerce clause transition or to the retreat from Reconstruction

244. Book Note, Legitinmacy and Justice in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1218, 1222 (1993) (reviewing BOBBiT, INTE
-RETATION,
supra note2) ("Linking the field of available
arguments within this elite discourse to social stability therefore has a 'don't rock the boat' effect.").
245. In the afterword to ConstitutionalFare, I stated:
Our teachers were wrong, captivated by a picture of a dancing class, ignoring the
inseparable unribboning relationship between the motion that law must be and the
participant-spectators whose presence makes the motion meaningful. In the work that
preceded this Afterword, we follow the body of thought as we might that of a dancer.
The Book is organized to make the reader attentive to the postures and attitudes learned
at the mirror so painfully.
BOBBrrr, FATE, supra note 1, at 249.
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The press of the world is never far from Balkin and Levinson's
questions; that is why, I surmise, they are so attentive to the importance
and diversity of constitutional discourse. In what I take to be a particularly
Levinsonesque passage,' I am asked whether, in the unlikely prospect
that I were to sit in the U.S. Senate, I would require that a nominee for the
Supreme Court must endorse all the forms of argument to be acceptable to
me as a Justice; and, if the nominee did so, whether or not I would feel
bound not to make any further inquiries; and if, having given a prominent
role to conscience in my work, I am not obliged to discuss a nominee's
personal background. 7 I imagine these concerns to be prompted by a
chapter in ConstitutionalInterpretationin which I discuss the institutional
jurisprudence of Robert Bork, and in which I say that his attacks on the
legitimacy of Warren Court decisions-rather than attacks on their holdings-made him an unacceptable choice.'
It is true that I would be
skeptically inclined toward any Justice who renounced whole forms of
argument, although I would observe that Judge Bork, in his work on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, used
all six forms as the occasion arose, and that it was Professor Bork who was
so contemptuous of certain forms. 9 What, after all, is "judicial
philosophy" if it is not the belief that certain forms of argument may
provide a legitimate basis for a judicial opinion? But I am not willing to
say this should always be the decisive factor; in any case, it is usually
more a matter of emphasis and style (style for a judge being the preference
for certain forms of argument over others) than complete rejection.
Despite their rhetoric off the Court, Justice Frankfurter relied on textual
arguments'
and Justice Black relied on prudential arguments,"
though not so often as the forms they preferred.
I certainly am not willing to say that simple acknowledgment of the
prevailing forms is sufficient to earn the Senate's consent to appointment.
The Bork chapter in ConstitutionalInterpretationbegins with an extensive
review of this question and relies on the superb analysis by Charles Black
that, to my mind, conclusively established the requirement for a larger

246. It is rare in my experience that a political scientist is able to so adroitly mix issues of contemporary politics and constitutional law. For another example of this combination, see JEFFREY K.
TuLs, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY (1987).
247. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1794-95.
248. See generally BoBBirr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 88-108.
249. See generally id.
250. See, e.g., National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646-47 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J.,dissenting) ("[W]hen the Constitution in turn gives strict definition of power or
specific limitations upon it we cannot extend the definition or remove the translation.").
251. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (Black, J.,dissenting)
(arguing that legislatures should have the power to regulate the length of trains because of the danger
to railroad employees).
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inquiry beyond the merely judicial? 2 Interestingly, Black-the supreme
structuralist of our era 3-methodically addresses the question of the
scope of senatorial inquiry by taking up each and every one of the forms
of argument.2 4
But I doubt that Balkin and Levinson would let me off so easily, for
Black's subtle argument appears to pose some peril for my position, as well
as offering a harbor. Black argues that the Senate is obliged to inquire into
the same matters regarding a nominee as does the President; how else
could it give either its advice or its genuine consent to a decision, if the
latter were based on considerations to which the Senate was barred? 2 5
Balkin and Levinson, in their hypothetical, implicitly ask: How can Bobbitt
separate law and politics, as he so often seems to do, and accept Black's
position regarding the scope of inquiry for judicial nominees? (This point
is analogous to other claims in their essay that de-limiting the availability
of certain forms of argument is necessarily a normative, political act.)
This riposte overlooks, I believe, the textual command in the Constitution that animates the Senate inquiry. The Senate is directed not merely
to approve, but to advise and consent. 6 Black's argument hinges on
construing this command. But for this constitutional-this legal-directive,
Senate inquiry might of course be a matter of politics alone. Instead, the
Constitution virtually mandates, here as elsewhere, a political inquiry.
Whereas Balkin and Levinson would portray my Constitution as one with
the politics left out-a portrait that I disown-I often find a tendency in
contemporary constitutional criticism to depict a Constitution with the law
left out. 7 The available forms of argument are different for those
deciders who are confined to legal argument-like government officials
sometimes are-and those who are not. Sometimes, as in the confirmation
example, the forms of legal argument (here, the text) will direct the
decider to enlarge her list. And sometimes those deciders who are not so
limited-the People, for example-will wish to consult the specifically legal
forms, as I shall discuss below.
Balkin and Levinson misread me if they believe it is my mission to
purify legal argument. The grammarian's dilemma they describe is no
different from the law professor's dilemma that arises when a professor

252. See BoBmTT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 83-86 (discussing Charles L. Black, Jr., A
Note on Senatorial Considerationof Supreme CourtNominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657 (1970)).
253. See BLACK, supra note 222 (reintroducing structural argument to American constitutional
interpretation).
254. See BoBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 83-86 (discussing Black, supra note 252).
255. See id. (discussing Black, supra note 252).
256. U.S. CONsr. art. H, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint... Judges of the supreme Court . .).
257. And so, on this issue, I must associate myself with the curmudgeonly Henry Monaghan. See
Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981).
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characterizes a decision of an authoritative court-say the construction of
a state statute by a state's high court-as erroneous. 21 Insofar as the law
professor is confining herself to legal argument, she is employing the same
rules as the court she criticizes; that they may be in error in acting
according to those rules is a necessary consequence of there being rules to
follow. Insofar as Balkin and Levinson treat my discussion of the
legitimating modalities, they confuse matters by depicting my approach as
a dual enterprise of description and prescription, 9 when in fact the latter
is wholly determined by the former. Prescription with respect to a form
of life is detached from description only when it arises from another,
collateral (and therefore not a legitimating) form-say, justification, which
has, of course, its own description from which arise the standards of
prescription that are then overlaid on the subject to be assessed. The word
"normative" therefore becomes, in Balkin and Levinson's hands, a very
obscuring term: It means the "policing" of a practice by standards wholly
derived from that practice ("That's not how to play chess!"), as well as the
assessment of a practice according to the standards of a collateral practice
("That's not how a gentleman would play chess!").
If this landscape is not kept clearly in mind, a number of conundra
will quickly appear; thus, Balkin and Levinson are led to conclude that the
question of whether a statement is grammatically correct must have a
normative, nonpractice element, even though they must know that this
sacrifices the legitimating force of grammar based on practice alone. A
"bit" of external normativity is utterly spoiling because the decision of how
much of a "bit" is required must also rest on external grounds.
The failure to keep these ideas distinct even infects the critical (as
opposed to the legal) enterprise. Thus, Balkin and Levinson observe that
there must be a normative element in my selection of the six modalities-in
my identification of these as arising from practice. And of course, this is
true. This normative element is not a legal matter, but rather comes from
an anthropological, historical, and empirical assessment of what arguments
appear to re-occur in legal texts and oral arguments. The normative
element in one form of life arises from practices in that form, even if the
purpose of this application is to determine the prevailing practices of
another form. One example is Margaret Mead on Samoa, who was recording data according to a particular socio-anthropological school, with respect
to practices that would have been, one may assume, exotic at the New

258. This is a dilemma for the Legal Realist and the Positivist. If the Constitution is no more than
"what the judges say it is," then how can an authoritative holding ever be wrong? But this is hardly
my position. For me, it is the way that judges say what the Constitution means that determines whether
the holding is right or wrong. That they might misapply their own forms, or ignore others, is inherent
in the existence of rules to follow in the first place.
259. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1780.
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Another example is the undercover agent
School of Social Research.'
who all the while is preparing for the arrest of his unwitting confederates.
Accordingly, when Balkin and Levinson argue that no set of linguistic
practices can be self-legitimating (with which I disagree), they are really
arguing that no set of linguistic practices can be self-contained (with which
I agree)." 1 The latter, in my view, does not determine the former.
By iguoring this fundamental idea, Balkin and Levinson are led to the
following depiction of my thesis: The role I reserve for conscience (as that
faculty by which we choose among incommensurables) must be available
to choose among competing arguments within a modality-for example, to
choose which of two textual arguments is correct. 2 This is a gross
misreading. For, within a single modality, the arguments are entirely
comparable; the standards for the better argument are supplied by the
modality itself. For example, there are well-developed canons of historical
assessment against which can be measured competing historical arguments
This, however, raises another issue: Is there no
in constitutional law.'
role for the conscience to resolve the conflicts that arise within a modality?
My belief is that there is such a role, but it is distinct from that played
when the modalities conflict. Suppose, for example, that there is
conflicting historical evidence about the intent evidenced by a certain
revision at the Constitutional Convention. Madison's notes suggest one set
of facts; other accounts differ from this. Once the decider has conscientiously applied the canons of historical judgment to no avail, she must
resort to conscience, by which I mean the unreasoning decision itself. The
difference between this situation and that of a conflict between (or among)
the modalities, rather than within a single one, is that some fact-iu the
example given, the discovery of clarifying notes that resolve the conflict-can always appear to bring harmony within a modality, whereas no
fact can accomplish this among different forms of argument.'
Balkin and Levinson's map of description plays itself out in the most
pervasive theme of their paper, the conflation of constitutional argument
and constitutional discourse. If we bear in mind that the normative
assessment of one form of life (constitutional discourse) can be brought to
bear on another form of life (constitutional law) without having to arise as

260. See generally MARGARET MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
OF PriMrIVE YOUTH FOR WESTERN CIVILISATION (1928).

261. Balkin and Levinson portray me as holding that "[e]ach lived practice of constitutional
argument, because and to the extent that it is lived by us, is self-contained." Balkin & Levinson, supra
note 79, at 1779.
262. Id. at 1798-1800.
263. See, e.g., Symposium, The RepresentationofflistoricalEvents, 26 Hisr. & THEORY 1 (1987)
(discussing the merits of various methods of representing history).
264. Of course, a fact-a new decision, for example, that affects doctrinal argument-may bring
a recalcitrant modality into harmony with others.
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a practice within the latter to be legitimate, then a number of problems
dissolve. It becomes quite possible to admit moral arguments as relevant
to our constitutional life without giving them a status as legal arguments;
and their presence in our political discourse does not require us to deny
them legitimacy or to corrupt our forms of decision according to law.
American constitutional law can be a profoundly moral enterprise, but
"Morality is not a Modality" in constitutional law; it clearly is in
constitutional discourse. Similarly, I can claim that Tushnet's sole reliance
on prudentialism is illegitimate as a matter of law,' while not in the
least denying its legitimacy as a matter of academic assertion and discussion.
Balkin and Levinson offer descriptions (even if they are sometimes
misreadings), rather than mistaken explanations, because they provide a
coherent overlay, an alternative description, of the territory I have been
mapping, although it is one that does not always correspond to my particular understanding of the terrain. Whether Schauer and Markovits are
right that there must be a seventh, moralizing modality to organize the
others, is an interesting subject for debate. Similarly, whether the
descriptive grammarian is actually discovering the structuralist necessities
of a practice, and therefore is bound by whatever practices are found, or
whether the descriptive grammarian is relying on normative assessments as
to what counts as a legitimate practice, and therefore can never claim to
merely reflect practice, is a debate that has been pursued for a long time
among anthropologists.'
It is not a debate in which I have more than
a passing interest because my own view is that the historical contingency
of the observer both undermines the claim to discovery and makes the
charge of normativity vacuous. The issue is not whether there are rules
being applied in the description of rules. Of course there are.
One of the objectives of my work in developing this kind of grammar
of constitutional law has been to enable constitutional decisionmakers to
take up nonjudicial questions and to enable nonjudicial decisionmakers to
take up constitutional questions generally, from a legal point of view. The
chapters in Constitutional Interpretation on the confirmation hearings of
Robert Bork 7 and the analysis of the presidential actions in the IranContra Affair," 8 as well as my recent essay on war powers, 2" contain

265. See Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 15, at 1241 (criticizing Tushnet for reducing
theorizing to "tactical political maneuvering").
266. See E. ADASON HOEBEL, ANTHROPOLOGY: THE STUDY OF MAN 600 (4th ed. 1972)
(expressing the difficulty some linguistic anthropologists have in divorcing their own attitudes from the
study of language).
267. See BoBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 83-108.
268. See id. at 64-82.
269. See Bobbitt, War Powers, supra note 6.
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examples of the former-officials who, though not judges, are required to
make constitutional decisions. In the absence of judicial precedent, it still
ought to be possible for members of Congress and the Executive Branch
to reach valid constitutional conclusions as to matters that may never be
tested judicially.' The same availability of constitutional argument must
occur for citizens at large so that they can assess the validity of the
decisions made in their name by officials. I think this is an important task.
But it is easy to be confused by it. Many have read me to believe that
the general public is confined to legal argument alone in its discussions of,
for example, an amendment to the Constitution. I do not believe this;
rather, I think the modal grammar I have described is useful in crafting
legal arguments by those who are so confined-constitutional deciders
whose authority is delegated to them by the people under legal rules-and
by the public at large in evaluating the work of their delegees, who include
those who are so confined: the courts, the President, the Congress, and
various state bodies and agencies. Moreover, the delegees themselves are
confined to legal argument only when making legal decisions with respect
to the application of the Constitution. Whether or not to have a balanced
budget amendment is not an issue that the legal construction of the
Constitution will settle.
It is a different kind of misreading to conclude that the role I have
described for the conscience is a kind of trap door for a grammar of
decisionmaking otherwise confined to decisions according to the rules of
the various modalities. Here, the misreading occurs not out of an inattention to differences of nuance among similar things, but out of a severe
expectation that everything can be analyzed in the same way.
By giving the role to conscience that I do, several points can be made
perspicuous: first, how competing values, as described in Tragic Choices
and ConstitutionalFate, can come to prominence in cycles; 271 second,
how values are instantiated by choice and do not exist except as subjects
for discussion in the absence of choice; and finally, how the constraint of
practice as the sole legitimating force can nevertheless be harnessed to
moral commitments that can be described by, but do not constitute, a
practice. Our values are not forms of life, any more than a color is an
attribute of an atom.

270. See Brest, supra note 27 (analyzing the issue of constitutional interpretation by federal
branches of government other than the judiciary). For an excellent piece in this Review showing how
this can be done, see Christine E. Burgess, Note, When May a President Refuse to Enforce the Law?,
72 TEX. L. REV. 631 (1993).
271. See BOBErr, FATE, supra note 1, at 248 (using as an illustration "the game of
scissors/paper/stone with its circular hierarchy that brings different values to a decisive but momentary
preeminence and is then replayed"); GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBrrr, TRAGIC CHOICES 196, 19599 (1978) ("IT]he admission that cycle strategy occurs is an admission that society is attempting to
preserve essential yet conflicting values.").
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There are, however, perfectly respectable views that all such human
events-the acts of conscience as well as the legitimating of argumentscan be reduced to a common analysis. One such view is behaviorism. It
is an interesting, though to my mind impoverished, map, derivative in its
way of a Spinozistic determinism. Whatever its merits, however, it is not
my view, not my map. Of the many excellent essays that depend upon the
sort of descriptions I have noted,' the paper by Balkin and Levinson in
this Symposium is the most carefully argued and has a unity that is characteristic of the best law review articles.
B.

Stephen Griffin: Pluralismin ConstitutionalInterpretation

For Dennis Patterson, the important point of the argument in
ConstitutionalInterpretationis that the forms of argument are modalitiesthat they are not propositions of law, and are neither true nor false, but are
the way in which propositions of law are determined to be true or
false. 2' For Stephen Griffin, the important point is that the forms of
argument comprise a family of arguments, each distinctive in some
respects, each bearing resemblances to the others, but all indisputably
legitimate. 4
ConstitutionalFate was the first book of which I am aware that
identified the six forms of argument and argued that a general theory would
have to accommodate all of these forms. Nineteenth-century scholars
produced lists of legitimate forms of argument, but they did not appear to
think that the constituent members of these lists are competing forms.
Twentieth-century writers accepted the competition of the forms, but this
led them to abandon a comprehensive list, instead isolating a favored form,
which in turn led to the interpretivist-noninterpretivist and originalistnonoriginalist debates. Stephen Griffin reminds us how this debate has
ignored what he terms "pluralistic" theories of interpretation. Griffin's
paper has the mark of the map of description because it recategorizes ideas
in a new and helpful way (as opposed to beginning with categories from
which the writer's ideas are said to derive and thus to which they must be
made to conform). Griffin's list of pluralists includes Robert Post and
Richard Fallon,'7 and I am pleased to be put in such company. Both of
these talented and interesting thinkers were early supporters of my efforts
and tried-as the editors of this Symposium have tried-to bring my work

272. A note on ConstitutionalInterpretationin the HarvardLawReviewcomes to mind. See Book

Note, supra note 244.
273. See supra subpart I(C).
274. See Griffin, supra note 170, at 1761 ("Each theory of constitutional interpretation is grounded
in a recognized source of law, drawing strength from the authority of that source.").
275. See id. at 1753.
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to light. Yet each scholar has his own distinctive views that do not derive
from mine (or from anywhere else, I imagine). A critic like Griffin
succeeds in grouping all of these writers together without erasing their
differences.
Having identified a group that shares an idea, Griffin sets about
assessing that idea: What do the pluralists offer? He accomplishes this by
first asking: What would a general theory of the Constitution offer?
First, he argues that a general theory must provide a means by which
all the provisions of the Constitution can be construedY 6 Usually, the
theorist focuses only on the Due Process Clause, or the Equal Protection
Clause, or another of the majestic generalities. Griffin rightly argues that
this is insufficient, and he suggests that focus on the clauses of the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments has distorted constitutional theory by
making single-source theories look more useful than they really are.'m
One is more likely to be tempted by textualism, to the exclusion of all else,
if the text one is construing is the awe-inspiring First Amendment, than if
one had to make the theory work for, say, "Letters of Marque and
Reprisal." 278
Second, Griffin proposes that a general constitutional theory must be
fully descriptive. 9 That is, it must be comprehensive enough to account
for all the rules that are followed in construing the Constitution. Because
contemporary scholarship has so heavily concentrated on the normative,
Griffin writes that it is not clear that the current debate even recognizes the
descriptive requirement.'
With much insight, he observes that the very
resilience of competing single-source theories testifies to the actual
pluralism of reality: the advocates of a single mode can always find support
in the cases even when they disagree as to what that mode ought to be."
One consequence of Griffin's attentiveness to the descriptive is his acute
remark that the Supreme Court has never ranked the forms of
argument.'
This practice can be contrasted, by the way, with the
canons of international law'
and with the methods of statutory
276. Id. He also mentions Daniel Farber and Cass Sunstein, two of the most productive and
exciting scholars in this field, although Griffin indicates more doubt as to whether they are properly
grouped together with the others as "pluralists." Id.
277. See id. at 1755 (noting that even if a single-source theory prevailed in the debates over these
specific clauses, "we would still not have a general theory of constitutional interpretation").
278. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
279. Griffin, supra note 170, at 1756.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 1761 ("Partisans of a particular theory of interpretation can always take comfort
in the fact that their theory is used somewhere in American law ...
282. Id. at 1757.
283. George K. Walker, Sources of InternationalLaw and the Restatement (Third), Foreign
Relations Law of the United States, 37 NAVAL L. REv. 1, 43-44 (1988) ("At the international level
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interpretation,' and I suggest that this practice has to do at bottom with
the differing concepts of sovereignty and delegation that underlie these
three types of construction.
Griffin appreciates that the radical idea of subjecting the state to law
was extrapolated from subjecting persons to law; this idea would subject
the officials constituting government, as agents of the people, to the
familiar rules of agency."8 I think that in this way it may be said that
American constitutional law grew out of international law. International
law also arose as an extrapolation of the idea that individual persons were
the subject of legal relations. The earliest international law simply
replicates the forms of law persisting among princes-legal rules governing
inheritance and descent (property), the law of treaties (contracts), the law
of war (torts and crimes)-and applies them to the state apparatus that
assisted and eventually supplanted princes. The American innovation
simply takes this one step further by severing sovereignty (also a personal,
anthropomorphic idea) from the state.
In Griffin's view, this sort of constitution requires general rules,
which require interpretation, which requires normative judgments. 6
Thus, disagreements over policy become disagreements over interpretation.
I am sure that I do not entirely agree with the reasoning behind this
conclusion-although Balkin and Levinson's paper in this Symposium
draws on similar arguments2 -but there is no doubt that the American
tradition puts legal questions in play in the political process in a way that
does not occur in other Western democracies. Griffin points us to
Damaska's important work in comparative law to support this assertion,
and he is right to do so." s On the other hand, his introduction of John
Marshall's efforts to separate law and politics 9 cuts against Griffin's
claims, I think. Whereas Griffin concludes that "Marshall and the Justices
who followed him did not attempt to develop a method of interpretation
that squarely confronted the unique status of the Constitution," but instead

..
, there is equality of rank among three basic sources-treaties, custom, and general
principles-with the possible applicability of lower-ranking sources, judicial discussions, experts'
writings, and perhaps resolutions of international organizations-plus the uncertain status of jus
cogens.").
284. See Bresgal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1987) ("In construing a statute...
the Court looks first to the language of the statute itself, then to its legislative history, and then to the
interpretation given to it by its administering agency.").
285. Griffin, supra note 170, at 1758.
286. Id. at 1759.
287. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 79, at 1785 (noting that they have an interpretive
disagreement over the content of ethical argument and that this disagreement is "unavoidably critical
and normative").
288. Griffin, supra note 170, at 1759 n.32 (citing MIRiAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE

AND STATE AuTHoRITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 46, 48 (1986)).

289. Id. at 1760.
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"enforced their understanding of the Constitution as law by employing
methods of interpretation appropriate to the various sources of American
law,"2' I am inclined to read these developments in the opposite way.
The fundamental template for doctrinal argument, I will argue in
ConstitutionalAnalysis, actually arises from the unique American role for
law governing the state and the consequent American separation of law and
politics. When the state is an instrument of a politicized sovereign, such
a separation makes no sense; but when the state is merely the politicized
agent of a sovereign with many competing sources for law, including but
not limited to politics, efforts at such a separation are fundamental and
inevitable. This fundamental consequence of limited sovereignty irks
political theorists, who are always complaining that European political
theory is so much more interesting. And it may also be what makes their
efforts so marginal in our political (and constitutional) life. Marshall's
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland291 gives us the clear statement of this
doctrinal template: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 2'
I believe every
doctrinal schema can be derived from this statement, and I will endeavor
to demonstrate this in ConstitutionalAnalysis. Moreover, I will attempt to
reconcile these two theories (the modal and the genetic) in that work, in a
way that confirms Griffin's endorsement of pluralistic styles for a general
theory.
Griffin's argument for the superiority of pluralistic theories on
normative grounds is not fully developed in his piece for this Symposium.
4e recognizes this,2' and one is eager to see his future papers on this
subject. After comparing various pluralistic theorists, Griffin concludes
with a fascinating argument to which I should like to draw attention.
Arguing that such theorists should not be embarrassed by the obvious
conflict in the modes of argument, and the fact that there is no implicit way
of resolving such conflicts provided by the modalities themselves, he
accuses those who demand such a resolution of a kind of category mistake.2'
Resolving the conflicts between and among arguments drawn
from competing modalities is the job of judges, not theorists, he
maintains.295 Scholars should not aspire to be judges and decide cases

290. Id.
291. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
292. Id. at 421.
293. Griffin, supra note 170, at 1757 ("1 will postpone inquiry into whether pluralistic theories
are normatively superior... ').
294. Id. at 1767.
295. Id. at 1768.
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through their scholarship. They should be interested, instead, in pursuing
truth.
This puts Griffin firmly on the side of my distinguished colleague
Sanford Levinson in his debate with Judge Harry Edwards. 2' To my
chagrin, I find myself disagreeing with Griffin and Levinson, though I am
honored by the company of Judge Edwards. I do not mean that legal
scholarship ought to transform itself into the memoranda of an academy of
clerks. But I do think that the pursuit of truth requires the theorist to

account for the remarkable phenomenon of the resolution of conflict when
the means of determining truth conditions-the modalities-continue to
conflict and resist coming to closure. For one thing, I may be wrong: It

may be that there does exist a hierarchy or other external rule for
resolution that does not compromise legitimacy, and if this is so, it is a
worthwhile task of the critic to describe this. For another, the fact that
decisions get made is a truth itself worth understanding.
I wonder if, instead, Griffin may be urging theorists to avoid
prescribing decisions. If this is the case, then his paper must be associated
with Powell's tour de force in this Symposium, and he has ended his
contribution, as Powell began his, on a most profound note.
Ill. Maps of Explanation

An essay on ConstitutionalInterpretation(or any other subject) may
be said to rest upon explanations, rather than descriptions, when it goes
beyond the misunderstanding of an argument-as for example, by adding
in speculation about motivation.' Thus, Martin Redish's 1984 essay in
the Michigan Law Review is description, though a complete misreading of
ConstitutionalFate.29 There is something hilarious, even Feydeauesque,
about such a reading, in that it so relentlessly misses the point, as a

296. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 36 (1992) (lamenting that too few professors are providing articles
that have utility for judges); Sanford Levinson, The Audience of ConstitutionalMeta-Theory (Or, Why,
and to Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 389. 389 (1992) (lamenting that
professors identify too much with judges and not enough with lawyers).
297. Let me illustrate. In my office in Austin, I have a wonderful cartoon by the brilliant and
mordant artist, Tom Kleh. At the right hand side of the picture is depicted an easel, holding a portrait
of a sitting man, who is balding and middle-aged, dressed in a suit. At the left side of Kleh's picture
sits the subject, just as he has becn portrayed. In front of him stands the painter, besmocked, his
palette in his left hand. In his right hand is held a paintbrush, with which the painter appears to be
carefully putting the finishing touches on the man himself. This is a typical flaw in the map of explanation, and I think it is what usually happens when the critic attempts to infer ideas from a biography.
298. Martin H. Redish, JudicialReview andConstitutionalEthics, 82 MicH. L. REv. 665 (1984)
(reviewing BoBBrrr, FATE, supra note 1). Redish writes that the book is little more than a rehash of
constitutional argument and that there is little point in the book's typology of constitutional modalities.
Id. at 665-66. Redish also views as unoriginal the suggestion that ethical arguments are compelling.
Id. at 671.
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character in a farce just enters the room when the person who would clear
matters up has exited by another door. Because Professor Redish's formal
expectations were so entrenched, he was apparently disabled entirely from
even suspecting that something was going on in a book other than the
failure to do the only thing he thought could be done with the subject. As
the distinguished philosopher Mark Sagoff put it,
readers may think Constitutional Fate presents a theory of the
Constitution or of judicial review when it does no such thing; rather
it is a book about theory and the relation of theorizing to history.
The book ought to be read as a philosophy of constitutional history,
as if history had a certain epistemology that could be understood by
looking at the theories people have used to justify what they do on
constitutional grounds. Everybody has a theory of judicial review
ont these days, so it is inevitable that people would read the book as
another theory. 2'
The expectation that Sagoff identifies is the source, I think, of some of the
descriptions to which some of my work has been subject.
But a map of explanations takes us into a different terrain altogether.
It is the second prong of the unfortunately ubiquitous characterization in
legal criticism that the author to be criticized is either a fool or a knave.
For the misreader who offers a description, the writer being described is
sometimes merely foolish. For the critic drafting a mistaken explanatory
guide, the writer to be explained is personally flawed, motivated by corrupt
intentions, or self-deluded. The watermarks of this sort of criticism are the
cropped quotation, and the string of out-of-context phrases, and the wounding or supercilious personal characterization. In the present Symposium,
there are regrettably two candidates for this abrasive but often entertaining
style.
A.

Mark Thshnet: Justificationin ConstitutionalAdjudication

To have your work assessed by Mark Tushnet is a little like having
your biography written by Robert Caro. In previous pieces, Tushnet has
accused Laurence Tribe of twisting his constitutional analysis to position
himself for appointment to the Supreme Court' and has doubted in print
the honesty of one of my colleagues for no greater an offense than relying
on historical argument ("in [his] hands, it is simply a lie")."°1 This is
unfortunate, I think; Tushnet correctly notes in his piece for this

299. Letter from Mark Sagoff to Philip Bobbitt (Dec. 7, 1983) (on file with author).
300. Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694, 710 (1980) (reviewing LAURENCE H.
TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)).
301. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 24 n.4 (1988).
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Symposium that I was "appalled" at this sort of thing.'
It is particularly sad because he happens tobe building one of the most significant
bodies of work in constitutional scholarship today. Moreover, Tushnet is
not one of those hypocritical spirits who damns others while ignoring the
mistakes in his own work; he is, it seems to me, refreshingly self-critical
and always willing to listen to (and even to hear) adverse comment, even
to the point of publicly confessing error and changing his mind in
print.'
A person of such moral stature has more to lose than most
when he stoops to speculation about the motives of those with whom he
disagrees. I can only speculate myself that this is a consequence of the
facile psychologizing that so saturates the social sciences and journalism in
our era.
Three kinds of mischaracterization of my views seem to me to mar
Tushnet's paper. First, he crops quotations from my books in a way that
distorts my views, and then, relies on the view that does emerge as the
basis for criticism of my opinions as a whole. Second, he imagines me to
have discreditable motives based, it happens, on a false and misleading
account of my nonacademic work (though I am certain this is inadvertent).
Finally, he gives partial accounts of my opinions that are not consistent
with my views taken as a whole. I will take up each of these practices, not
because I must deflect any animus towards me-I don't think there is anybut because they are characteristic of a certain kind of criticism.
Tushnet reports that I say that my conclusions in ConstitutionalFate
"precipitated other questions . . . [that] are the next frontier for
constitutional jurisprudence,"' so that he may, understandably, indict
me for pomposity. In fact, I wrote:
It was the attempt to meet this Objection that generated my
description and discussion of six modalities of constitutional
argument. These, I argued, maintained the legitimacy of judicial
review in the United States. None of the modalities I identified,
taken singly or together, justify judicial review....
My conclusions precipitated other questions.
How was
legitimacy then distinguished from justification? For if the modalities
of argument could not justify judicial review, then surely arguments
and opinions that followed these modalities could not justify their

302. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1708 n.7.
303. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutionalinterpretation,Character,and Experience, 72 B.U.
L. REV. 747, 747 (1992) (admitting the flaws in his earlier understanding of ConstitutionalFate). I
cannot cite this generous reference to my work without ruefully noting that the author wrote this after
having been subjected to my rather remorseless review of his Red, White, and Blue. See Bobbitt, Is
Law Politics?, supra note 15 (reviewing TUSHNET, supra note 301). It is hard not to appreciate such
generosity.
304. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1712-13 (quoting BOBBrT, INTERPRETATION, supranote 2, at 9).
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outcomes. Were there other practices of constitutional review
outside the judiciary that might also employ these modalities to reach
legitimate constitutional decisions? And above all, what if the
conscientious adherence to these modalities resulted in contradictory
outcomes?... If both were legitimate, as it seemed, which was
right? These sorts of questions are the next frontier for constitutional
jurisprudence. 5
If my choice of language really is, as Tushnet charges, "characteristically inflated,"'
and if though I have "materially advanced
constitutional scholarship...[, I]still claim[ ] for what [I] did more than"
he thinks is warranted,' then why is it necessary to enlarge my assertions by erasing their qualifying context? It is embarrassing to be thought
to be so self-aggrandizing.
Even though Tushnet notes that ConstitutionalFatewas misunderstood
as presenting another brief for a single form of argument, he taxes me with
responsibility for this misunderstanding and reports that I have conceded
as much."8 He supports this charge by quoting me: "I came to realize
that I had, to some extent, perhaps incited the very errors that so grated on
me ...."' But, in fact, the quoted passage refers to other sorts of
errors, specifically the tendency on the partof my critics to rely on a single
form, as a fuller quotation makes clear:
And I came to realize that I had, to some extent, perhaps iucited the
very errors that so grated on me, for in my description of the six
modalities of argument as legitimating, I had uot addressed the issue
of what to do if the forms disagreed .... By invariably adopting
one of the forms to criticize the others subsequent critics had
310
inadvertently focussed on this dilemma.
When Tushnet attempts to portray me as denying a constitutional role
to the public, he crops my complaint that the Iran-Contra hearings failed
to awaken the public to the grave constitutional crimes committed by the
Executive Branch. Drawing attention to a cropped quotation, he writes,
"[i]n particular, [Bobbitt's] phrase 'listened but ... did not really hear'
311
suggests, and possibly endorses, a passive role for 'we the people.'"
In fact, the entire passage aims at the opposite conclusion:

305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 8-9 (emphasis in original).
Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1714.
Id. at 1730.
Id. at 1713.
Id. at 1713 n.37 (quoting BOBBItr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xi).

310. BOBBI'rr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xi.

311. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1721 n.91 (quoting BOBBnTT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at
82).
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But why were the constitutional dimensions of this supremely
constitutional issue missed despite weeks of televised hearings?
Partly this was the result of the mass of information being
declassified ....
Partly the lawyers were to blame. By treating the hearings as
if they were a trial, by looking for individual venality . . . , and
subordinating constitutional subjects, the lawyers reflected their
practices....
Partly it was the media. Relying too heavily on less complex
seenarios than the facts warranted, the media naturally turned to the
fascinating personalities involved ....
Partly it was the Congressmen ....
The model of a joint
hearing.. . was.., a fiasco.
But finally, it is we the people who are responsible ....
Throughout that summer, we listened but we did not really hear.
The basic constitutional structures we have labored for two eenturies
to preserve are so little a part of our understanding that we eould
3 12
watch them compromised without even noticing.
These are minor examples, and are interesting only as evidence for a

particular technique. The map of explanation proceeds by assessing the
person of the writer-not his work, per se-and then reading back into the
work the portrait that has been assembled. Let me show you what I mean.
First, see what happens when he addresses the following passage from the
preface to ConstitutionalInterpretation:
For it was the assault on American constitutional institutions
commenced by the American right wing in the 1950s and 60s that
had prompted my reaction in the late 1970s. This attempt to
discredit the legitimacy of our legal institutiou was taken up by the
cultural left in the early 1980s and... the current work is a reaction
to this development.... These assaults are a depressing aftermath
to the great triumphs of American law that brought civil rights and
civil liberties within reach of all the American people ....
To
explicate and defend these institutions, where they are explicableand
defensible, is a duty I inherited, as most of us come into title with
things, partly by the obligation of background and partly by the
obligation of training.313
Tushnet crops this passage and writes:
Bobbitt says that he inherited "a duty" to "explicate and defend" the
institutions of "American law that brought civil rights and civil
liberties within reach of all the American people." I can understand

312. BOBBIT,

INTERPrETATION, supra note 2, at 82.

313. Id. at xii (emphasis added).
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that scholars of constitutional law have a duty to explicate those
institutions, and Bobbitt's treatment of legitimacy and the modalities
of constitutional argument is the best explieation available. What I
do not understand, however, is why we must defend them unless
(and to the extent that) they satisfy the requirements brought out by
the standard form of justification.314
Nor do I, as the complete quotation makes unmistakably clear. We are to
defend our constitutional institutions when they are worth defending, but
his omission of this qualification provides support (by providing a
motivation) for what he then concludes is a complacent view of our

constitutional institutions.
Let me give a second example of this distinctive move from distorted
biography to erroneous, substantive conclusion. It is my contention that
this kind of method-the map of explanation-can virtually disable the

critic from actually taking in the argument that is being made. Consider
my description of the Iran-Contra Affair. I argued that the constitutionally
significant crime in the Affair was the reliance of the Executive Branch on
nonappropriated funds, the receipt of which had not been ratified by

statute.3 1 These funds were used to endow the "Enterprise," as General
Secord called it,316 so that it could perform various covert activities on
behalf of the government. This, I contended, went to the very heart of our
constitutional system, which depends upon the authorization of federal
expenditures-even if they come from gifts-by the elected officials of the
Congress. This authorization scheme links the public with-and commands
the public's attention to-governance. It was the framers' way of connecting popular sovereignty and responsibility with the acts that are
committed in its name. The famous "diversion" of funds from the Iranian
arms sales to the Contras was, I claimed, itself a kind of diversion because
it distracted from the constitutional issue and diverted attention to what was
little more than an accounting mechanism for the Enterprise, the activities
of which embraced many regions." 7
Tushnet misunderstands this profoundly and seems to think that my
point was that it is unconstitutional for quasi-private entities to use public
funds, when in fact my point was that it is unconstitutional for quasi-public
entities to use private funds without congressional authorization. As a

314. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1718 (footnotes omitted) (quoting BOBBITr, INTERU'IErATION,
supra note 2, at xii).
315. See BoBBrrr, INTERPRErATION, supra note 2, at 67-69.
316. Id. at 67 & n.12.
317. See id. at 68; U.S. Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the
Nicaraguan Opposition, Covert Action in a Democratic Society, in REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMIEES INVESTIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, S. REP. No. 216, H.R. REP. No. 433, 100th

Cong., 1st Sess. 375-86 (1987).
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result of this misunderstanding, he points out that Congress could authorize
a controlled subsidiary (like the Postal Service or Amtrak) to carry out a
policy specified by the Congress, thinking this to be a counter-example to
my argument, and then asks: Is foreign policy different? Was secrecy the
problem?318 And if it is the latter, he thinks my emphasis on the selfsustaining and self-financing aspects of the Enterprise-aspects which
permitted the National Security Council group to dispense with congressional authorization-would seem to be "irrelevant." 319 How could
so adept and serious a critic as Mark Tushnet go so far wrong? Look at
what follows:
Why [then] does Bobbitt focus on the Enterprise? ...
By accepting North's Enterprise as a real organization .
Bobbitt actually makes North and Secord appear to be better public
servants.... I wonder whether a scholar less connected to the
administration in power from 1987 to 1990 would have evaluated the
Iran-Contra Affair in quite the same way. 32
It is true that I served in the government in 1987 and in 1990. But in
1987, 1 was working for Arthur Liman as Legal Counsel to the Iran-Contra
Committee321 and had no connection whatever to the "administration in
power" (unless it was an inquisitorial one). I returned to Austin at the end
of the hearings and the drafting of the report, and remained at the
University of Texas until 1990, when I became the Counselor on International Law at the State Department.
I cannot bring myself to believe that Professor Tushnet, who is
actually a rather decent fellow, really intends the calumny on my academic
opinions that such allegations of tainted scholarship by virtue of political
association would suggest. On the contrary, I think he is misled by the
peculiar demands of the map of explanation. Still, I confess that I am
grateful that he got his facts wrong. Suppose they had been right!
Suppose I was a ... Republican!
Having derived a certain picture of a writer, the critic is inevitably led
to small carelessnesses, because it no longer seems necessary to attend to
the detail of the writer's work. Let me give three examples. First,
Tushnet says, "Bobbitt's work exemplifies the most basic characteristic of
constitutional scholarship-it is oriented to Supreme Court decisions." "
Not exactly. Rather, I derive the modalities that determine the truth status

318. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1727.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 1727-28 (emphasis in original).
321. The Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan
Opposition.
322. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1709.

19941

Reflections Inspired by My Critics

1937

of legal arguments from an examination of Supreme Court opinions, oral
arguments by lawyers, presidential papers, and congressional hearings
because these incidences of constitutional decisionmaking are constrained
by their status as decisions according to law. It is my aim to make these
forms of argument familiar to a much wider audience than those academics
and judges who are primarily concerned with the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court.
A second example is Tushnet's characterization that "[flor Bobbitt,
[ethical] arguments 'deriv[e] rules from those moral commitments of the
American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution,' although too often
he suggests that the only such commitment is one to 'the idea of limited
government.'" ' 3 Not quite. I cannot really say if I seem to think this
too often, but I do not in fact think that the commitment to limited
government is the only ethical commitment of the Constitution. Indeed,
the chapter on Iran-Contra is devoted to the ethos of self-government.'
My third example is Tushnet's claim that, "according to Bobbitt,
'Holmes ... confirm[s] ... that Missouri v. Holland is to be a doctrinal
opinion.' The attitude expressed is that opinions must 'be' in one mode or
another. " " While I do believe, as I wrote in ConstitutionalFate, that
the preference for one form of argument characterizes the style of a
judge,' I certainly do not believe that an opinion has to be in a single
dominant mode. Indeed, the most satisfying opinions deploy a multiplicity
of modes.
My point is not that, in these three examples, Professor Tushnet has
simply misconstrued my texts. Rather, the views attributed to me are
views I hold-but only partially, only in conjunction with other views, and
without these accompanying views, the attribution amounts to a mistake
(and not simply a misreading).
This takes us to a final type of explanation that occurs when the critic
actually changes the object of the work being discussed. This too is
evident in Tushnet's paper. In ConstitutionalFate, I made the following
323. Id. at 1716 (footnotes omitted) (quoting BOBBITr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 13, 20).
324. See BoBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 64-82.
325. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1724-25 (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 59).
326. As I note in ConstitutionalFate,
I would emphasize that no sane judge or law professor can be committed solely to one
approach. Because there are many facets to any single constitutional problem and...
many functions performed by a single opinion, the jurist or commentator uses different
approaches as a carpenter uses different tools and often many tools in a single project.
What makes the style of a particular person... is the preference for one particular mode
over others.
BoBBmr, FATE, supra note 1, at 124 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 8 ("[Wlhat is usually called
the style of a particular judge.., can be explained as a preference for one type of argument over
others." (emphasis in original)).
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argument about judicial review and the counter-majoritarian argument:
Insofar as the counter-majoritarian objection is a legal objection, it must
be-and can be-resolved by reference to the various modalities of legal
argument. But insofar as it is an extra-legal objection, it conflates two
ideas, legitimacy and justification.: 7 The counter-majoritarian objection
then maintains that unless judicial review is justified by reference to a
justifying theory (as the acts of executive or legislative bodies are justified
by their Support by majoritarianism), the practice of judicial review is not
legitimate. This is why the objection is "counter-majoritarian." This is
vacuous, however, because the forms of argument that can legitimate
judicial review cannot justify it. If they were able to do so, they would
presuppose their own justification. For example, if it were sufficient to say
that the framers' intention to rely on courts for constitutional review
justified that review, we would already have assumed the very legitimacy
for historical argument for which we sought a justification in the first
place. Grounding legitimacy in extra-legal justifications leads to an infinite
regress: Each justification must be independently legitimated, and that
legitimacy in turn demands a fresh justification. My solution is to claim
that legitimacy flows from following various legal rules.3' These rules
depend upon modalities of argument-ways in which particular arguments
are assessed, rather than arguments themselves-and the legitimacy of
executive and legislative bodies also comes from following their modal
rules. There is nothing more to legitimacy than that. Justification comes
from external sources and does not establish or undermine legitimacy.
Tushnet understands this very well, of course. But he goes on to note
"that it is entirely unclear that this distinction between legitimacy and
justification actually concerned the constitutional scholars on whom Bobbitt
directs his fire."329 This is a very important point. In my view, the
counter-majoritarian objection has been kept alive so long because constitutional scholars played a kind of shell game-they questioned the
legitimacy of judicial review by demanding justifications. Had they been
willing to concede the legitimacy of the practice and simply asserted that,
though legitimate, they believed it lacked an appealing political theory, I
doubt there would have been much fuss about the matter. But when the
Supreme Court began handing down very controversial decisions in the
1930s, and again in the 1950s and 1970s, academic arguments about legitimacy really caught fire.3'

327.
328.
329.
330.
349 U.S.

See id. at 5.
See id. at 6.
Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1714.
See BoBB1Tr, FATs, supra note 1, at 3 (describingthe reactions to Brown v. Board of Educ.,
294 (1955), and to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973)).
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I have discussed the reactions of one generation of scholars and judges
in ConstitutionalFate.331 I might have added another generation-John
Ely, Thomas Grey, Harry Wellington, Archibald Cox, Michael Perry,
Laurence Tribe, Jesse Choper, and Ronald Dworkin-all of whom addressed the question of what political theory would legitimate the exercise of
judicial review, and each of whom provided a partial, modal answer. To
take one of the most distinguished of this distinguished set, Ely offers a
structural argument for judicial review.332 By transferring a legal
argument to an encompassing political theory, Ely (and the others) hoped
that justification could provide legitimacy.
Tushnet is well steeped in this body of discussion. His remarkable
book, Red, White and Blue,333 is in large part a dissection of this
literature. But, he now says, had these writers known that legitimacy was
a matter of legal argument, they would have abandoned the object of
legitimacy and simply turned their attention to justification.'
I wonder
if this is so.
Walt Kelly once did a series of Pogo strips illustrating Mother Goose
rhymes.33 In one of these, Pogo, playing Mother Goose, recites the
famous nursery puzzle about St. Ives to a rapt Albert, his alligator friend
and companion in the swamp that Kelly immortalized. At the end of the
story, Pogo asks, "Kits, cats, sacks and wives, / How many were going to
St. Ives?" 6 After some complicated arithmetic, Albert slyly asks to
compare his answer with Pogo's. Pogo replies, "One"-an answer that at
first perplexes and then enrages the alligator.337 Pogo patiently explains
that the rhyme actually specifies the destination of only one person, the
speaker ("As I was going to St. Ives."). 33 8 "Where was [the others]
goin?" Albert demands. Finally, Pogo relents and says, "Who knows?
... Mebbe ... to Altoona."339 The series closes with Albert, now
himself dressed as Mother Goose, reciting the rhyme to a group of eager
children:
As I was going to St. Ives,
I met a man with forty wives
Every wife had forty sacks,

331. See id.at 3-4.
332. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismusr 135-36 (1980) (arguing that the Court must
ensure that representative processes are not thwarted and it must provide special protection for those
groups that even perfect process will not protect).
333. TUsHNET, supra note 301.
334. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1714.
335. WALT KELLY, The Pogo Peek-A-Book, in A Po0 PANORAMA 103 (1977).
336. Id. at 123.
337. Id. at 126.
338. Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
339. Id.
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Every sack had forty cats
Every cat had forty kits!
Kits, cats, sacks and wives

How many were going to Altoona? °
This is Tushnet's move in the debate about the counter-majoritarian
objection to judicial review. I have given an argument that shows that
what we thought were issues crucial to legitimacy were not so; and that the
objection itself, insofar as it implicates legitimacy, can, I think, be
decisively answered. My answer does not require one to count up, as it
were, the many reasons for and against judicial review. Instead, it asks
that we stick to the actual 'question being asked. Like Albert, Mark
Tushnet is distressed by this and wants to re-orient the question so that it
fits the calculations that make the problem so bedeviling in the first place.
This is, I believe, the crucial move of the map of explanations. It changes
ground, and then claims for itself the primacy of the original discussion.
In such maps, one invariably encounters such phrases as, "What we're
really talking about here is ... " or "What the writer was really doing
was...," or "What really motivated him was .. . ." And that is why
it is so mortifying when it turns out that the casual causalist has got the
facts wrong. But is that the trouble with such "explanations"? I doubt it.
I think, instead, that they are vulnerable to an irremediable flaw. If, as is
asserted, the causalist can discern, beneath the surface, an otherwise hidden
mechanics, how can we know that he, too, is not motivated by something
as obscure to himself as he believes the true motives of others are to them?
When, exactly, is Freud's cigar not just a cigar?
Tushnet is one of the most accomplished constitutional scholars of our
period. He combines a commitment to utter honesty with a voracious intellect and an indefatigable pen. Surely, if there is anyone capable of
overcoming the customary assumptions of explanation that are so much a
part of our contemporary intellectual life, it is he. When he comes to
believe that the unquestioned aspects of our lives are not the petty stylistics
of class, but are the profound tyrannies of unreflectively ascribing
psychological dynamics to other people, I should not be surprised if his
iconoclasm turns to attack the very shibboleth that currently casts a shadow
on his work.
B.

Steven Winter: The Constitutionof Conscience

But Tushnet's is only one sort of map of explanation. There is
another, equally ambitious critical overlay that draws on some of the same
assumptions about motivation, but is nonetheless different. Whereas the

340. Id. at 132.
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kind of mistake at which we have been looking derives from an ascription
of motives to the person whose writings are being discussed, this second
sort of explanation arises from typing the writer to be discussed, and,
usually, responding to that "type" with the program of another type. One
unfortunate effect of this sort of mapping is that it imports into the stony
landscape of legal prose the jargon-yard clutter of a style of writing that is
best confined to American sociology. When the writer is as well read as
Steven Winter, this kind of essay is leavened with interesting and often
amusing observations. 341
Of course, I am not suggesting that critics dispense with archetypes,
or typing generally, in their criticism. The very maps I have been discussing are types. But I would distinguish three different sorts of uses of
types, only one of which is objectionable. First there is the archetype-a
useful tool for any writer. Consider this passage:
One classic position is that judicial review is legitimate only if
the holding is logically true, that is, if it follows necessarily from the
Constitution....
Another view is that the holding in a constitutional case is true
because the Court said so, and no other authoritative decisionmaker
contradicted it....
Yet another reply is to say that the holding will become true as
it becomes legitimate in the eyes of the public. 4
Here, the categories are abstracted from a number of different writers, no
one of whom is the embodiment of the type, and a great many of whom
would doubtless be surprised to find themselves lumped together for the
purposes of a discussion. These types have no more reality than the class
of classes has in logic, and one must be correspondingly careful about
treating them as if they were the constituent members of a group in the
way that, say, the signers of the Declarationof Independence compose a
group.
Second, there are types that arise from a discussion-are created for
the purposes of the discussion-and perish with the end of the article,
having no more life than a mayfly that dies with the summer day that
brought it into being. These sorts of typing can also be useful to the critic.
When I write that there are three sorts of maps, or that the map of
explanations is composed of two kinds of errors, I am simply indicating
common traits, as one might point to the repetition of similar musical
motifs in a number of different symphonies. The "relaxed cadence," or in

341. See, e.g., Winter, supra note 48, at 1814 (incorporating a story about the colorful baseball
manager Earl Weaver); id. at 1812 (employing Merleau-Ponty's image of a person in a phone booth
to make a point about meaning and communication).
342. BOBBITr, FATE, supra note 1, at 236.

1942

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 72:1869

poetry, "sprung rhythm," are types of moves shared among disparate
artists. The Hudson River School never met for class.
Rather, it is a third sort of typing to which I object. This places the
individual within an archetypal class (reversing the first kind) and then
abstracts traits (reversing the second kind). This kind of typing is a useful
foundation for irony because it sets up an easy contradiction between the
expectation typified by the class trait and the departure from that
expectation that is everywhere present in individual life. Thus, we may
hear someone say, "Why I thought you were a Catholic! And yet you say
you paid for your goddaughter's abortion?!" Or, to take a more elegant
example from Dr. Johnson, one might recall his attack on the American
revolutionaries of 1776: "[H]ow is it that we hear the loudest yelps for
liberty among the drivers of negroes?" 3
Let me say at once that I do not wish to "purify" the law review
article as a genre by purging it of this sort of typing. Rather, I simply
want to call attention to its pitfalls, which are amply illustrated in Steven
Winter's paper, The Constitution of Conscience. This paper has four
parts-two of which, an introductory overture and a reiterating coda, I will
leave for a moment. Of the central two sections, one takes up Ludwig
Wittgenstein's allegedly naive view of language and the proposal by Winter
that this view can be corrected by supplementing it with the work of two
distinguished sociologists. The other section addresses my view of law and
the Constitution.
Wittgenstein, Winter has decided, is a naturalized behaviorist' and
thus, we are told, is guilty of two familiar philosophical sins that arise
from the behaviorist's conviction that all language is embodied in action.
Bobbitt, Winter has decided, is a Wittgensteinian and thus is guilty of these
same sins as they are committed in jurisprudence.'
At first, it appears difficult to determine the content of the beliefs of
Winter's Wittgenstein. The difficulty is that though Winter builds his
explanation mainly with quotations from Wittgenstein, he does not do so
exclusively. Some of these passages are more relevant to his enterprise
than others, and some are contradictory when taken together, and some he
appears to rely upon but clearly does not altogether take on board. Thus,
he says that the problems with a Wittgensteinian understanding "stem from
Wittgenstein's claim that all language and thought are embedded in
In a footnote, Winter adds, quoting Wittgenstein, that "the
action."'

343. SAMUELJOHNSON, Taxation No yranny, in THE YALE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF SAMUEL
JOHNSON: POLTCAL WRITINGS 411, 454 (Donald J. Greene ed., 1977).
344. See Winter, supra note 48, at 1814 ("The fundamental Wittgensteinian move might be
characterized as a naturalized behaviorism ...
345. Id. at 1814 & n.28.
346. Id. at 1813.
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term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."'"7
Winter compares this statement with a remark of Tom Grey's that the
"distinctive feature of recent reinterpretations of pragmatism is ... the
idea that thought is essentially embedded in a context of social
practice."'
As one can readily see, the passage from Wittgenstein does
not support the characterization Winter gives it: Wittgenstein did not write
that all thought is imbedded in action, and he did not conclude that,
therefore, every form of life composed a language game. Winter's
characterization seems more in harmony with the observation of Grey's
about pragmatism.
Similarly, Winter writes, "[flor the Wittgensteinian, meaning does not
derive from something (like a practice); rather, meaning inheres in
practice. " ' In asserting this, Winter cites a passage from me in which
I say that law (not meaning) "is something we do, not something we have
as a consequence of something we do." 3' And he iguores his own citation shortly thereafter to Wittgenstein, who says, "[flor a large class of
cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can
be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."351
Winter has apparently become aware of these inconsistencies, for in his
reply to Patterson, composed after his principal paper, he attempts to
distance himself from the reader's understandable conclusion that he
intends to portray Wittgenstein's views when he gives us, in his first paper,
long quotations from Wittgenstein, and numerous citations to texts of
Wittgenstein. When, Winter says, he referred to "'the Wittgensteinian,'
the careful reader will have discerned, I trust, that this was not old Ludwig
himself but a composite of Bobbitt, Rorty, and Fish as documented by my
citations."352 I will return to this bizarre alibi in a moment, but for
present purposes it really does not matter whether Winter is providing his
understanding of Wittgenstein or of Wittgensteinians. It is the type in
which he is interested. Bobbitt, Rorty, and Fish are Wittgensteinians, we
are told. "The fundamental Wittgensteinian move might be characterized
as naturalized behaviorism....
The Wittgensteinian [asserts] an

347. WirroENSMIN, supra note 194, § 23 (emphasis in original), quoted in Winter, supra note
48, at 1813 n.26.
348. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes andLegalPragmatism,41 STAN. L. REv. 787,798 (1989), quoted
in Winter, supra note 48, at 1813 n.26.
349. Winter, supra note 48, at 1814 (emphasis in original).
350. BOBBrfT, INTE PRETATION, supra note 2, at 24, quoted in Winter, supra note 48, at 1814
n.28.
351. WrrrrENS,
supra note 194, § 43 (emphasis in original), quoted in Winter, supra note
48, at 1815 n.35.
352. Winter, supra note 178, at 1865-66.
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essentially performative view of meaning .... 5 For the latter
statement, Winter cites Wittgenstein, a rather dirty trick on the discerning
reader if one is to credit Winter's slightly embarrassing afterthought.'5
And what does it mean that a Wittgensteinian (one type) is resolved
into a behaviorist (another type)? It means that the familiar shortcomings
of the behaviorist in accounting for meaning can be attributed to the
Wittgensteinian. For Winter, these are termed the "particularist fallacy"
and "practice fetishism."355 The particularist fallacy is "the assumption
that every practice or discourse is a matter of understandings and
conventions specific to that activity-for example, that judging is judging
and folklore counselling is folklore counselling and never the twain shall
meet."356 To maintain this, Winter must ignore that Wittgenstein (and
even Bobbitt) repeatedly give examples of practices that consist in the
comparison of other practices."' In any event, the "Wittgensteinian"
view is not compatible with Winter's opinions of the matter: he cites his
own work at this point to show, he says, "that, in rebuking the husband
who abandoned her, Medea employs ostensibly 'modem' legal argnments
premised on doctrines such as performance as consideration, quantum
meruit, detrimental reliance, and rescission for impossibility of
performance."35
I do not doubt that a law professor might actually
experience a performance in this way-though I do not envy him for that-but I would account for the phenomenon by claiming that he brings to the
theater a sensibility that is external to that of Euripides's, and, I daresay,
Diana Rigg's 59 There is nothing "ostensible" about it. Only a
behaviorist could appear to be disabled from showing how different persons
can have different takes on the same experience, because the behaviorist-if
any such persons actually exist-is said to believe that all psychological
entities are matters of observable behavior.
The other Wittgensteinian vice, practice fetishism, is defined by
Winter as the "tendency to regard a practice as an irreducible, elemental
quality that is the virtual embodiment of the understanding that it makes
possible. " " This is his description of such views (for which he cites
Wittgenstein):

353. Winter, supra note 48, at 1815 (emphasis in original).
354. Id. at 1815 n.35 (citing WITTGENMsEIN, supra note 194, § 43).
355. Id. at 1816.
356. Id.
357. In my case, justification is no more than the assessment of various legal practices when
measured against external norms-it is itself a practice that is not composed of a practice, but that
studies other practices from a point of view that is not theirs, but is its own.
358. Winter, supra note 48, at 1816 n.40.
359. Diana Rigg played the title role in the London production of Medea.
360. Winter, supra note 48, at 1816.
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A practice is a dynamic pattern of performance under varying
circumstances. Consequently, it cannot be reduced to a set of rules
because no such set could be both explicit enough to give adequate
guidance and comprehensive enough to cover [new situations]....
On this view, there is little or nothing one can say about the
content or structure of a practice, except perhaps to describe the stepby-step process of rote initiation. 61
The first and second points are certainly views I hold. The first is I
think widely agreed upon, these days, and the second is explicitly stated in
3 62 But the third point is absurd. Here,
Constitutional Interpretation.
Winter quotes Wittgenstein: "[I]f a person has not yet got the concepts, I
shall teach him to use the words by means of examples and by practice.And when I do this I do not communicate less to him than I know myself."

This scarcely is support for the view that there is nothing one may say
about the content or structure of a practice. Indeed, the quoted passage is
a profound example of just the sort of thing one might say about virtually
all practices: it recapitulates the first two points in Winter's argument and
asserts that understanding is a matter of being able to do something.
Moreover, much of Wittgenstein's work shows that rote initiation cannot,
logically, account for meaning. Such a characterization can seem persuasive only to a person who thinks that the refusal to accept the cosmology of mediating devices (like Winter's "objectified sedimentations")
amounts to a confession that "little or nothing" can then be said.
Winter also cites Richard Rorty for this point, and supplies a
quotation:
[Iff we understand the rules of a language-game, we understand all
that there is . .. save for the extra understanding obtained from
inquiries nobody would call epistemological-into, for example, the
history of the language, the structure of the brain, the evolution of
364
the species, and the political or cultural ambiance of the players.
Now we know what the third point actually is meant to say: that on this
view, there is little or nothing, as an epistemological matter, one can say
about the content or structure of a practice, except the way it is learned and
performed. That is perfectly true, it seems to me, and I am mystified as
to why it eludes Winter unless it is because that statement will not support

361. Id. at 1816-17.
362. See, e.g., BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 16.

363. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 194, § 208 (emphasis in original), quoted in Winter, supra note
48, at 1816 n.43.
364. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 174 (1979), quotedin Winter,

supra note 48, at 1817 n.43.
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the charge of practice fetishism that Winter wishes to press. The charge
is that practice "thus becomes fetishized in two senses. First, it is treated
as a kind of conceptual primitive; a practice is seen simply to embody the
knowledge that it enables.... Second, practice is fetishized in the sense
that it tends increasingly to be represented as an autonomous, active

agency."

36
5

But nowhere of which I am aware does Wittgenstein claim that practice is a conceptual primitive, except as to the epistemology of some kinds
of language games, which are, of course, only some kinds of forms of life.
Winter confuses understanding how to play a game, for example, with
understanding how to comment on it, or understanding how to depict it.
Only if Wittgenstein claimed that a practice was an island, unconnected
with any other practice, could such an absurd conclusion be maintained.
I think this is exactly what Winter has in mind, however, when he suggests
that Wittgenstein presents practices as autonomous, active agencies. This
is what leads him to say that Wittgenstein's view "eclipses" the sociology
of how concepts are institutionalized and "effaces the role of reflection" by
persons engaged in the practice. 31
And this is why, having frogmarched two perfectly respectable sociologists on the stage-Berger and
Luckmann-he insists that they, unlike the Wittgensteinian, "recognize that
a certain amount of reiflcation is integral to the process of institutionalization. "36 How does Winter think the practice of justification, for
example, takes place without reification? The issue is not whether
reification takes place, but precisely what it consists in.
Perhaps to appreciate my sense of distress at this caricature of
Wittgenstein and his thought, wherein Winter presents Wittgenstein as a
behaviorist and then contrasts his work, to Wittgenstein's detriment, with
that of Berger and Luckmann, one has to recall Wittgenstein's labors
during the decade after the ractatuswhen he struggled against the general,
causal account of meaning of which behaviorism is a variant. Consider
this passage from his notebooks of the period:
It would be characteristic for a specific erroneous view if a
philosopher believed a sentence would have to be printed in a red
colour, since only in this way would it completely express what the
author wants to say.... I believe that to the causal theory of
meaning one can simply answer that if someone received a push and
fell, we don't call the fall the meaning of the push.... The sense
of language is not determined by its effect. Or what one calls the
sense, the meaning in language is not its effect.

365. Winter, supra note 48, at 1817.
366. Id. at 1818.
367. Id. at 1819.
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What we investigate is actually the "meaning of meaning":
namely... the grammar of the word "meaning. "36
Wittgenstein's views thus contrast with the common, causal view-a
view that I imagine most persons (including Berger and Luckmann, by the
way) still hold-that was prominently expressed in the works of Bertrand
Russell during the period Wittgenstein composed the above passage. That
view accounts for meaning in terms of the psychological results that signs
have on the mind. It considers the purpose of language to have particular
effects on the mind, "as a drug might produce certain hallucinations or
feelings."369 Thus, words (signs) produce mental impressions. One uses
a sigu correctly if the hearer (or reader) experiences the mental impressions
Such a view is behind
that the speaker (or writer) intended to convey."
the claim that the world is "constituted by an ongoing, three-way dialectic
in which externalization ... [,] objectification, and internalization are each
necessary moments."371 As Russell put it, "If a complex stimulus A has
caused a complex reaction B in an organism, the occurrence of a part of
A on a future occasion tends to cause the whole reaction B."17
This view can, obviously, serve as a basis for behaviorism, and
But it has certain
Russell at various times embraced behaviorism."
shortcomings that must have particularly troubled Russell-for example, the
account of logical connectives. What "experiences," for example, do the
words "or" or "not" convey? This was his reply:
We wish to know what are the occurrences that make the word
"or" useful. These occurrences are not to be sought in the facts that
verify or falsify beliefs, which have no disjunctive quality, but are
what they are. The only occurrences that demand the word "or" are
subjective, and are in fact hesitations. In order to express a
hesitation in words, we need "or" or some equivalent word....
"[N]ot" must derive its meaning from experiences of rejection, and
"or" from experiences of hesitation. Thus no essential word in our
vocabulary can have a meaning independent of experience. Indeed
any word I can understand has a meaning derived from my
experience. 74

368.

S. STEPHEN HILMY, THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN

108 (1987) (emphasis in original) (quoting

Wittgenstein's notebooks from 1932-34).
369. Id. at 109 (quoting Wittgenstein's notebooks from 1932-34).
370. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE ANALYSIS OF MIND 198 (1921).
371. Winter, supra note 48, at 1821 (footnotes omitted).
372. RUSSELL, supra note 370, at 86.
373. See, e.g., BERTRAND RUSSELL, AN INQUIRY INTO MEANING AND TRUTH 14 (1940)
(recognizing that his theory of knowledge uses behaviorism as a starting point).
374. RUSSELL, supra note 370, at 264-65.
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In contrast to this "psychological view"-which has had such profound
effects on Western education and politics-Wittgenstein developed a "logical" account. Far from being a behaviorist, Wittgenstein was attacking the
very basis for Russell's behaviorism. By the early 1930s, he was writing
that the expressions, "I understand [a sentence]" and "I mean something
[by a sentence]," should not be viewed as proof that the sentence had
produced something within us-that it had taken hold of us, that we imagined something as a consequence-but rather could simply mean that the
sentence is "part of a system familiar to me. I play the game of which it
is a part. " ' Wittgenstein stated that he was not interested in the sign
"in so far as it influences the mind by suggestion, thus in so far as it has
an effect," but rather was interested in a sign "only as a move in a game;
term in a system, that is autonomous."'376
Remarks like the last may have thrown off readers like Winter. These
remarks do not mean that signs have no effect on the mind, nor do they
mean that every langnage game is an island without connections to the rest
of langnage. If this were so, one could never learn a language. Rather,
passages like this are attempts to locate Wittgenstein's purpose: He is
attempting to work out a theory of meaning from a logical point of view,
one that does not depend upon any particular empirical stimulus to account
for its function. He is not denying reality to psychological effects; he is
denying they have any necessary role in meaning. And, as Wittgenstein's
most interesting and successful elucidator has urged, Wittgenstein was
reacting to "'causal theories of language" in general, including those
of a behaviourist inclination.... [W]hatever the effect of a word,
whether unconditioned (for instance, we might discover some incantation that causes our enemies to suffer-severe bouts of sneezing
or perhaps some other more sinister affliction) or conditioned
(whatever sort of conditioned response, be it a "neurological
reaction", a "mental image" or a gross "behavioural reaction"), we
would not call the effect the meaning of the word. And this, of
course is neither a denial that words might have such effects, nor a
denial of the "law of mnemic eausation" per se. Rather, it simply
is an attempt on Wittgenstein's part to point out that such effects and
the laws which govern them are not what we mean by "meaning." 377
I venture to say that Steven Winter must be the only literate person of
whom I am aware who would say that Wittgenstein's views ignored the

375. HILMY, supra note 368, at 121 (brackets in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wittgenstein's notebooks from 1932-34).
376. Id. at 122 (quoting Wittgenstein's notebooks from 1932-34).
377. Id. at 276 (emphasis in original).
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social context of meaning, because drawing attention to this relationship is
the achievement for which he is best known to the public. It is therefore
clear that Winter, who is terribly widely read, must have something special
in mind when he makes this charge. Having taken us through his summary
of Berger and Luckmann who argue, quite irrelevantly for Wittgenstein's
epistemological purposes, that "the social world [is] constituted by an
ongoing, three-way dialectic in which externalization-that is, ongoing
human activity-objectification, and internalization are each necessary
moments,"3 7 Winter then announccs: "We are now in a position to see
exactly why the Wittgensteinian approach is prone to the problems and
distortions identified earlier."379 And it turns out that the reason is that
Wittgenstein
goes straight from externalization-that is, ongoing human activityto internalization without any mediations whatsoever. Thus, even in
the hands of its most subtle proponents, the Wittgensteinian account
is necessarily impoverished by its elimination of the middle term of
the dialectic. Without a moment of objectification . .. , it has no
alternative except to reduce meaning to a[n] ... inexplicable
dimension of practice.... [W]e can also see why, for the Wittgensteinian, reflection necessarily drops out.3 .
It may be helpful to remind the reader that Wittgenstein's account of
meaning begins in an attack on the very idea of internalization-that there
are internal mental entities that necessarily accompany meanings. I doubt
that Wittgenstein, who wrote in an indescribably beautiful and powerful
prose, ever actually wrote something like Berger and Luckmann's phrase
that intersubjective meaning becomes "truly social only when it has been
objectivated in a sign system of one kind or another, that is, when the
possibility of reiterated objectification of the shared experiences
arises,""' but Wittgenstein's unforgettable description of the builders
assumes this truism.3" It is not that Berger and Luckmann have nothing
of importance to say; it is that they could be thought relevant in the first
place only if you completely misconceived Wittgenstein's project, if you
believed that Wittgenstein was a very doctrinaire behaviorist, one who
maintained that there was no role for reflection because, having denied the
necessity of "internal" events, he then was forced to conclude that, in
Winter's words, there was "nothing-that is, no 'thing'-for practitioners

378.
379.
380.
381.

Winter, supra note 48, at 1821 (footnotes omitted).
Id.
Id.
PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LuCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REM=: A

TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 63 (1966), quoted in Winter, supra note 48, at 1820.

382. See WrrrGENSMTrN, supra note 194, §§ 2-21 (imagining the possibility of a language with
only four words: "block," "pillar," "slab," and "beam").
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to reflect upon"3" and no practice (call it reflection) capable of
meaningfully occurring."'
Winter announces, in conclusion, that Wittgenstein ignores two things:
"The first is the ordinary capacity of humans to use language to encapsulate, 'communicate, and conserve shared social experience....
The
second, closely related thing this view ignores is the ineradicably
imaginative nature of human rationality." 3"
Yet, there is scarcely a page of Wittgenstein's work, including his
work on the foundations of mathematics, 86 that is not devoted to an
attempt to rescue our understanding of meaning by linking it to the
ordinary practices of human beings using language; and the many striking
examples of Wittgenstein's imaginative anthropology are testimony to his
commitment to the imaginative nature of rationality. Practice fetishism and
particularism may indeed culminate in the denial that human beings can
conserve and transmit shared experiences and in a related refusal to
recognize the imaginative elements in human rationality. But because these
very ideas-how human beings learn a language, how imagination plays a
crucial part in that learning-are so much at the center of Wittgenstein's
work, it casts some doubt on whether Winter's charges of fetishism, among
others, are accurate. For the devotee of the "type," however, the
reasoning runs the other way: if the subject is part of the type of offenders,
then he must take the positions that such offenders take.
It tries one's patience when Winter insists that "[t]he importance and
ubiquity of imaginative processes such as metaphor undermine the Wittgensteinian claim that there is no more to meaning than its performative
significance within a social practice." 3" Is the use of "metaphor" not a
social practice? But worse is yet to come. In the final two paragraphs of
this section, Winter announces that the "Wittgensteinian understanding of
a practice becomes untenable once we appreciate that we regularly use
knowledge from one experiential domain to structure our understanding of
another,"' and, patronizingly, that the Wittgensteinian assumption of
professional independence "is quite fantastic once one appreciates the many

383. Winter, supra note 48, at 1821.
384. For this reason, I am not greatly tempted by Winter's invitation to "see Steven L. Winter"
for an "extended argument for the possibility and importance of reflection by situated practitioners,
what I call 'situated self-consciousness,' [which] requires a full-fledged account of the role of
imagination." Id. at 1821 n.73 (citing Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42
STAN. L. REv. 639, 644, 686 (1990)).
385. Id. at 1822.
386. LUDWIG WTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS (G.H. von
Wright et al. eds. & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1956).
387. Winter, supra note 48, at 1823-24.
388. Id. at 1824.
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ways, though complex and nonlinear, in which meaning is dependent on
social experience. " 389
Indeed, Winter's entire essay is structured around such small coups de
theatre, which culminate in announcements of such banality that they are
made ludicrous by the portentous, jargon-ridden analysis that precedes
them. Does anyone think that Wittgenstein would be shattered to be
informed of such revelations? Or that it is really "news" that we use
knowledge from one domain in assessing another? Or that meaning is
dependent on experience? To maintain otherwise would turn autonomy
into autism.
But then, of course, Winter is not writing about Wittgenstein, but
about the Wittgensteinian account, which I fear must mean me. This takes
us to the second part of his critique. Winter is far more generous to me
than to Wittgenstein. I especially appreciate his apt use of quotations and
paraphrases to present the views he attributes to me. And yet, because he
must fit me in the Wittgensteinian indictment (the particularist fallacy and
practice fetishism), and because of his own agenda (to bring the insights of
social and cognitive science to jurisprudence), every important treatment
of my views arrives at a terminus that is inconsistent with them. Sometimes this is comic, for example when, as he does with Wittgenstein,
Winter dramatically unveils a clinching finding that turns out to be in
error. Sometimes it is unsettling, as when he attempts to work out a
constitutional problem using the modalities. But in each case it serves to
justify Dennis Patterson's caustic remark that, despite the accurate
quotations and paraphrases, Winter really "has no idea what Bobbitt is
doing. " " It is clear enough that Winter thinks I am doing with law
what Wittgenstein did with language. But his ideas about my work and the
Constitution are as formulaic and mistaken as his ideas about Wittgenstein's
views of language.
Before we begin this section, therefore, it may be helpful to review
some of the opinions I have expressed earlier in this Paper, as well as in
Constitutional Fate and Constitutional Interpretation: Constitutional
interpretation by formal decisionmakers committed to confine their decisions to legal bases is not the same practice as constitutional discourse,
which, among other things, evaluates those decisions.391 Constitutional
argument is available to the public at large (which constitutes the largest
group of constitutional deciders) only because the language and means of
such argument have a resonance in the rest of our cultural life."g
Id.
Patterson, supra note 169, at 1843.
See BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 111-13.
As I wrote in ConstitutionalFate,
The concepts which occur in Constitutional law must also occur and have a meaning in everyday life. We must argue in everyday life. We must arrive at decisions by

389.
390.
391.
392.
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Justification is a practice that is of immense moral and political significance, but it does not confer legitimacy." And similarly, the various
modalities of constitutional argument do legitimate, but they do not
justify.39" Confusing justification and legitimization occurs, among other
times, when we attempt to legitimate legal decisions by claiming that they
were made because of the legal reasons that are adduced in their support.
As he does with Wittgenstein, Winter intends to indict me for the
particularist fallacy and for practice fetishism, though in my case it is not
because I am a behaviorist, but because I am a Wittgensteinian. The first
charge is supported by evidence of a contrived conflict with Karl
Llewellyn-I scarcely mention him in my two books, though he is much
admired and revered by me. This drives Winter to write what might be
one of the classic lines in mystery work: "The evidence is as revealing as
it is terse. Bobbitt makes just two references to the Llewellyn piece
"395

It turns out that I have a "conflicted reaction" to Llewellyn's great
article, The Constitution as an Institution,3' because his thesis "cuts
uncomfortably close to the bone." 31 Winter says, "Although both
Bobbitt and Llewellyn claim that the legitimacy of constitutional law is a
matter of 'practices,' they have strikingly different things in mind. (There
is no lack of irony here..

.

, Bobbitt and Llewellyn simply do not intend

the same real-world referents.)" 39 How true. For me, the use of the six
forms of constitutional argument is the way we decide constitutional
questions in the American legal culture. The use of these six forms
maintains the legitimacy of judicial review. Llewellyn was interested in the
practices of not just legal deciders, but also interest groups and citizens at
large. "A national constitution... involves in one phase or another the
ways of a huge number of people-well-nigh the whole population." 399
The practices on which we have each focused may overlap, but they are
different because the institutions we are examining are different. The
whole population is rarely called upon to make legal decisions with respect

way of arguments. It is the use of these concepts outside law (and this use is of course

influenced by the reports of legal decisions, opinions, and so forth) that makes their use
within constitutional law meaningful .... The rules of constitutional law are not derived
from these everyday uses, however, but result from the operations of the various

[modalities].
BOBBrrT, FATE, supra note 1, at 237 (emphasis in original).
393. Id. at 245.

394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

BoBBT, INTERPRETATION, supranote2, at ll4; see also supratext accompanyingnote215.
Winter, supra note 48, at 1824.
K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
Winter, supra note 48, at 1825.
Id. at 1826.
Llewellyn, supra note 396, at 18, quoted in Winter, supra note 48, at 1827.
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to the Constitution, although they are involved in constitutional discourse
almost continuously, a distinction that this Symposium has underscored as
important to my work.
Missing this distinction, Winter seizes on what must have seemed a
decisive piece of evidence. Not only do I disagree with Llewellyn in the
way Winter has identified, my disagreement is confirmed by a neurotic
manifestation: I unconsciously rewrite the very title of Llewellyn's essay
in my own terms. Winter writes:
Interestingly, Bobbitt refers to Llewellyn's article as "The
Constitution as Construction/Creation." That this is a parapraxis,
and not a mere mistake, is clear when one considers that Bobbitt's
reformulation of the title recapitulates the fundamental theoretical
difference between him and Llewellyn: Bobbitt approaches constitutional law as a matter of lawyers' argumentative practices;
Llewellyn, in contrast, sees it as an institution. "
Now that really would be screwy. On Winter's view of Llewellyn and
myself, it would be as if Jung were to cite to Freud's Civilizationand Its
Discontents" by writing the title as Civilization and Its Myths, or as if
Ronald Reagan were to refer to Lyndon Johnson's domestic program as
"The Great No Free Lunch!" These are beyond conflicted reactions; they
would evidence dementia. Actually, the title I cited comes from the
original typescript of Llewellyn's Storrs Lectures, a copy of which I was
fortunate enough to come across when I was a law student (and I kept
Llewellyn's journal photo over my small desk). And no, I'm not going to
tell you what a "parapraxis" is-I had to look it up too-except to say that
Winter's is the sort of embarrassing mistake that occurs when you are so
very sure of the "type" of writer you are recreating in your criticismhere, both Llewellyn and myself.
In the second of these arranged confrontations, I am to encounter
Roberto Unger. Unger maintains that "every branch of doctrine must rely
... upon some picture of the forms of human association that are right and
realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals."'
This picture,
Winter summarizes, does not take its form from a "'coherent, richly
developed normative theory' because there is none that can account for all
the conflicting legal doctrines it is offered to explain."'
For Unger, it
follows that law can only be the product of a myriad of political and
ideological conflicts.

400. Winter, supra note 48, at 1824 n.81 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
401. SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Joan Riviere trans., Doubleday

Anchor Books 1958) (1930).
402. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITIcAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986), quoted in
Winter, supra note 48, at 1827.
403. Winter, supra note 48, at 1827-28 (quoting UNGER, supra note 402, at 9).
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Now we are told:
[C]onsider how a Wittgensteinian such as Bobbitt might respond to
Unger's argument. First, he would exhort us to abandon the question of justification precisely because it precipitates this kind of allor-nothing conclusion. Second, and relatedly, he would deny that
there are any such "pictures." He would argue that law does not
consist of representations of social life. On his view, law is the
activity of decisionmaking within the existing modalities.'
Not at all. First, I would acknowledge Unger's focus on justification,
which can only be the product of political and moral debate. Second, I
would agree that there are an infinite number of mental pictures we hold
that guide us in writing, interpreting, and applying law. And I would
agree that these are, in the main, representations of social life. Some of
these-like the picture of economic competition enshrined in the Sherman
Act, 5 or the picture of the family depicted in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland,' or the extrapolation to international affairs of the role of
neighbor expressed in Roosevelt's Lend-Lease message -are explicitly
written into law. I deny only that the outcome of a justificatory debate
legitimates the actions of those deciders bound to govern according to law
or that the mental images of social life must be consulted, as a logical and
epistemological matter, when such decisions are made.
Thus, when Winter discloses that "[i]n effect, then, Bobbitt concedes
that law faces the very predicament that Unger identifies""-that legal
decisions are sometimes indeterminate-he discloses nothing because I
"concede" nothing. Rather, it is a fundamental part of my views that the
modalities may conflict, that they are incommensurable, and thus that no
decision-procedure can determine the outcome in advance without sacrificing legitimacy. Winter writes that I believe I have "solved this
problem with the resort-to-conscience gambit"' because he thinks there
is a problem to be solved. He thinks my conclusion that such conflicts
must be decided-but are not perhaps resolved-by the conscience is a
gambit, a ploy, that must lead to an infinite regress. For what, after all,
legitimates or justifies the resort to the conscience? All of this is in
ConstitutionalInterpretation:The resort to conscience is legitimated by our

Id. at 1828.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & $upp. V 1993).
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Presidential Press Conference (Dec. 17, 1940), in 16
PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCES OF FRANKLIN D. RoosEvELT 354 (1972) (defending the proposed
Lend-Lease Act, ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941) (expired on July 1, 1946), by comparing America to a
homeowner whose neighbor's house is burning).
408. Winter, supra note 48, at 1828.
409. Id.
404.
405.
406.
407.
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practices, which compel such a resort.41 ° There is no regress precisely

because the conscience is not in need of further legitimating. It is justified
to the extent that it produces results that can be justified-can be judged
according to the prevailing moral sense of the day. The system as a

whole, however, is justified because it has a role for the conscience within
a legitimate system, though it is not the only conceivable system that can
be justified on these grounds.

Having "problematized"411 my alleged conflict with Unger, Winter
offers a solution. We could, he proposes, "accept the Wittgensteinian's
first response without buying into the second; we could abandon the notion
of justification without relinquishing entirely the concept of representation."412 Of course for me, this is the worst of both worlds: we should
certainly not abandon the important enterprise of justification, nor should
we return to the correspondence view of meaning, wherein it is claimed
that we understand words and sentences when they represent (or stand for)
our thoughts, feelings, or intentions. In law, this amounts to the claim that

legitimation occurs when a decision can be said to accord with something
in the world. This I have decisively rejected.413 Winter wishes, how-

ever, to indict me for practice fetishism and must therefore both ignore my
remarks about the social setting within which law occurs41 and refute my
arguments about a practice's being understood simply by those who are
able to do it.415 His argument to the contrary can be quoted almost in
full:
A principal point of Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game
is to emphasize that a language or rhetorical system like law is
always "part of an activity, or of a form of life." . . . But, as

410. See BOBBrrr, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 168, 184-85; see also BOBBrrr, FATE, supra
note 1, at 169-75.
411. Winter, supra note48, at 1811.
412. Id. at 1828.
413. 1 have noted that
[ConstitutionalFate] explicitly discards the notion that law takes place within a framework
that is independent of the structure of legal argument. It rejects the view that a set of
legal presuppositions exists that are discoverable in the absence of legal arguments, upon
which legal argument is supposed to depend.. . . In contrast to my approach, one might
think of the legitimation of Constitutional law as a particular state occurring when law and
argument bear a certain relationship to social facts (or metaphysical ones) that are thought
to underlie law.... []f we think of law in the way contrasted to mine, we will want to
get behind arguments to causes. If we are motivated by this idea, we shall want to escape
the argumentative structure with its inevitable choices to get to a compulsion from social
facts, measuring our arguments against the social and political realities that are thought
to account for them in the first place.... It is a view rejected, not simply ignored, in
my work.
BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 1, at 245-46; see also BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 2. at 179-83.
414. See BOBBIrT, FATE, supra note 1, at 239.
415. See id. at 245; BOBBIrT, INTERPRE-ATION, supra note 2, at 23-24.
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Bobbitt himself recognizes, constitutional law is not an abstract
forensic exercise; it must also connect with our day-to-day affairs.
It follows that a practice like constitutional law cannot be understood
apart from the larger social practices-the form of life-in which it
participates. 416
This is not an argument.
It is a complete misconstruction of
Wittgenstein's thought, and my own, to say that it "follows" from the
relationship between a language game and a form of life that one cannot
understand a practice without first understanding the "larger social
practices," whatever they may be. But perhaps my own unfamiliarity with
Winter's use of these terms concealed some consistency with my own convictions. Perhaps the "larger social practices" were not political and social
movements, which are as irrelevant to being able to practice law legitimately as is an understanding of mortgage interest rates to being able to
build a structurally sound house. My concern that I was not interpreting
this passage fairly was allayed when I encountered the example Winter next
gives us.
Consider, he invites us, the right to travel. He tells us:
It is easy enough to imagiie the historical, textual, structural,
doctrinal, ethical, and prudential arguments in support of the
constitutional right to travel.... Still, the Supreme Conrt has been
remarkably casual about the nature of this right-noting, for
example, that "[w]e have no occasion to ascribe the source of this
417
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision."
From this fairly straightforward textual remark, Winter concludes, rather
than relying on any of the other legal modalities of argument-I would
have thought the structural argument to be the soundest, and the Court has
largely relied on doctrinal argument 1 -that
it seems at least equally likely-and more consistent with the (absent)
forensic evidence-that the legitimacy of the right to travel arises
from the fact that it's deeply implicated in the cultural and historical
life of a nation forged in the experience of immigration and westward
expansion [and now so] dominated by the automobile.4t 9
If this means, as it says, that the legitimacy of the right to travel arises
simply from the historical facts of migration and westward expansion, then

416. Winter, supra note 48, at 1829 (footnotes omitted) (quoting WrrTGENSTEIN, supra note 194,
§ 23).
417. Id. at 1831 (brackets in original) (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969)).
418. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630 ("It suffices that ... 'It is a right that has been firmly
established and repeatedly recognized.'" (quoting United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966))).
419. Winter, supranote 48, at 1831. When Winter mentions "forensic evidence," one is tempted
here to believe that Winter has again found the data as terse as it is telling. See supra text accompanying note 395.
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it seems to me plainly wrong. How would an historical fact simpliciter
confer constitutional status on a proposition entirely apart from any legal
basis? If it means that the Justices may have been motivated by the
importance of the freedom to travel to the American experience, I imagine
this may have been so (although consistency with "absent forensic evidence" moves again close to the mystery genre). But the relevance of this
point depends upon confusing motivation with causality. The mere wish
to celebrate interstate travel does not write an opinion. If we revisit
Shapiro v. Thompson,42° we will find a series of legal arguments-not as
good perhaps as the Court's arguments for such a right in Crandall v.
Nevada,421 but actual modal arguments that lead to the legal proposition
that is the holding.
Winter concludes that I am a legal ethnocentrist, this being my particular type of the "practice fetishism," the crime for which he has indicted
Wittgenstein generally. And he calls to my attention that, in an "earlier
encounter with" me, he had stated that "the practice of a truly 'constitutional' politics must struggle with the much more difficult task of making
constitutional meaning and that this task requires social action,"'
a
lesson I had evidently failed to heed. To bring home the point, he ends his
essay with this helpful summary:
(1) The justice we can achieve is constrained by the forms of life
in which we find ourselves.
(2) It follows, therefore, that the justice we can imagine is attained
only in the construction of new forms of life.
43
(3) If we think otherwise, we are just fooling ourselves. 2
Winter's first point confirms that, at least as Wittgenstein used the
term, Winter means something unexplained by the use of "form of life."
We do not find ourselves in a form of life anymore than we find ourselves
in life itself. I think Winter must mean something like an "institution."
Winter's second point simply does not "follow" as claimed. One can
easily imagine justice that is achieved acting through institutions that
already exist.
The third point is the last example of Winter's stylistic inclination to
work in the climactic mode. Interestingly, it is an apt illustration of the
reliance on "typing" to which I have drawn attention because it fits nicely
within a genre that depends on typecasting.'
Do you recognize the
420. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
421. See BLACK, supra note 222, at 27-28 (discussing Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1867)).
422. Winter, supra note 48, at 1835 (emphasis in original).
423. Id.
424. 1 recall that somewhere Scott Fitzgerald observes that, if a writer creates a character, he
inevitably creates a type; but if he creates a type, he creates nothing.
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familiar pattern? A "type" of intellectual response is identified, much as
a detective might explain an otherwise esoteric sort of criminal behavior.
A list is drawn up of suspects, then the detective explains "the one thing
they always overlook." Having set the stage, all the characters are
summoned to a meeting in the drawing room. Then, the fatal flaw in the
criminal's approach is exposed, and an arrest is made. A few wise
reflections on the vagaries of mankind close the scene.
In The Constitution of Conscience, the detective is not Basil
Rathbone's Holmes, 4' but rather Michael Caine's, not David Suchet's
Hercule Poirot, or even Peter Ustinov's, but rather Peter Sellars's. Where
else does one find the exquisite examples of aggressive blunderingquotations deployed as rapiers that turn out to be spring-loaded umbrellas, 4' aerosol cans of mace fired only to reveal the nozzle has been
reversed, spraying the person holding down the button, obtuse characterizations of great authors, opaque and delphic quotations from lesser
ones, all expressed with a sublime tenacity and a rigid smile, and then, the
dramatic unmasking that discloses... a misquotation, a misunderstanding,
the detective's own (dare I say?) parapraxis. Finally, of course, we have
the epigrammatic observation without which the play would be incomplete.
It is almost too much. How, one wonders, can the detective have the selfcontrol, the utter lack of self-doubt, to be able to pull this off?. But there
it is: "Detection," he reminds us, with a half-smile playing beneath his
worldly mustache, "detection is not just a game; it is an activity!" And
thus, Winter ends his paper with the dramatic, culminating caption: "Forms
of Justice? Forms of Life."427
It will be recalled that I deferred a discussion of Professor Winter's
introductory analysis, which set the terms for his paper. With the dramatic
paradigm in mind, let me now review, in closing, that structure.
1. The Setting.-Winter begins with a hypothetical taken from Jeremy
Paul that posits a society that uses counsellors much as we use lawyers.
These counsellors study maxims and precedents before advising clients on
important life-choices. "Inevitably, however, some brash young scholar
at one of the elite university schools makes a startling discovery: Every
maxim appears to have a counter-maxim that, in any given case, could be
applied with equal plausibility."428

425. Sherlock Holmes, not Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
426. Winter's essay begins with this epigram: "Nowhere more than in law do you need armor
against that type of ethnocentric and chronocentric snobbery-the smugness of your own tribe and your
own time." Winter, supra note 48, at 1805 (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON

OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 44 (2d ed. 1951)). This is an admonishment that is almost uniquely well
suited to his own efforts to bring cognitive theory to bear on legal problems.
427. Id. at 1833 (emphasis in original).
428. Id. at 1806.
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2. The Cast of 7pes.-"Traditionalists" maintain that this body of
maxims is an authoritative repository of the objective wisdom of the culture
and claim that counsellors properly trained in their craft are able to resolve
problems entirely by resort to the body of maxims.429
"Critics"-whom Winter refers to as adherents to "counselling lore
semiotics" or "cls"-maintain that the system of contradictory proverbs
cannot itself generate solutions and accordingly accuse Traditionalists of
mystifying their profession in order to advance their claims to power and
wealth. 4'
"Wittgensteinians" also appear in the cast. They are summoned to
point out that both Critics and Traditionalists assume that the legitimacy of
counselling depends upon establishing sufficient truth conditions for the
maxims: Traditionalists believe, because the maxims correspond to objective states of affairs (for example, the facts of a case or the holding of a
precedent), these maxims can be verified. Critics contend that there are no
independent, external referents and regard truth conditions entirely as a
matter of convention. Both thus assume that counselling maxims are
representational, that is, they can have meaning only insofar as they
correspond to the facts about the world. "Consequently, they think that the
maxims stand in need of justification."431 But the Wittgensteinian,
Winter says, holds that maxims are actually "constitutional... [they] are
432
not statements about the world, but a means of engagement with it.
Thus, legitimacy is measured by the conformity of the practice to the
traditions of the practice itself; justification is irrelevant to legitimacy."
3. The Crime.-Someone in the house party is concealing the matter
of indeterminacy, while claiming the problem of legitimacy has been
resolved.
4. The Investigation.-The likeliest suspect, the Traditionalist, is
examined first. His long record of hiding behind allegedly objective rules
is paraded before the assembled party. He defends himself by relying upon
claims about "proccss" and is dismissed. He has the motive, perhaps, but,
since the days of Legal Realism, he has not had the opportunity. Next, the
Critic is questioned. Is her expos6 of the system merely a ruse? But the
Critic is dismissed too. She may be guilty of other things, but hiding
indeterminacy is not one of them.
Finally, the Inspector turns to the Wittgensteinian. When questioned,
the Wittgensteinian claims that indeterminacy is built into the system,
necessarily, and that furthermore, it is a good thing because it ensures the

429. See id. at 1807.
430. See id.
431. Id. at 1808. Here, we have to assume that Winter is using a shorthand and that he means
that the "legitimacy of the practice stands in need of an external justification."
432. Id. (emphasis in original).
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role of moral decision by the individual conscience. But the inspector
points out that this alleged excuse is often offered by suspects, that it is
"boringly familiar."43 Moreover, the question of justification now arises
again: "[W]hat justifies the choices of the individual conscience? " '
Whereas the Wittgensteinian had earlier managed to elude the problem of
infinite regress by discarding the question of justification, he has now
recreated it.
5. The Scene in the Drawing Room.-Under this close examination,
the Wittgensteinian confesses that "U]ustification comes after decision";43 it is always a matter of applying an external standard to the
decision (as opposed to recapitulating the process by which the decision
was reached).
Aha! The Inspector explains:
The move is predictable because there is nowhere else . . . for a.
Wittgensteinian to go except to some other, entirely distinct practice.
And it is telling precisely because it can tell us so little about what
it means for an individual conscience to decide. If the conscience
does not engage in moral theorizing, then in what language-game is
it engaged when it does decide? If that language-game is the lore
itself, then what is added by the resort to conscience? And if the
conscience is engaged in some language-game other than the lore,
then what is the form of life that characterizes that activity? What
...is the form of life that constitutes conscience?"
Here, "one is left only with silence"! 7
Muffled applause. Perhaps the exits are sealed to prevent the
Wittgensteinian from escaping.
But hold on. Does this histrionic summation really make sense? For,
one's conscience is not engaged in any language game at all when one
decides. Not every form of life is a language game-remembering a passage in a concerto, for example, or deciding to go to sleep. It is not the
clinching moment of detection to show that the Wittgensteinian does not
identify the conscience as part of the reciprocal moves of a language game.
It is simply the Inspector's mistake to expect otherwise: the sort of critic's
mistake-the map of types-that arises from faulting the writer for not
meeting the expectations inhering in the type. In fact, Wittgenstein wrote,
on this very point,

433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Id. at 1809.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1809-10 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1810.

1994]

Reflections Inspired by My Critics

1961

[g]iving grounds... justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but
the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true,
i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part;
it is our acting, which lies
438
game.
language
the
of
bottom
the
at
Now, all eyes shift back to the Inspector who coughs nervously. He
then explains that "[w]ith respect to 'the Wittgensteinian,' the careful
reader will have discerned, I trust, that this was not old Ludwig himself but
a composite."" 3
There is some disenchanted muttering among the
guests. Now, characters begin to drift from the room. Finally, only the
Inspector remains.
"If they think otherwise, they are just fooling ourselves,"' 4 he says
bitterly. Someone turns the lights out. For that is the ultimate consequence of this kind of map of explanation: it simply doesn't illuminate.
Rather, with its neologisms, its stock characters, it actually obscures.
Good night, Inspector." 1
IV. Concluding Reflections
A.

Why This Reply Is the Way It Is

Writing a paper for this Symposium presented some formidable methodological choices. I have been urged by everyone who has considered the
issue to write an essay generally discussing the themes in my work and
referring to the Symposium papers as exemplary of various interpretations,
misunderstandings, divisions of opinion, and areas of overlap and
agreement. "I would not feel obliged to say something on every author in
the symposium," wrote one of my colleagues. This seems wrong to me,
as it appears to treat the other papers as significant only when they are
illustrative. Moreover, it sacrifices the opportunity for me to demonstrate
the value I place on the understanding'of my work by exhibiting a willingness to try to obtain it from my critics. Finally, it underrates the

438. LUDWIG WTTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY § 200, at 28e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von
Wright eds. & Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscome trans., Harper Torchbooks 1972) (1969) (emphasis in
original).
439. Winter, supra note 178, at 1865-66.
440. See Winter, supra note 48, at 1835 (If we think otherwise, we are just fooling ourselves.").
441. With apologies to Professor Winter, I recall that Randall Jarrell once observed:
Since I have complained of the style and method of much of the criticism that we
read, I ought to say now that I know my own are wrong for this article. An article like
this ought, surely, to avoid satire; it ought to be documented and persuasive and
sympathetic, much in sorrow and hardly at all in anger-the reader should not be able to
feel the wound for the balm. And yet a suitable article might not do any more good than
this sort: people have immediate and irresistible reasons for what they do, and cannot be
much swayed by helpful or vexing suggestions from bystanders.
JARRELL, supra note 130, at 86.
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excellence of the criticism itself. I fear that I have naturally tended to
write this Reply as if all the answers to my critics were perfectly obvious
in the text on which they are commenting, and my only job has been to
draw attention to these answers. In fact, I have learned a lot about what
I think in the course of drafting this Essay and am grateful for that
experience.
Randall Jarrell once lamented that "[o]ur universities should produce
good criticism; they do not-or, at best, they do so only as federal prisons
produce counterfeit money: a few hardened prisoners are more or less
surreptitiously continuing their real vocations."' 2 And yet, in the same
essay, he also said, "I do not believe there has been another age in which
so much extraordinarily good criticism. . . has been written. . . . This
criticism has been extremely catholic and extremely acute; there has been
no analysis too complicated, delicate, or surprising for these critics to
undertake. "
I believe I must endorse both these observations. A glance at the law
reviews dishearteningly confirms that the universities produce an enormous
amount of legal criticism-really commentary on criticism-that exhibits
little fresh insight, and little appreciation for what insights it encounters.
The general avoidance, broken only rarely by astonished applause, of the
work of my colleague Richard Markovits is a particularly striking example.
The faddishness and mesmerized presentism that is so characteristic of contemporary American life generally is nowhere more in evidence than in
academic criticism.4 When Jarrell condemned the poetry criticism of
his age as "not only bad or mediocre, [but] dull[,] . . . an astonishingly
graceless, joyless, humorless, long-winded, niggling, blinkered, methodical, self-important, cliche-ridden, prestige-obsessed, almost-autonomous

442. RANDALLJARRELL, ContemporaryPoetryCritcism, in KIPLING, AUDEN& CO.: ESSAYS AND
REvIEwS 1935-1964, at 58, 62 (1980). 1 have in mind those healthy spirits like my colleagues
Professors Wright, Anderson, Weinberg, Baade, and others who are not distracted by fads.
Erik Erikson once observed:
In the evaluation of the dominant moods of any historical period it is important to
hold fast to the fact that there are always islands of self-sufficient order-on farms and in
castles, in homes, studies, and cloisters-where sensible people manage to live relatively
lusty and decent lives: as moral as they can be, as free as they may be, as masterly as
they can be.
ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER 75 (1958).
443. JARRELL, supra note 442, at 62.
444. This brings to mind a passage from Roy Campbell:
Who forced the Muse to this alliance
A Man of more degrees than parts
The jilted Bachelor of Science
And Widower of Arts
ROY CAMPBELL, On ProfessorDrennan's Verse, in SELEcrED POEMs 197 (1955).
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criticism,""' it is hard not to imagine that he had law review criticism
in mind.
At the same time, there has never been so much good work of such
ambition and scope. Compared to the legal criticism of a century ago-or
even half a century ago-the work of American critics and writers since the
Second World War is vastly superior (and far more vast), and simply more
interesting. Its very diversity alone would engulf the work of earlier eras,
work which seems pathetically narrow by comparison. At such a time,
how could I refuse to give as much attention to the criticism in this
Symposium as these critics have given to my work?
Anticipating this decision, my colleague wrote me, in that case "I
suspect almost no one will read [your essay] except those who are reading
the entire Symposium. That will presumably be a small number of readers." Then so be it. To those few, and to the participants in this
Symposium itself, and to its organizers, I offer my gratitude and this
Essay.
B.

What We Are All Writing About

Each essay in this Symposium addresses the same problem in its own
way, a problem that was also the subject of ConstitutionalInterpretation.
That book began by calling on its readers to
see what a seriously American problem is faced in this book, and
placed right in the center of American hopes, as a vortex and turning
point. Some will be unable to take seriously ideas that implicitly
disavow the most fundamental assumptions of our age about progress
and justice on what might be sarcastically called philosophical
grounds. But others will learn how to work with constitutional
materials for the first time to reach a validation, or instance, of the
very point of view I am urging.'
Sometimes the centrality of this problem is more obvious than at other
times.
This problem is: How does a society that has decided to take moral
responsibility for its fate actually make decisions that fulfill that
responsibility? Powell is perhaps the one most obviously concerned with
this question because he is attempting to place the moral element in
American judicial decisionmaking in an environment that is self-consciously
an autonomous practice. But this is no less true of Amar's paper, which
points the way to how the methods of teaching that practice would be
different (they would focus consciously on the modalities) and how

445. JARRELL, supra note 130, at 65.
446. BOBB
INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at xviii-xix (emphasis in original).
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scholarship would be different (the focus of political theory would be
relevant in a different way-for example, the legitimating force of our
practices would liberate us to contemplate changes in advance of, and
indeed without reference to, a justificatory ideal 7 and at the same time
constrain us when contemplating such ideal systems). Mark Tushnet,
though I criticized him at length in the Stanford Law Review for taking a
unitary, prudential point of view in constitutional theory,' graciously
shows in the very piece published here (and in others) that he is willing to
address the "change in subject" I have been attempting to bring about. 9
One way to characterize this shift is as a shift from truth to meaning. This
is the shift from the modem to the postmodern. Jack Balkin wittily, and
with easy erudition, sets the context for my claims that the modalities use
conflict as a way of creating values. He is the clearest example of the
postmodernist addressing the postmodern in these pages. Stephen Griffin
is the first, as far as I know, to group a set of contemporary thinkers
together around the proposition that constitutional law acts to hold opposite
views in tension in a way that requires agreement on the practice itself.
Steven Winter, in his efforts to make us aware of the meta-narratives that
he believes guide and structure our understanding, is a postmodernist of
obviously high intelligence and broad learning. He would be impossible
not to take seriously, and stakes out a unique interest, as far as I am aware,
in the application of cognitive theory to law. Dennis Patterson seems to
me to oppose the postmodern to the postmodernist, but I may be reading
my own hopes into this ambitious and powerful writer. At any rate, I am
sure, regardless of his position on the debate I have sketched here, that he
sees the understanding of law as accessible without mediating or justificatory devices, a key move to the postmodern. I would not be surprised
to find that, in the future, we come to look to his writings as the basis for
a postmodern jurisprudence, just as we will look to Balkin's to understand
postmodernist jurisprudence, whatever his ultimate assessment of that
movement. For Sanford Levinson, these developments must be seen, in
part, as a natural outgrowth of his work on American attitudes toward the
Constitution as a scriptural document and his original description of

447. See Amar, supra note 131, at 1704. This view of American institutions is captured by Owen
Fiss's observation, in an article rather courageously entitled Against Settlement, that adjudication
"American[-Istyle is not a reflection of our combativeness but rather a tribute to our inventiveness and
perhaps even more to our commitment" because it provides the way by which constitutional adjudication is made a means to achievingjustice. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1090 (1984).
448. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, supra note 15.
449. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretation, Character,and Experience, 72
B.U. L. REV. 747, 756 (1992) ("I no longer believe that constitutional theory constrains or is supposed
to constrain Justices. Rather, as Bobbitt argued, it serves primarily to provide a set of rhetorical
devices that Justices can deploy as they believe effective.").
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American jurisprudence, so often adopted by many other writers, as
radically "Protestant."'
It is as if the law, which functions as a means
of precipitating our values, also works in the opposite direction: reassuring
us of commitments that constitute us as a people. This is not a "modem"
idea, so much as a "postmodern" idea, and I should observe that, in
addition to so much else in my field, Levinson was the first to provide a
volume collecting and describing the hermeneutic turn. 451
C. Which Map I Provided
The map I offer is this kind of map: like the famous graphic that
represents the London underground, it is not topographically representative, though it aims to be topologically accurate; it is not a depiction,
though it can help clarify things on the surface.4 52 Its greater value (if
it has value) lies when it is followed to a destination you may have often
visited but were unsure of properly locating once you thought about it.
The maps in this Symposium show what destinations I have made the
object of my rendering, which routes I have chosen. They are not paths.
One might say my critics' maps provide transparent overlays, rich with
insights and descriptions and explanations, that re-imagine the maps I have
myself drawn. For this, and to their authors, I am greatly indebted.
D. One Purpose of My Map
Constitutional Interpretation concerns the relationship between
constitutional law and jurisprudence. The standard view is that the latter
determines the former. 3 The revisionist view is that the former
determines the latter.'
I wish to sever any necessary-any but the
contingent-historical connection between the two.
E.

What My Map Is Not
One common transmutation of my argument goes like this:
Accepting the description of constitutional law as composed of
arguments drawn from the modalities-historical, textual, structural,
prudential, doctrinal, ethical-it nevertheless occurs that such

450. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-30 (1988).
451. INTERPRfETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (Sanford Levinson &

Steven Mailloux eds., 1988).
452. But see State v. Hewet, 500 A.2d 233, 237 (Vt. 1985) (recommending ConstitutionalFate
for the advocate briefing a state constitutional question).
453. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 90-91 (1986) (theorizing that jurisprudence is a
prologue to any legal decision).
454. See generally UNGER, supra note 402 (viewing contemporary doctrine as an expression of
a political and social vision of society).
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arguments conflict. When they conflict, the judge must decide
among them. In so doing, she relies on her moral convictions. Call
this a seventh modality with a trumping role, call it the socio-political
ideology of the judge, call it background morality, call it eonscieuce
if you want (Bobbitt does), but this is what happens.
Now my view, on the contrary, is that "conscience" is a name for the
act of deciding among incommensurables. It is not a language game (as
both Winter and Patterson appear to believe), and it is not an algorithm (as
Markovits may believe). It does not, therefore, depend upon the availability of a private language, nor does it induce a regress of legitimation,
because the very structure of the forms of argument require it. That an act
of conscience may be motivated by many conscious and unconscious cultural, historical, political, and moral convictions is probably true. But
these convictions cannot legitimate the act, nor is it necessary that they do
so, so long as the decisions can be retrospectively explained in terms of the
accepted modal arguments. This contrary view is analogous to the empiricist claim that an image must accompany a thought. It may, of course, but
it need not. The idea that it must is a consequence of the theoretical needs
of a certain kind of explanation. The decider may be motivated by many
virtuous or base motives-it does not matter here because these kinds of
motives cannot cause a legal decision to issue. Whether you accept this
view, you can see that it does not fit in the current galaxy of theories.
F.

One Reader Writes

In a letter to me, Patterson asks: If he cannot believe in God, must he
question, therefore, whether he can have the sort of faith that is necessary
for conscience, because he wishes to have the sort of conscience that is
necessary for just acts in the American system.'5
Does Patterson believe in the pricelessness of human beings because,
of all earthly things, human beings are capable of love? To maintain this
belief in the face of the inevitable pricing of human worth requires faith.
Does Patterson believe that our decisions are impossible to explain causally
because they are the products of free will? To maintain this belief in the
face of the usual modern explanation requires faith. Does he believe that
our legal decisions are inevitably moral because-not in spite of-the factladen, culture-laden nature of legal judgment that cannot be captured by an
external moral calculus (because the decider is also the critic, the observer
is the participant) and thus requires an account be given in its own terms,
which alone can satisfy the conscience? As I read Patterson, he does
believe these things; I doubt that he would deny that such a position

455. Letter from Dennis Patterson to Philip Bobbitt, supra note 203.
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requires faith, whereas the explanatory view requires only conviction-the
firm belief that you are right because you know better, because there is
something about knowing that you know. You know, or think you know,
that it can all be explained.
However he may achieve this faith, whatever his religious views, if
any, is Patterson's business and his affair. The more it is needed, the
more that grace aboundeth.
G. The First Voice456
When Mark Tushnet alludes to my isolation from the community of
critics,457 he has it right.
Surely Goethe speaks for me when he
counsels, "Against criticism we can neither protect nor defend ourselves;
we must act in despite of it and gradually it resigns itself to this."458
Professors Balkin and Levinson, however, are not such fatalists. For
my good, they proposed and became the architects of this Symposium. I
hope they already know what I gratefully acknowledge here: that their
considerable efforts, and those of their colleagues, to bring my work to
light, and to bring their own light to it, are appreciated and treasured, for
if scholars such as they are interested in my work, then it may perhaps
have real value.
The light work sheds is a beautiful light which, however, only
shines with real beauty if it is illuminated by yet another
59
light.4

456. "The first is the voice of the poet talking to himself-or to nobody." T.S. ELIOT, THE
THREE VOIC.S OF POETRY 4 (1953); cf. CZESLAW MiLosz, Island, in BELLS IN WINTER 6 (1974).
457. Tushnet, supra note 47, at 1707.
458. RMDALLJARRELL, Poets, Crtics, and Readers, in KiPLINO, AUDEN& CO., supra note 442,
at 305, 3 10-11 (quoting Goethe).
459. LUDWIG WrENSTEIN, CULTURE AND VALUE 26e (G.H. von Wright ed. & Peter Winch
trans., 1980).

